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In the study of ideas, it is necessary to 
remember, that insistence on hard-headed 
clarity issues from sentimental feelings, 
as it were a mist, cloaking the perplex­
ities of fact. Insistence on clarity at 
all costs is based on sheer superstition 
as to the mode in which human intelligence 
functions. Our reasonings grasp at straws 
for premises and float on gossamers for 
deductions.
Alfred North Whitehead
PREFACE
This dissertation is concerned with a paradox. It is 
concerned with illustrating the paradox of man in the philo­
sophical thought of John Dewey. This is not to be taken as 
merely an exercise of philosophical criticism on the written 
ideas of Dewey, their formulations, assumptions and contradic­
tions. Nor is it merely an effort to "read between the lines" 
of the written ideas in order to ascertain a hidden or im­
plicit formulation of a theory of man which does not reflect 
the method and metaphysical position used by Dewey. The ob­
ject here is to do both— in the light of the whole purpose of
John Dewey, the man and the philosopher. It is in such a pro­
cedure that the paradox appears. One comes to ask about 
Dewey: is he primarily of philosopher of man, or is he basi­
cally a thinker who perpetuates a naturalistic world view, and 
only then focuses on the problems of men through its methods? 
There is, however, no clear answer.
Perhaps in no man’s thought are there clear answers
to such a question, for to care about man and his situation 
is the potential which must necessarily initiaue and support 
the efforts of a philosopher of man. To act on such a care 
is to specifically define man's situation and to assume a
concrete method for his development. To act on one's care is 
to limit its potential of action to a specific sphere and 
method. Philosophy criticizes, logically, sphere and method? 
it can but feel and guess at man's care for man. John Dewey 
is criticized here in terms of sphere and method; the overall 
meaning of his life and work, however, must be judged by a 
much broader criterion.
Dewey quoted William James as saying the "every phi­
losopher is motivated by some bogey in the background that he 
wants to destroy." Dewey agreed, and added that "failure to 
realize what it is that a philosopher feels the pressure of 
and wants to get rid of is one of the main sources of the in­
fertility of philosophical controversy.For Dewey this 
"bogey" was the problems of men, expressed in relation to two 
historical schools dealing with these problems. Dewey, as a 
student, first reacted to the disintegrative effect on modern 
civilization of fractured individualism born of the industrial 
age and philosophically backed by the scientific atomism of 
empirical philosophy which accompanied the expanding capital­
istic/industrial scene. Dewey accepted an Hegelian stance of 
idealistic organicism to units the atomistic elements of the 
empirical school, but later reacted to the idealistic scheme 
because of what it implied for man in relation to the greater 
emphasis on the universal or the Absolute. Dewey came to
^John Dewey, "The Philosophy of William James," South­
ern Review, Vol. II, No. 3 (Winter, 1937), p. 453.
vii
feel that such an idealism once again lost sight of that very 
essence which he sought to save: the integrated, but indi­
vidual human being. Only after Dewey had rejected the ex­
tremes of these two schools of thought did he take what he
considered the more valuable elements of both and seek to prc-
2
pound a philosophy of organic naturalism.
It was on the basis of a philosophy of organic natu­
ralism, developed for the purpose of dealing with the problems 
of human beings, that Dewey called for the reconstruction of 
philosophy. Pre-scientific philosophies dealt with the prob­
lem of knowing Reality, of finding the eternal. Post- 
scientific thought dealt more with astronomy, physics, biology, 
anthropology and historical learning:
Nevertheless, the most striking fact about these mod­
ern philosophies is the extent in which they exhibit 
the influence of the postmedieval movements in poli­
tics, industry and science, but without having sur­
rendered the old, the classic, view that the chief 
business of philosophy is search for a kind of 
Reality that is more fundamental and more ultimate 
than are or than can be the facts disclosed by the 
sciences.3
Dewey asserted that this was a "dualism" resulting in an em­
phasis on both the material world and on the "true" and "eter­
nal" world of final truths. This, in turn, caused an emphasis
2
The specific development is recorded in this writer's 
M. A. thesis, "The Early Development of the Conceptions of 
Social Psychology and the Social Organism in the Philosophy of 
John Dewey" (unpublished Master's thesis. University of Okla­
homa, 1969) „
^John Dewey, The Problems 'f Men (New Y:rk- Philo­
sophical Library, 1946), p. 6.
viii
on the conditions of knowing, and the problem of knowledge be­
came the chief "problem" of philosophy.
The more actual knowings flourished, the more philoso­
phies, mutually contradictory among themselves, occu­
pied themselves with furnishing 'Foundations for Knowl­
edge,' instead of employed what is known to direct it 
in discovering and performing its own task.
The search for knowledge was primary, for in a dualism the 
problem of one element knowing about the other demands a com­
mon ground— a lack of which is precisely that which originally 
instituted the dualism. The immensity of the problem called 
for basic occupation with the conditions of knowing, and not 
of its consequences. Using knowledge for the intelligent con­
duct of the affairs of human life— wisdom slowly receded into 
the background of philosophical thought, Dewey asserted, and 
philosophy came to occupy itself with a task which is no 
longer humanly pertinent.^  However, for him philosophy had to 
deal with the deeply human and moral issues of the present 
time— it had to deal with the consequences of knowledge and 
not exclusively with the conditions of it. Dewey proposed, 
therefore, that inquiry should devote itself to systematic in­
vestigation of the consequences of science, its state of de­
velopment, and to the question about why it had not been ap­
plied to institutions which affected the conditions of human 
life. While science had been used for economic purposes, it 
had not been employed to determine freely the moral, humane
4 5
Ibid., pp. 5-7, Ibid., p. 7.
IX
ends of practical conditions and the actual state of ends and 
6
values. Why science? Dewey answered that it was the "best 
tested resource that inquiry has at command . . . "  and that 
the problems of men "demand the most systematic reflective 
attention that can be g i v e n . D e w e y  acknowledged his almost 
"childlike" trust in science, but considered that those who 
had accused him of having too much trust in it did not under­
stand that scientific method had not even yet begun to reach 
ics maturity— and it would not reach such maturity until it
g
was applied to "all aspects of all matters of human concern." 
Dewey was careful to point out that his use of science, under 
the names of pragmatism, experimentalism and instrumentalism, 
was different from that of other philosophies of science, and 
he made reference to the logical positivists. The latter be­
lieved the methods of science were the only acceptable methods, 
but they took such a strict view of scientific verifiability 
that value statements and statements of ends valuative in 
character were not verifiable and therefore not allowable in 
the process of knowledge. Dewey noted that this reduced 
science and its achievements to mere means for ends not re­
flected upon by any rational method, thus loosing devastating
9
irresponsibility upon society. Prom this criticism, one
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 12.
Q
Ibid., p. 11. (Emphasis added).
9
Cf. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: 
Random House, The Modern Library, 1930), pp. 257-258.
understands Dewey's emphasis on the necessity of the availa­
bility of science in the areas of human morals and values, 
and specifically in the "projection of liberal hypotheses as
to ways in which the required social change may be brought 
10
about." Science is responsible not only for means, but for 
ends as well; in fact, the definitions of ends and means be­
come blurred by using the same empirical criterion of their 
verifiability.
It is this emphasis on the viability of the methods 
of science in the realm of human morals, values and ends, and 
its subsequent blurring of traditional distinctions, which be­
comes the focal point of the critique of Dewey's sphere and 
method. Applying the scientific method, even quite broadly 
conceived, to human morals, values and ends has the effect of 
"flattening" certain characteristics of the activities of man 
to conform with the demands of method. While Dewey was aware 
of this process, the full implications were not thoroughly de­
veloped. There is an example of foreboding import in Problems 
of Men. Dewey defended himself against the charge of "rela­
tivity" and pointed out that this was characteristic of all 
scientific inquiry. "For the latter also finds its only work­
able 'standards' are provided by the actual connections of
^%ewey, Problems of Men, p. 11. Also of. John Dewey, 
Logic, Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1938), p. 503.
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things; connections which, when they are generalized, are 
given the name of space-time. Dewey then wrote:
Dependence upon space-time connections now marks 
all the victories won by scientific inquiry. It is 
silly to suppose they terminate in mere particulars.
On the contrary, they constantly move toward the gen­
eral, provided only the generalizations have to do 
with wider and wider connections, so as not to swim in 
wordy vacuity. And so it is with a philosophy that 
employs the methods and conclusions of authentic in­
quiry as instruments for examination of values that 
now operate in regulation of human habits, institu­
tions and efforts. No span of connections in space­
time is too wide or too long, provided they are rele­
vant to judgment of issues that are urgently here-and- 
now.l
Scientific method, no matter how broadly conceived, deals with 
empirical verification in the space-time world. There was an 
implicit assumption in Dewey that human values, moral and 
aesthetic, and human ends, purposes, were fully available to 
the space-time methods of empirical science. No matter if 
science is conceived experimentally and instrumentally as 
"our best resource for solving problems" and not an absolute 
in itself, it is still used as such— thus defining the objects 
of its use within the assumptions of its own procedure, i.e., 
the space-time empirical method. When one considers the natu­
ralistic world view which Dewey assumed to support the broad 
claims of science, one notices how close science does come to 
an absolute value— the very thing which Dewey elsewhere was 
concerned with criticizing through the "relativist" method of 
science itself. It was an unfortunate choice of words in
^^Ibid., p. 13. (Emphasis added). ^^Ibid.
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this discussion in Problems of Men, where Dewey said man's
"intellectual instrumentalities . . . need sterilizing,"
which causes one to ask just how sterile the concept of man
and his value structure has become when defined solely through
13
reference to the instruments of empirical science.
It is the purpose of this dissertation to explore how 
Dewey defined the world in which man lives and how this defini­
tion reflects on man himself and on his values, morals, aes­
thetics and ends. Why did Dewey, whose primary care was evi­
dently man and not cosmology, define man so far down the lad­
der in a cosmological model? The possibility is here explored 
that man, for the man John Dewey, was not merely or simply the 
creature defined by the method he assumed in order to solve 
man's problems, but that there was, indeed, a second view of 
man not at all presupposed by the methodological considera­
tions. Through such a study, one begins to perceive the para­
dox of man in the philosophy of John Dewey.
~^Ibid., p. 16.
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THE PARADOX OF MAN IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF JOHN DEWEY
CHAPTER I 
SCIENCE AND THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEME
The distinction between science and philosophy is not 
a sharp one in the thought of John Dewey. "For what 'science' 
means is simply the most authentic knowledge of nature, man, 
and society that is possible at any given time by means of the 
methods and techniques then and there available."^ Philosophy 
adds nothing to this; it is but another name for it, and it is 
relatively unimportant which name is used as long as the pro­
cess is one in which the most systematic reflective attention 
2
can be given. If any difference can be made between the two 
terms, it is that philosophy is concerned with "the values and 
ends that known facts and principles should subserve." But 
since this concern is only toward action in effecting the ends
John Dewey, "The Determination of Ultimate Values or 
Aims Through Antecedent or a Priori Speculation or Through 
Pragmatic or Empirical Inquiry," Thirty-seventh NSSE Yearbook. 
Part II, ed. by G. M. Whipple (Bloomington, 111.: Public
Schocl Publishing Co., 1938), p. 473.
2
John Dewey, "Introduction," The Problems of Men,
p. 12.
2and values in question and not in establishing any superior 
knowledge or reality, the criterion of the method of science 
is as relevant here as in establishing known facts and princi­
ples . ^
The concern with showing the relevance of science in 
more areas than it has been traditionally assigned is philo­
sophic, but the way that this is done and the criterion of 
success are those of science. Science and philosophy are both 
inquiry— inquiry concerned with ascertaining and experimentally 
modifying the activity of things in terms of consequences. It
is not unduly concerned with the conditions of knowledge, per 
4
se, nor is there undue stress on the conditions of the method 
of science itself and the scheme of the universe which sup­
ports its claim to be relevant in all physical and human condi­
tions: the naturalistic explanatory scheme of reality.
When science is used by man to know and manipulate the 
physical world about him, little or no judgment is made about 
man himself. In such situations man is the scientist, the doer, 
the purposeful agent who describes the ends the means to which 
science provides. If science is viewed as nothing more than 
this, the horizon of man's meaning and activity is only par­
tially described by empirical methods, and the possibility of 
other methods knowing and judging is not only left open, but
^Dewey, "The Determination of Ultimate Values," p. 474. 
4
Dewey, "Introduction," Problems of Men, p. 7.
3encouraged. In a situation as is thus described, the only 
conflict between different portions of the horizon of possi­
bilities of man is found when one method pronounces itself 
adequate to the understanding of all things. It claims to be 
the absolute judge of reality and proceeds to define all ac­
tivities on its own criteria. Unfortunately, the history of 
man's thought is filled with much confusion and little posi­
tive benefit for demanding existential problems. The conflict 
of assumed supernatural absolutes, usually in the form of 
religious dogma, but also in political, economic, and social 
dogma, has made progress in these areas of man's concern dif­
ficult, if not impossible. It has also made the possibility 
of such horizons existing peacefully side by side seem highly 
remote. If only one could be made dominant, and the others 
subservient, then the progress of man could be assured; but 
in history, such an attitude has been precisely the cause of 
the struggle of absolutes, not its conclusion. Furthermore, 
the practical results of any absolute, when given existential 
authority, have not been conspicuously successful in bettering 
the condition of man.
Such was the condition of thought which Dewey saw him­
self confronting. His solution rose out of the basis of prac­
tical need in the condition of man, not out of an allegiance 
to a historical principle for its own sake. To the questions : 
"Which absolute worked best in the past?" and "Which imposi­
tion of a general category proved itself most adequate for
4the needs of himan conditions?" Dewey did not find or seek an 
answer. What he did find was the crippling consequences of 
any supernatural absolute, in terms of theories of reality as 
well as in terms of methods. Generally, Dewey saw that most 
efforts in gaining knowledge of this world were hindered by 
the "necessity" of holding supernatural views about reality 
which were first developed because of a lack of method for 
the acquisition of existential knowledge, but later for some 
other purpose, usually the authority of custom or tradition, 
religious and secular.^ Science, the method without absolutes 
or supernatural appeal, attracted Dewey because it did not pro­
pose to judge without rigid verifiability procedures based on
"Here is the negative fact that renders argument for 
the necessity of supernatural intervention to effect signifi­
cant betterment only just another instance of the old, old 
inference to the supernatural from the basis of ignorance.
We lack, for example, knowledge of the relation of life to in­
animate matter. Therefore supernatural intervention is as­
sumed to have effected the transition from brute to man. We 
do not know the relation of the organism— the brain and ner­
vous system— to the occurrence of thought. Therefore, it is 
argued, there is a supernatural link. We do not know the re­
lation of causes to results in social matters, and consequently 
we lack means of control. Therefore, it is inferred, we must 
resort to supernatural control. Of course, I make no claim to 
knowing how far intelligence may and will develop in respect 
to social relations. But one thing I think I do know. The 
needed understanding will not develop unless we strive for it. 
The assumption that only supernatural agencies can give con­
trol is a sure method of retarding this effort. It is as sure 
to be a hindering force now with respect to social intelligence, 
as the similar appeal was earlier an obstruction in the develop­
ment of physical knowledge." John Dewey, A Common Faith (New 
Haven: The Yale University Press, 1934), p. 75. Cf. John
Dewey, Theory of Valuation, International Encyclopedia of Uni­
fied Science, Volume II, No. 4 (Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1939), p. 61.
5the natural situation, and because it had proved to be the 
one method which consistently solved the problems with which 
it was confronted.^
Science was a type of inquiry for Dewey; the specific 
procedure of the inquiry defined the method of science. This 
method is also named logic. By defining the method of scien­
tific inquiry as logic, Dewey expanded the availability of 
science to areas beyond merely the physical sciences and the 
more recent social sciences. He made available to science 
all areas of human purpose and meaning and the valuative 
structures which were substantiated by them. These areas were 
objects of thought, and logic concerned the reasonableness of 
thought. It was an assumption on Dewey's part that such a 
logic encompassed the full realm of human valuation and pur­
posefulness , but he made this assumption for a specific rea­
son and on the basis of a particular world view.
Dewey denied that logic and method were two different 
things, but maintained that they were the same, neither pre­
supposing the other. Some, he said, thought that a specific 
method had to be constructed on the basis of an already exist­
ing logic. But this was not true, just as it was not true 
that logic, having created a method, must then continually 
criticize the method on the logic's given criteria. This was 
but another form of absolutism. Rather, Dewey thought, the
^Cf. Dewey, Logic, Theory of Inquiry, p. 61 et
passim.
6growth of logic and method was an organic process in which 
each created itself and the other, and criticized itself and 
the other. Logic, as the scientific method of inquiry, was 
not imposed upon methodology from outside, a priori, but it 
was to be seen pragmatically, as part and parcel of the evolve- 
ment of thought. The hypothesis which Dewey assumed and was 
concerned with proving in Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, was 
"that the logical principles involved in scientific method 
have themselves arisen in the progressive course of inquiry."® 
The problematic situation was the basic explanatory 
scheme in Dewey's thought. It was from this situation that 
man's intellectual and valuative activities sprang. Dewey 
continually began discussions of particular activities by 
pointing to their origin in the problematic or doubtful situa­
tion, and the case was not different when he discussed inquiry
itself: "If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the in-
9
stitution of conditions which remove need for doubt." The 
result of the inquiry was the settled condition of objective 
subject-matter, together with the readiness to act upon it
^Ibid., p. 5.
^Ibid., pp. 5-7. Cf. John Dewey, How We Think (En­
larged ed.; New York: D. C. Heath & Co., 1933), for a general, 
less technical statement of this hypothesis and the develop­
ment of the concepts upon which it is based. Dewey subtitles 
this revised s-.-.temant of his .'riginal 1910 edition as "A Re­
statement of the Relation of R- .'elective Thinking to the Edu­
cative Process."
^Ibid., p. 7.
7overtly or in imagination. The result was something of war­
ranted assertibility, not of belief, when used as a personal 
belief which was settled (no longer open to inquiry) or of 
knowledge when this term was used to mean something with its 
meaning apart from connection with and reference to inquiry. 
"The position here taken holds that since every special case 
of knowledge is constituted as the outcome of some special in­
quiry, the conception of knowledge as such can only be a gen­
eralization of the properties discovered to belong to conclu-
10
sions which are the outcomes of inquiry." Dewey thus held 
that there was no meaning apart from the inquiry, for such 
would imply a cessation of inquiry and an importation of a 
priori beliefs or an unwarranted absolutizing of operational 
knowledge. "The attainment of settled beliefs is a progres­
sive matter; there is no belief so settled as not to be ex­
posed to further i n q u i r y . D e w e y  held that inquiry and its 
methods were the primary and ultimate source of logical sub­
ject matter, an idea he attributed to C. S. Peirce.
The process of inquiry is rational as well as descrip­
tive and empirical. Since inquiry starts in a doubtful or 
problematic situation, ends as well as means are automatically 
subject matter for consideration. That is, consequences as 
well as means are drawn into the scope of scientific endeavor. 
Therefore, "through examination of the relations which exist
^°Ibid., p. 8. ^^Ibid.
8between means (method) employed and conclusions attained as
their consequence, reasons are discovered why some methods suc-
12
ceed and other methods fail." Reason or rationality, then, 
is not an affair of fixed first principles as ultimate prem­
ises introduced from outside the basic problematic situation. 
"Reasonableness or rationality is, according to the position 
here taken, as well as in its ordinary usage, an affair of 
the relation of means and consequences."^^ Reason exists 
here-now in the particular relation. It is irrational, and, 
in moral situations, evil to choose some other means than the 
means which will establish the end-in-view that will consum­
mate the problem of that situation, or to work toward some 
other end-in-view than the one which consummates the problem­
atic of that situation.
The hypothesis which is generated by inquiry toward 
specifically defining the problem in the doubtful situation and 
describing a solution, is, in itself, neither true nor false.
It is an ideal, and like reason, not established or judged 
from outside the problematic situation itself. It is rather 
judged upon the fruit of its consequences. "The deductive 
conclusion /from a principle or an hypothesis/ is used to in­
stigate and direct operations of experimental observation."
Then Dewey noted that "the observable consequences of these 
operations in their systematic correlation with one another
^^Ibid., p. 9. ^^Ibid.
finally determine the scientific worth of the deduced prin- 
14
ciple." Dewey's emphasis was not on the correctness of the 
process of deduction, but on the scientifically observable 
consequences of that deduction. This is an exceedingly im­
portant point, for it defines what the characteristic of war- 
ranged assertibility was for Dewey: namely, empirical obser­
vation. Reason, ideal hypotheses and general principles are 
not denied, but in themselves they are valueless.Only in 
an empirical verification of their existential consequences 
is their worth judged. It is important to keep in mind that 
this process of inquiry— the scientific method— is that which 
Dewey found capable of dealing with not only empirical prob­
lems, but also with social problems and the purposes and 
valuations of man.
Of primary importance in inquiry and the problematic 
situation is the theory of habit. Life is impossible without 
ways of action sufficiently general to be properly named 
habits, and every act of thought or inference is either ex­
pressing an old habit or initiating a new one.
At the outset, the habit that operates in an infer­
ence is purely biological. It operates without our 
being aware of it. We are aware at most of particu­
lar acts and particular consequences. Later, we are 
aware not only what is done from time to time but of 
how it is done. Attention to the way of doing is, 
moreover, indispensable to control of what is done. °
14
15
Tbid., p. 11. ^^Ibid., p. 40.
'ibid., p. 12. Cf. below pp. 109-114, et passim.
10
Thus Dewey, after Peirce, traced the biological origin of the 
theory of inquiry, first through observation of acts and conse­
quences, then through realization of the relations between 
acts (means) and consequences. It is at this point that in­
quiry actually begins, for at this point theories or hypothe­
ses are constructed about means/consequences and the ability 
to change them for varying conclusions. When those means 
with satisfactory consequences are generalized with regard to 
their form, and not the specific content, one has a general 
method or logic, through which further problematic situations 
may be handled. Logic, or method, based on empirical verifi­
cation, is thus a growing, organic conception. Dewey had 
faith in its potential for growth. In his opinion, science 
and its method were still in their childhood, and their matu­
rity depended on their being applied to all concerns, espe­
cially those of man's purposive and valuative activity.
When an organic, natural model is taken for the devel­
opment of inquiry and logic, there is no ontological separa­
tion made between the form of the method, the logical, and 
its content, the material. Logical principles or forms are 
not premises from which reality is deduced; rather "they are 
conditions to be satisfied such that knowledge of them pro­
vides a principle of direction and of t e s t i n g . L o g i c  is 
then, itself, subject to growth and change through the
^^Ibid., p. 13.
11
empirical investigation of its consequences. Logic is the 
method of inquiry' in a specific problemr the empirical conse­
quences of this inquiry may and do require changes in the 
method of inquiry such that satisfactory consequences are 
more easily attainable. Any absolute principle of method 
would destroy the synthesis of method and consequence.
In speaking of the primary relationship of the organ­
ism to the environment, Dewey denied that, strictly speaking, 
the organism and the environment were "given" as independent 
things and that interaction was a third and dependent thing 
which finally intervenes. The integration of the organism 
and the environment is a complete thing, a whole. To speak 
of "integration" as an assimilation of separate entities is 
to confuse the subject, for Dewey described organism and en­
vironment in terms of one another. The organism is a part of 
the larger world and is an organism only in terms of the ac­
tive connections with its environment. Environment is also
18
characterized only as it interacts with the organism. Thus 
one understands Dewey as having said that the poles of the 
relationship of world and organism exist only as they are in­
tegrated or related. The relations establish them both, not 
the other way around. The dynamic nature of things is toward 
reintegration as long as life continues. The same thing is 
said of the activity of inquiry, and provides its organic
^®IMd., pp. 33-34.
12
basis. Inquiry begins only when the original integration is 
destroyed. Tension builds, search for new reintegration is 
started and consummation concludes it. Thus, inquiry has not 
only a biological basis in that men do it, but it also con­
forms to the biological form of original integration, disin-
19
tegration and movement toward a new integration. The pro­
cess is continual, not merely in the sense of time taken in 
its process, but also the process itself— the continual transi­
tion effected in existential material toward the new integra­
tion.^ *^  The mental operations of logic as method deal both 
with the material and the symbols of the material, but both 
are to be seen in the light of the existential conditions and 
consequences and not in themselves.
Dewey assigned the term "naturalistic" to this ap­
proach. He noted that this means there is no breach of con­
tinuity between operations of inquiry and biological/physical 
operations, and that "rational operations grow out of organic
activities without being identical with that from which they 
21
emerge." These rational operations continue to be relevant 
only as long as they remain within the naturalistic framework, 
i.e., are judged consequentially by empirical observation.
But "conceptions derived from a mystical faculty of intuition 
or anything that is so occult as not to be open to public 
19
Ibid., p. 34. The analogy to Hegelian dialectic is
obvious.
^°Ibid., p. 246. ^^Ibid., p. 18.
13
inspection and verification (such as the purely psychical for
22
example) are excluded." One cannot overstress, in Dewey's 
thought, the importance of the organic basis of logic and the 
requirement that all thought, ideals and reason itself, be 
finally judged on the basis of existential activity through 
the verifiability criterion of empirical science.
The basic importance of logic and scientific method—  
that which makes logic a viable method— is that it is rooted 
not in intuitive, assumed absolutes, but in the conditions of 
life itself.
Modification of both organic and environmental ener­
gies is involved in life-activity. This organic fact 
foreshadows learning and discovery, with the conse­
quent out-growth of new needs and new problematic situ­
ations. Inquiry, in settling the disturbed relation 
of organism-environment (which defines doubt) does not 
merely remove doubt by recurrence to a prior adaptive 
integration. It institutes new environing conditions 
that occasion new problems.
The learning that takes place enables the organism to become
aware of new and more complex problems. It establishes forms
to handle these problems, and it continues to modify those
forms as the problems demand. There is no such thing as a
final settlement in such a procedure. Then,
. . .  in the stage of development marked by the emer­
gence of science, deliberate institution of problems 
becomes the objective of inquiry. Philosophy, in 
case it has not lost touch with science, may play an 
important role in determining formulations of these 
problems and in suggesting hypothetical solutions.
22 23 24
Ibid., pp. 18-19. Ibid., p. 35. Ibid.
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Dewey noted that when philosophy ceased this endeavor and pro­
posed to find comprehensive and final solutions, it ceased to 
be inquiry.
Looking at the world from a naturalistic standpoint, 
as did Dewey with special attention to organic development, 
the problem of mind-body dualism does not appear. The pro­
cess Dewey used to show that such a dualism in his thought 
was impossible is quite interesting, and becomes exceedingly 
relevant to later discussions. Dewey noted that the "older 
Greek conception that the difference / between the material
and the mental_J was one in the type of organization of common
25
materials and processes, was lost from view." Dewey at­
tempted to regain this view by way of analyzing experience.
Is experience only of empirical objects (as in scientific 
verification), or is it merely personal (as a mental or per­
sonal state of mine)? This becomes the problem of the rela­
tion between material that is observed and subject matter 
that is conceived or thought of. Is the first only empirical 
and the second only rational? Dewey answered that "in a 
proper conception of experience, inference, reasoning and con­
ceptual structures are as experiential as is observation, and 
that the fixed separation between the former and the latter 
has no warrant beyond an episode in the history of culture." 
The position which Dewey took "implies that logic is empirical
^^Ibid., p. 36. ^^Ibid., p. 38.
15
in that its subject-matter consists of inquiries that are pub-
27
licly accessible and open to observation."
Dewey did not consider the object experienced and the 
thought about that object to be anything but two parts of one 
process: inquiry, or logic. The object itself is secondary,
the thought about the object is secondary; but, using them 
both to change conditions, they are judged by the value of 
their consequences, and are so judged empirically. Logic or 
inquiry is thus "experiential in the same way in which the 
subject-matter and conclusions of any natural science are em­
pirical; experiential in the way any natural science is ex­
periential, that is, as distinct from the merely speculative
28
and from the a priori and intuitional." The facts of the
object out there, the fact of our thoughts about it, are not
in themselves meaningful, but are so only insofar as they act—
what they What they do is itself judged empiracally.
Thus, the fact of a consequence is judged by the same criterion
as the fact of an object out there as a condition or means.
Thought, too, is judged by this criterion— on material conse- 
29
quences.
This point is reinforced when Dewey speaks of Pure 
Reason. Pure Reason, or intuition, is supranaturalistic and
~^^ Ibid., p. 39. ^^Ibid.
29One is inclined to ask if Dewey has solved the mind- 
body problem or just denied it by narrowing the concept of 
mind to fit empirical criteria.
16
thus when introduced into the field of inquiry in the natural­
istic, biological situation, it destroys the continuity of
30
what it is that man does when inquiring. Reason, in itself, 
had the value for Dewey of anything else taken in itself.
That is, it has no positive value. Either the value of an 
idea is developed out of the biological growth of the situa­
tion, or it is introduced ab extra into the situation through 
appeal to an absolute value or being. Reason itself, and in­
tuition, are such ab extra additions to the problematic situa­
tion. Pure Reason is defined as mystical. Dewey seldom used 
the term "reason," but accepted the term "rational" or "rea­
sonable" if the elements of a logical process were found to 
have existential, empirical conditions for their fulfillment 
to the consummation of a problematic situation.
The concept of knowledge is dealt with likewise. It 
is not a "thing" which exists independent of the knowing situ­
ation, but rather knowledge is grounded or verified assertion 
about particular parts of the environment. Knowledge is a 
mediated process ; there is no immediate knowledge. Immediate 
knowledge as a concept denies, again, the process of an or­
ganic life situation. Knowledge is also "understanding" in 
the sense that it is a "seizing or grasping, intellectually, 
without questioning. But it is a product, mediated, through 
certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit, and it
*^^ Dewey, Logic, pp. 24-25. Cf. John Dewey, Experience 
and Nature (Chicago: Opencourt Pub., 1926), pp. 67-58, 435-36.
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presupposes prior experiences and mediated conclusions drawn 
31
from them." The specific object of attention in a situation 
is an object of knowledge, but it is not complete within it­
self without continual and final reference to the situation 
in which it is found. "It is only when an object of focal ob­
servation is regarded as an object of knowledge in isolation 
that there arises the notion that there are two kinds of knowl­
edge, and two kinds of objects or knowledge, so opposed to 
each other that philosophy must either choose which is 'real'
or find some way of reconciling their respective 'reali- 
32
ties'." Knowledge in itself, for its own sake, or intro­
duced ab extra into a situation as a premise, just as Pure 
Reason in itself, was rejected by Dewey. Again, the criterion 
of this rejection is finally that such an introduction de­
stroys the natural, biological continuity of the situation 
and provides that nonempirical facts (the existence of which 
Dewey did not deny) be judged on some other criteria than 
their arising from and being judged by empirical conditions.
^^Ibid., p. 143. 
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Ibid., p. 57.
CHAPTER II
SCIENCE AND COMMON SENSE
Chapter I was an effort to express the basic issues 
in Dewey's theoretical philosophy of method found in the 
Logic. As the book itself is presented in a circular fashion, 
that is, it continually comes back to previous points to more 
adequately explain them on the basis of the intervening mate­
rial, one here follows a similar pattern.^ Using distinctions 
made earlier, Dewey turned his attention to one of the more 
revealing problems in the work: the elaboration of the dif­
ference between common sense and scientific inquiry.
In this particular development, one becomes conscious 
of two distinct usages of the word "science." Dewey had gone 
to some length in his works to note that science must be used 
in the social and valuative activities of man. In the Logic 
he was concerned to show that logic, the theory of inquiry, 
had grown out of the biological conditions of the organism 
and its activities through natural processes. The
^Dewey himself notes the circularity of development in 
this work in its explanation of organic, social naturalism.
He preferred to look at it as a "spiral" development, p. 20, 
et passim. This is not an incorrect assessment of the devel­
opment of most of his works, and accounts for the equally 
circular or "spiral" development of this dissertation.
18
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transformation of animal activities into intelligent behavior 
and the particulars of that continuing process is the study 
of logic. It is the activity of an organism with its environ­
ment noting the irretrievability of overt actions. When such 
an activity can be rehearsed in symbolic or intellectual terms,
overt activity may be foregone if preview of consequences 
2
bodes ill. As Dewey explained this process, he used exclu­
sively the empirical verifiability principle and called the 
whole procedure "science." Perhaps one should be careful to 
call this an "application of scientific method" because here 
there is a very definite and limited concept of science qua 
science apart from the use of scientific method in other 
areas.
Dewey said that a man dealt in common sense when he 
thought and adapted his environment around him for immediate, 
direct involvement now— for pressing problems. On the other 
hand, scientific inquiry deals with knowledge for its own 
sake and is not directly practical, but rather is primarily 
theoretical. Common sense problems "on their very face . . . 
need to be discriminated from inquiries that are distinctively 
scientific or that aim at attaining confirmed facts, 'laws' 
and theories. Common sense problems are such as "constantly 
arise in the development of the young as they leam to make 
their way in the physical and social environments in which
2 3
Dewey, Logic, p. 57. Ibid., p. 61.
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they live; they occur and recur in the life-activity of every
adult, whether fanner, artisan, professional man, law-maker
or administrator; citizens of a state, husband, wife, or 
4
parent." Dewey emphasized the ordinary affairs of common 
life, but equally emphasized that it implied discernment of 
significance, value, and had a distinctively intellectual con­
tent. The basic criterion of common sense inquiry is that it 
deal with "use and enjoyment." Common sense also deals with 
the group, the social or common problems and meanings. Com­
mon sense problems "have something of the same ultimacy in 
immediacy for a group that 'sensations' and 'feelings' have 
for an individual in his contact with surrounding objects. 
Dewey emphasized the regulative and normative qualities to 
which common sense problems address themselves. The concern 
with quality in general is the concern of common sense inquiry. 
"It is by discernment of qualities that the fitness and capac­
ity of things and events for use is decided . . . . But 
common sense is in relation to specific social and cultural 
groups and varies in content from age to nation. In the 
strictest sense, science qua science does not so vary, accord­
ing to the principle of the community of scholars who may look 
at the same objects of inquiry in the same way with the same 
results.
4 5 6
Ibid. Ibid., p. 62. Ibid., pp. 63-64.
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Common sense inquiries are concerned with qualitative 
matters and operations in distinction from strict scientific 
inquiries. The fundamental difference is "that between sig­
nificances and meanings that are determined in reference to 
pretty direct existential application and those that are de­
termined on the ground of their systematic relations of co-
7
herence and consistency with one another." Common sense in­
quiry deals with the qualitative use and enjoyment of the en­
vironment. "On the other hand, both the history of science 
and the present state of science prove that the goal of the 
systematic relationship of facts and conceptions to one 
another is dependent upon elimination of the qualitative as 
such and upon reduction to nonqualitative formulation.
If left at this, there is a definite difference be­
tween the two types of inquiry. But in the existential world 
of continuity, this is not the case, for scientific subject 
matter and methods grow out of common sense concerns in prac­
tical uses and enjoyments and then are again used in common 
sense inquiry "in a way that enormously refines, expands and
liberates the contents and the agencies at the disposal of 
9
common sense." Consequently, the specific and limited con­
cept of strict science is only an intermediate, instrumental 
device. Problems occur in life activity and are inherently
^Ibid., p. 65. ^Ibid.
9
Ibid., p. 66. Cf, below, p. 59, this statement to 
that of A. N. Whitehead's description of this same process.
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qualitative in nature. Movement to a satisfactory conclusion 
demands proper hypotheses and use of empirical fact. Science 
qua science prcrides this, but nothing more. Common sense, 
then, uses and enjoys the benefits of the facts and hypothe­
ses of strict science. Nevertheless, the ambiguous usage of 
the term "science" is everywhere apparent for Dewey continually 
called for the use of "science" in human relationships; for 
example :
In the region of highest importance to common sense, 
namely, that of moral, political, economic ideas and 
beliefs, and the methods of forming and confirming 
them, science has had even less effect. Conceptions 
and methods in the field of human relationships are 
in much the same state as were the beliefs and methods 
of common sense in relation to physical nature before 
the rise of experimental science. These considera­
tions fix the meaning of the statement that the differ­
ence that now exists between, common sense and science 
is a social, rather than a logical, matter.
How much difference is there, really, between the 
strict definition of science which Dewey proposed, and the 
broader science which he asserted must replace belief in ir­
rational, absolute and a priori considerations in social life? 
The problem is created when one considers that Dewey proposed 
common sense more fully appropriate the lempirical method 
of strict, nonqualitative science for the qualitative and 
practical needs of common sense. One looks to the problematic 
situation scheme for an answer. Any problem involves quali­
tative judgment, and the object of inquiry here is to change
^°Ibid., p. 77.
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the existential conditions such that the problem is consummated 
and life activity proceeds smoothly once again. It is a matter 
of empirical method that such an operation be successful, and 
it is judged so on the empirically verifiable consequences of 
the movement toward its fulfillment. This method Dewey called 
"science."
One of the steps of the inquiry is to ascertain just 
exactly what the problem is and to draw from experience of 
scientific law and concrete fact to establish an hypothesis. 
(This step is an appeal .to what Dewey refered to as "strict 
science," in its function of dealing exclusively with the 
quantitative facts of existence.) Then the inquiry proceeds 
to use these quantitative and abstract facts and relations in 
a qualitative situation toward the solution of the original 
problem. In short, there seem to be two sorts of science or 
scientific method here, the one dealing with strictly quanti­
tative material, the other with both the quantitative and 
qualitative. But Dewey did not really consider this a prob­
lem:
Two aspects of the disintegration which creates_the 
semblance of complete opposition and conflict {_ be­
tween science and common sense_J will be noted. One 
of them is the fact . . . that common sense is con­
cerned with a field that is dominantly qualitative, 
while science is compelled by its own problem and 
goals to state its subject-matter in terms of magni­
tude and other mathematical relations which are non­
qualitative. The other fact is that since common 
sense is concerned, directly and indirectly, with 
problems of use and enjoyment, it is inherently tele- 
ological. Science, on the other hand, has progressed 
by elimination of 'final :causes' from every domain
24
with which it is concerned, substituting measured cor­
respondences of change. It operates, to use the old 
terminology, in terms of 'efficient causation,' irre­
spective of ends and values. Upon the basis of the 
position here taken, these differences are due to the 
fact that different types of problems demand differ­
ent modes of inquiry for their solution, not to any 
ultimate division in existential subject-matter.^^
While Dewey nowhere denied that the existential sub­
ject matter of strict science and common sense were the same, 
in almost every work he affirmed that the necessary task of 
science was precisely in defining values, morals and purposes—  
in a word, qualities. One need but take the "Introduction" to 
Problems of Men, as noted in the Preface here, as an example 
of the little patience Dewey had with a philosophy of science
which proposed that science was merely a means to other
12
method's qualitative ends. Dewey, in rejection of such a
position, noted that his own position
. . . affirms that the purpose and business of phil­
osophy is wholly with that part of the historic tra­
dition called search for wisdom— namely, search for 
the ends and values that give direction to our col­
lective human activities. It holds that not grasp 
of eternal and universal Reality but use of the me­
thods and conclusions of our best knowledge, that 
called scientific, provides the means for conducting 
this search. It holds that limitations which now 
exist in this use are to be removed by means of ex­
tension of the ways of tested knowing that define 
science from physical and physiological matters to 
social and distinctly human affairs.
^^Ibid.. p. 75.
12
Dewey, Problems of Men, pp. 8-13, et passim. Dewey 
is doubtlessly referring to the logical positivists here.
^^Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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Dewey maintained the division between the two sorts of 
“science" throughout the Logic, despite the fact that it 
seemed in contradiction to the broader idea of science that 
he generally held. He summarized his position in the Logic 
by noting:
In and of itself, the existential world is such that 
an unlimited variety of selective discriminations is 
possible. A problem decides the selection which is 
actually instituted in any given case. In what is 
called common sense, the problem is that of use- 
enjoyment. In science the generic problem is promo­
tion of controlled inquiry. Since the required con­
trol can be obtained only through the intermediations 
of abstract interrelated conceptions, inductive exis­
tential determinations are conducted with constant 
reference to institution and application of concep­
tions deductively interrelated with one another, 
while the conceptions are chosen and ordered with 
reference to ultimate existential application.
Yet, no matter how abstract and quantitative is the 
strict definition of science here proposed, it too must be, 
finally, practical and applicable to existential conditions. 
There is, indeed, no inquiry whatsoever which does not involve 
judgments of practice, and such judgments are evaluative and 
therefore qualitative in nature. Dewey said that the "conduct 
of scientific inquiry, whether physical or mathematical, was 
a mode of practice; the working scientist was a practitioner 
above all else, and was constantly engaged in making practical 
judgments: decisions as to what to do and what means to em­
ploy in doing it."^^ Further, Dewey explicitly noted that
14 IS
Dewey, Logic, p. 48% Ibid., p. 161.
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. . . judgments of practice are not a particular kind 
of judgment in the sense that they can be put over 
against other kinds, but are an inherent phase of 
judgment itself. . . . The identity of valuation judg­
ment with judgments of practice is implicitly recog­
nized in scientific inquiry in the necessity of ex­
periment for determination of data and for the use of 
ideas and conceptions— including principles and laws —  
as directive hypotheses. °
The difference here between strict science dealing 
with only quantitative facts and common sense inquiry dealing 
with qualitative judgments is blurred by the use of a scien­
tific method explicitly dealing with purposes, consequences, 
as well as means and conditions. Common sense is concerned 
with the quality and value of empirical facts which have also 
quantitative features in that they are objects available to 
empirical method. Science, defined strictly, deals with only 
the quantitative facts and relations of empirical objects, 
but in doing so evaluates them in terms of the purposes of 
the inquiry. In the final analysis, the qualitative and 
quantitative cannot be separated, for the naturalistic world 
view which Dewey accepted demands that every activity be seen 
in the light of existential transformation and consequence. 
For this reason, throughout the remainder of this disserta­
tion, the term "science" refers to the empirical method of 
warranted assertibility which is in continual growth in terms 
of organic development. It is that broader definition which 
is a direct deduction from Dewey's naturalistic world view—
^^Ibid., pp. 179-180'. ^^Ibid., p. 220 fn.
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in which distinctions of common sense inquiry, strict science,
value, ethics and aesthetics are all drawn together in the
organic, natural continuity of the world view. Thus there,
theoretically, but one method inquiry: the logic which rests
upon the growth of symbolic and intellectual capabilities of
man through experience and verified in terms of empirical
consequences of continued growth. Every part singled out for
specific distinction and inquiry— as is Dewey's discussion of
common sense and strict scientific inquiry— is finally but an
instrumentality of the whole, and judged finally in terms of
18
its value to the growth of the whole.
18This conclusion seems borne out by Dewey's general 
usage of the term "science" throughout the major works— and 
even in the greater part of the Logic itself. Cf. John Dewey, 
The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. by J. Ratner (New York: 
Modem Library, 1939), pp. 458-460 and especially pp. 631ff.
CHAPTER III 
SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
To this point, little mention has been made of the 
social environment which Dewey considered so important as to 
label his system one of "cultural naturalism.He thought 
that logic/inquiry/science was itself a social discipline in 
the sense that it was not merely a function of a reduction of
2
human behavior to the behavior of apes, amoebas or electrons. 
Man has culture— he "is naturally a being that lives in asso­
ciation with others in communities possessing language, and 
therefore enjoying a transmitted culture. Inquiry is a mode 
of activity that is socially conditioned and that has cultural 
consequences. The importance of this position is that every 
inquiry grows out of the cultural background. Its effect is 
a modification to a greater or lesser extent of that social 
background. The physical interaction of an organism with the 
environment is part of the more inclusive whole of the social 
environment for intelligent directionality. "Neither inquiry 
nor the most abstractly formal set of symbols can escape from
1 2 
Dewey, Logic, p. 20. Ibid., p. 19.
^Ibid., p. 20.
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the cultural matrix in which they live, move and have their 
4
being." This is why Dewey called his position "cultural 
naturalism."
The salient feature of this position is that all of 
man's methods and activities are defined as growing out of 
man's interaction with his environment, which is physical to 
be sure, but embodied in a broader cultural matrix.^ Logic, 
the theory of scientific inquiry, is a uniquely human func­
tion, developed by man for and through his interaction with 
the world and other men. While it develops from unconscious 
reactions, it progresses to abstract formal functions with 
simply the purpose of better controlling the problematic en­
vironment of man. In the process of its development, it de­
fines its creator.
Understanding the idea of culture, which was of such 
importance to Dewey, means understanding his concept of lan­
guage which is the primary attribute of culture.
'Culture' and all that culture involves, as distin­
guished from 'nature,' is both a condition and a 
product of language. Since language is the only 
means of retaining and transmitting to subsequent 
generations acquired skills, acquired information 
and acquired habits, it is the latter. Since, how­
ever, meanings and the significance of events differ 
in different cultural groups, it is also the former.
'^Ibid. ^Cf. below, pp. 130-131.
^Dewey, Logic, p. 56. An explicit and extended state­
ment of Dewey's naturalistic theory of language/communication 
is found in his Experience and Nature, Chapter Five.
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While Dewey noted that language was one of man's cultural in­
stitutions , its basic importance was evidenced by three facts :
It is (1) the agency by which other institutions and 
acquired habits are transmitted, and (2) it permeates 
both the forms and the contents of all other cultural 
activities. Moreover, (3) it has its own distinctive 
structure which is capable of abstraction as a form."^
Without language there would be no transmission of culture, 
and therefore no culture save the peculiar systems of habit 
of each individual man. Because it permeates all cultural 
activity, it is the medium by which all other institutions 
are related into a functioning whole. Yet, unless it is also 
capable of abstraction as a form, language is merely the trans­
mission and coordination of social habit.
The formal and abstractive function of language ef­
fects the "transformation of the biological into the intel­
lectual and the potentially l o g i c a l . T h e  logical, or sci­
entific, is that which is common to or available to the com­
munity of scholars. So language is "common" such that it is 
communicable.
The importance of language as the necessary, and, in 
the end, sufficient condition of the existence and 
transmission of nonpurely organic activities and their 
consequences lies in the fact that, on one side, it 
is a strictly biological model of behavior, emerging 
in natural continuity from earlier organic activities, 
while, on the other hand, it compels an individual to 
take the standpoint of other individuals and to see 
and inquire from a standpoint that is not strictly 
personal but is common to them as participants or 
■parties' in a conjoint existence. But is first has 
reference to some other person or persons with whom
^Ibid., p. 45. ^Ibid.
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it institutes communication— the making of something 
common. Hence, to that extent its reference becomes 
general and 'objective.'°
Thus language, too, must stand the empirical test of scientific 
method before it may have meaning. It must be general and ob­
jective, because its meaning does not lie in itself, but rather
in the concord of consequences when acted upon by the partici- 
10
pants. Language is composed of physical sounds, marks, and 
structures, but it is not judged on the operation of these 
physical traits; rather, these traits stand in their "repre­
sentative capacity of meaning" and this is judged only when
the participants in the communication act in concordance with 
11
one another. Agreement on the ends of action, empirically 
verified, is the final criterion of the cultural and intel­
lectual meaning of language. Culture rests upon the trans- 
mittable character of language, and its growth upon the intel­
lectual and logical character of symbolic representation.
Both the transmittability and logical character themselves 
rest upon the criterion of the "common"' which is defined as 
the empirically verifiable concordance of activity in reaction 
to the symbol.
The consequence of this discussion is that culture, 
the broader milieu— in which the purely physical is to be 
seen— is itself, just as the purely physical, judged solely
%bid., p. 46. ^°Ibid., p. 47.
^^Ibid., p. 46.
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upon its empirically verifiable consequences. Within the
final inevitable appeal to the empirical consequents, Dewey
noted the fulness and richness of the possibility of lan- 
12
guage, just as he saw the breadth of morals and aesthetics. 
It was through a similar approach that he theorized about man.
Dewey noted repeatedly that THE problem was the de­
velopment of a method for dealing with the problems of men.
The development of the theory of inquiry, logic, and the 
scientific method, is the development of an instrument reflec­
tive of the world view which will satisfactorily consummate 
problematic situations. Such situations are situations of 
man, not merely those of the physical sciences, but of all 
man's activities. Developing the method of the world-view, 
naturalism, in the specifically human milieu was, broadly, 
the chief interest of Dewey.
The subject matter of the social sciences is, like 
the natural sciences, existential— that is, it is in the real 
world and thus defined as available to empirical method. The 
social sciences are therefore branches of natural science.
The question for Dewey was not the social sphere as subject 
matter was available to scientific methodology— that was as­
sumed. The real question is if one is allowed by the social
12An interesting discussion of the different types of 
language is found in the Logic, p. 46. Cf. also John Dewey, 
"Qualitative Thought," in On Experience, Nature and Freedom, 
ed. by Richard J. Bernstein (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc.,
1960), p. 185.
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situation to actually use the method of science.  ^ Dewey 
noted, as often as was required, that "pre-scientific ideas 
and beliefs in morals and politics /_ the basic social situa­
tions __/ are . . .  so deeply ingrained in tradition and habit 
and institutions, that the impact of scientific method is
feared as something profoundly hostile to mankind's dearest
14
and deepest interests and values."
Unless inquiry is allowed to change the existential 
conditions which stand under the problematic situation which 
called forth inquiry in the first place, then there is no 
chance for science to be of value in man's situation as the 
criterion of valuative, purposive behavior. Dewey believed 
that such a situation left the continued existence of man in 
the doubt of an anarchy of vying absolutes. Since all inquiry 
proceeds within a cultural matrix which is ultimately deter­
mined by the nature of social relations, the cultural matrix 
itself must be available not only to the reflection of intel­
lect, but to its modifying activity in the form of science. 
Dewey noted that the
. . . special lesson which the logic of the methods of 
physical inquiry has to teach to social inquiry is . . . 
that social inquiry, as inquiry involves the necessity 
of operations which existentially modify actual condi­
tions that, as they exist, are the occasions of genu­
ine inquiry and that provide its subject-matter.
^^Dewey, Logic, p. 487. ^^Ibid., p. 77.
^^Ibid.. p. 492.
34
Social inquiry is not a science until it establishes "methods 
of observing, discriminating and arranging data that evoke 
and test co-related i d e a s . S u c h  ideas must then be em­
ployed as hypotheses and must be of a form such as to direct 
and prescribe operations of existential determinations of 
fact. The primary and urgent problem of social science is 
the "institution of methods by which the material of existen­
tial situations may be converted into the prepared materials
17
which facilitate and control inquiry." Dewey summarized:
In fine, problems with which inquiry into social 
subject-matter is concerned must, if they satisfy the 
conditions of scientific method, (1) grow out of ac­
tual social tensions, needs, 'troubles ;' (2) have 
their subject-matter determined by the conditions 
that are material means of bringing about a unified 
situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, 
which is a plan and policy for existential resolution 
of the conflicting social situation.
One must carefully note, however, what the scientific 
demand on the social situation does to the definition of that 
situation. What happens in the social situation cannot be 
referred exclusively to such human factors as desires, skills 
or purposes. Rather, what happens is the product of the inter­
action of physical conditions, like soil, climate, and machin­
ery, in all their variety, with the human factor. Dewey con­
cluded, therefore, that "social phenomena cannot be understood 
except as there is prior understanding of physical conditions
^^Ibid., p. 491. ^^Ibid., p. 493.
^^Ibid., p. 499.
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and the laws of their interactions." Thus, social phenomena
are not the direct objects of inquiry, qua social, but only
qua physical. Inquiry into social phenomena "is conditioned
upon extensive prior knowledge of physical phenomena and 
20
their laws." It is because past inquiry’ has been based on 
the assumption that the social is other than the physical, 
that such inquiry has made a priori and absolute claims, and 
has not solved the problems of men. Dewey refered to the re­
cent "sufficient" understanding of the biological and physi­
cal sciences of physical relations as the basis for providing 
the necessary intellectual instruments to approach social 
phenomena. "Without physical knowledge there are no means of
analytic resolution of complex and grossly macroscopic social
21
phenomena into simpler forms." The social matrix, while 
broader than the physical, rests upon the physical and must 
be reduced to the physical for sake of inspection and modifi­
cation. What is the effect of such a reduction? Dewey was
definitely aware of the problem created when scientists did
22
not regard the social consequences of their work. One be­
comes concerned to ask if Dewey was equally aware of the 
social consequences of importing the methods and criteria of 
physical sciences into human interaction.
^^Ibid., p. 492. '^^ Ibid.
21 22
Ibid. Ibid., p. 489.
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Dewey, it is shown, did not ask if the scientific 
method should be introduced into the field of human purpose 
and valuation— he asked how. The importation of the proce­
dures of physical science into human relations is not in it­
self an experimental step; Dewey assumed it is necessary for 
two reasons. First, such a method had proven viable for em­
pirical data in the past. Second, he thought he could define 
the activities of men as finally available empirically. What 
is experimental about the procedure Dewey introduced into the 
social sphere of man is the manner in which scientific method 
handles its specific subject matter: man. Dealing with the
23social situation and man introduces the moral consideration. 
The moral and evaluative aspect of man then comes to be 
treated experimentally. The traditional moral position is 
that moral judgment demands a specific conclusion: there is
a given right and wrong, and the problem is to structure be­
havior in those terms. Dewey noted that such a procedure was 
an anathema to scientific procedure. Dewey was therefore a 
blatant critic of traditional views of ethics. Science must 
operate on the assumption of ends-in-view, as instrumentali­
ties, and not as necessary truths. Evaluations must be made 
of material which is dealt with in the problematic situation. 
Such evaluations are made with an idea to the end-in-view, 
but they are not what the traditional moral stance requires.
^^Cf. below, p. 125ff.
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The material evaluated is not mere factual data sought out to 
support an already given conclusion, but rather it is evalu­
ated with the purpose of establishing the end-in-view demanded 
by this man in this situation. Dewey's instincts led him cor­
rectly to a criticism of the definition of the moral character 
of man when subsumed under a given ideal and absolute system 
of morality. This was one of the main considerations when he 
rejected his faith in the Hegelian system. The question is, 
then, to survey the extent and character of his reaction.
Dewey noted that social problems tended to be inter­
preted in moral terms. He did not deny that the human situa­
tion was a profoundly moral one, but to solve social problems 
demands intelligent handling, and this demanded that the prob­
lem be realized first, then stated with an objective intellec­
tual formulation dealing with the empirical conditions of its 
solution. Such a formulation requires abstainment from con­
cepts of sin and righteousness, good and evil, which are at­
tributed to individuals and nations and social situations. 
Dewey noted:
There was a time when desirable and obnoxious physical 
phenomena were attributed to the benevolence and malevo­
lence of overruling powers. There was a time when dis­
eases were attributed to the machinations of personal 
enemies. Spinoza's contention that the occurence of 
moral evils should be treated upon the same basis and 
plane as the occurence of thunderstorms is justifiable 
on the ground of the requirements of scientific method, 
independently of its context in his own philosophic 
system.
24
Dewey, Logic, pp. 494-495.
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The scientific procedure was the only way Dewey felt in which 
social problems could be formulated objectively. Such a 
formulation is the only approach through which amelioration 
of the unsatisfactory conditions can be undertaken with accu­
racy. Dewey thought this approach could be made viable if 
man would only use it, for the "approach to human problems in 
terms of moral blame and moral approbation, of wickedness or 
righteousness, is probably the greatest single obstacle now
existing to development of competent methods in the field of
25
social subject-matter." Moral blames and approvals are not 
evaluative in any logical sense of evaluation, nor are they 
even judgments in a logical sense, "for they rest upon some 
preconception of ends that should or ought to be attained. 
This preconception excludes ends (consequences) from the 
field of inquiry and reduces inquiry at its very best to the 
truncated and distorted business of finding out means for re­
alizing objectives already settled upon. " Dewey held that 
what was truly moral was that which furthered man's attempt 
to solve his problems, and that this could only be accom­
plished through a system of dealing with existential condi­
tions which changed them effectively to solve the problem 
which brought them to our attention. "Only an end-in-view 
that is treated as a hypothesis (by which discrimination and 
ordering of existential material is operatively effected) can
25 26
Ibid., p. 495. Ibid., p. 496.
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by any logical possibility determine the existential materials 
27
that are means."
Traditional views of morals are rejected because they 
are assumed from outside the particular social situation in 
which man finds himself. They are not conclusions from genu­
ine inquiry of past events, and they are introduced ab extra 
to the present existential condition. The scientific procedure 
is inherently evaluative because it judges what is to be used 
and how it is to be used to solve the problematic situation.
The problematic situation itself is basically evaluative, the 
very reason it exists is that it has forced itself upon the 
intellect as a valuative problem. Dewey's primary point was 
that the valuative aspect of the problem was inherent in the 
problem, and not to something else. It is in the natural situ­
ation, not brought in from elsewhere. A thing is evaluated in 
terms of the specific situation, not in terms of values sup­
posed to exist in all times and in all places. This in it­
self, however, is not a strict limiting factor on traditional 
ethical positions. It could be argued that absolute moral 
judgments are the stuff from which situational judgments are 
made, and that such absolutes exist only in the specific situ­
ations. Man is therefore judged by his situational use of 
such a priori absolutes. But Dewey did not so argue. Rather, 
he took the additional step of demanding that such evaluative
Z^ibid., pp. 496-497.
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procedures were to be made manifest "only on the basis of the
tensions, obstructions and positive potentialities that are
found, by controlled observation, to exist in the actual 
28situation." The "situation" itself is finally judged em­
pirically through scientific method.
The assumption that the specific situation is finally 
empirically available, and that any "ideal" content is in an 
intellectual reaction to the empirical situation, is supported 
and demanded by the naturalistic world view. Thus the problem­
atic quality, and all other qualities with which the problem­
atic social/moral situation deals, must be in one sense or 
another "given" in the situation. Since "social," "value" 
and "problematic" are not themselves quantities available to 
empirical observation, and are not to be brought in from out­
side the specific empirical situation, they must be given as 
already a part of the situation. They are "given" in the 
naturalistic world view.
Existences are immediately given in experience; that is 
what experience primarily is. They are not given ^  
experience but their giveness is_ experience. But such 
immediate qualitative experience is not itself cogna- 
tive; it fulfills none of the logical conditions of 
knowledge and of objects qua known. . . .
^^Ibid., p. 503.
29
Ibid., p. 522. Later it is found that intelligence, 
too, is a "given" in the situation. Cf. below, p. 135.
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Such qualities in the immediate situation are "felt," "taken," 
30
"adjudged." What exactly is this "feeling" is of importance.
Dewey noted that the quality of a situation was that which
made it a whole, a unique situation which was this situation
rather than another. Such a qualitative whole is "sensed" or
"felt;" it is not an object of discourse.
Stating that it is feIt is wholly misleading if it 
gives the impression that the situation is a feeling 
or an emotion or anything mentalistic. On the con­
trary, feeling, sensation and emotion have themselves 
to be identified and described in terms of the immedi­
ate presence of a tocal qualitative situation.
The concept of the givenness of quality is quite im­
portant in Dewey's theoretical concept of logic, and therefore 
the activity of man and finally the theoretical definition of 
man, because such qualitative wholes are precisely that which 
set the situation as problematic, which set and define the 
limits and ends within which any method of inquiry and activ­
ity of man must function. When the function of the concept 
of quality is carefully viewed, it becomes a definitive study 
of the assumptions Dewey had to make in his naturalistic world 
view. Qualities are valuative by definition. If the method 
used to solve the problems of man is to be strict scientific 
method, then value, morals, purpose, qualities and problems 
must be included within the naturalistic framework. Since 
they are not strictly the objects of an empirical investiga­
tion, they must be subsumed somewhere in order that Dewey's
^°Ibid., p. 107. ^^Ibid., p. 68.
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theory not set up a dualism of method and reality. So they 
are "given" as pervasive in whole situations— in the natural 
world. Furthermore, they are prior to cognition; they are
32
the given or the "taken" in the strict sense of that word.
They are there to be had in the relation of the human organism 
to its environment which is the specific situation. Since 
Dewey defined language as basically the transmission of mean­
ings, and as the basis of transmitted culture, the quality 
immediately felt was not culturally defined— at least not in 
its immediate specificity. Quality is, as a whole, not open 
to symbolization which is a particularizing and mediating 
function.
As has been said, a qualitative and qualifying situa­
tion is present as the background and the control of 
every experience. . . . Such qualities as are desig­
nated by 'distressing,' 'cheerful,' etc., are general, 
while the quality of distress and cheer that marks an 
existent situation is not general but is unique and 
inexpressible in words.33
Parts of the quality may be singled out, and are when they are 
felt important. These then become the facts with which science 
deals through symbolization, hypothesis and empirical verifica­
tion. But they remain, in their wholeness, simply had quali­
ties, prior to any generalization or symbolization. They are 
unique and individual. They are prior to culture and reflec­
tion, they are the creator of the problematic situation and 
thus stand under any projection of purpose and evaluation. It
^^Ibid., p. 124. ^^Ibid., p. 70.
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should be noted that even in Dewey's formulation of the theory
of the pervasive, ineffable whole of quality there is nothing
which requires the naturalistic world view or empirical
method. The latter were assumed for the prior purpose, in
Dewey's mind, of developing a systematic framework inclusive
of all activity and capable of defining such activity through
34
the method of science, in terms both of means and purposes.
The theory of organic, social naturalism through sci­
entific method was proposed by Dewey for the fulfillment of 
man in the existential world. It rests on a faith in— but is 
not deducible from— the incommensurable, inexpressible qualita­
tive whole of reality. Far from denying this, Dewey made it 
the central theme of A Common Faith. I t  is, perhaps, Dewey's 
acknowledgment of a metaphysical (ontological) stance. One 
thus should note that there are two important implications to 
be dealt with in the theory outlined in the first three chap­
ters: first, the metaphysical position which Dewey took, and
second, the implied position of man in such a metaphysics.
But Dewey denied "metaphysics" altogether. Its denial 
is, in principle, the same as his denial of Pure Reason or ab­
solute ethics. Dewey first defined metaphysics as absolute, 
a priori sets of propositions from which the world, reality
34A critical study of Dewey's concept of quality is 
to be found below, Chapter VI.
^^Dewey, A Common Faith, pp. 18-19, et passim.
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and truth had to be deduced. Then he noted that it was there­
fore not related to the specific existential situation at all—  
except by a misdirected, fantasying intellect. Consequently, 
for Dewey, the term "metaphysical" came to refer to anything 
which did not rest on empirical evidence.Dewey asserted 
that reality had to be approached through logical thinking in 
which logical forms accrue through man's use of thought reach­
ing warrantably assertible conclusions in the existential 
world. Such a thesis asserts that at first, there is a mere 
noting of consequences, but this grows to formation of a 
process of controlling conditions such that consequences are 
favorable. Then symbolization accrues, greater and greater 
modes and degrees of abstraction are attained, and a greater 
degree of control over consequences is progressively achieved 
through continually modifying the method itself. Such is what 
Dewey meant by "accruing." This is a natural process, growing 
naturally out of the organic/biological condition of man. It 
is, simply, reflective thought, if thought is continually de­
fined as resting on empirical evidence. It is inquiry, it is 
logic, it is the method of science itself— it is always
Cf. Dewey, Logic, p. 475. The more traditional use 
of the term, defined as the study of being as such, not in its 
particularity but as first principles of the natural order of 
reality, was not used by Dewey. He described metaphysics in 
the secondary meaning as anything concerned with the supra- 
physical. Dewey used the term "ontology" (traditionally syn­
onymous with metaphysics) for the study of being qua being. 
Thus, for Dewey, ontology could be subject matter for science, 
but metaphysics could not be, for the latter stood contradic­
tory to all scientific endeavor.
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true to empirical evidence. Dewey noted the continual develop­
ment of the theory as inquiry adjusted itself to actual condi­
tions through continually working in those conditions to modify 
them. Logic, when it inquires into inquiry is itself such a
circular or spiral process : "It does not depend upon anything
37extraneous to inquiry." Dewey was saying that inquiry, cor­
rectly conceived, was sufficient unto itself for both dealing 
with the world, and continually recreating itself to better 
deal with the world. Thus, Dewey thought, "it precludes rest­
ing logic upon metaphysical and epistemological assumptions
38and presuppositions." Assumptions and presuppositions them­
selves "are to be determined, if at all, by means of what is 
disclosed as the outcome of inquiry; they are not to be shoved 
under inquiry as its 'foundations'!"^® There is but one order 
of being, and that is the environment in which we find our­
selves. It can be, to a degree, changed to better suit our 
needs. To change it, one must deal with the physical reality 
of it, and but one method has proven pre-eminently successful: 
empirical science. Therefore, if all inquiry and activity is 
finally based upon what is empirically verifiable, then one 
cannot misdirect his efforts to some world of wish gone abso­
lute, i.e., "metaphysics." Thought is to direct our actions 
in the environment. It has to direct our actions when we can­
not naturally or habitually deal with the environment. Man
^^Ibid., p. 20. ^^Ibid., p. 21. ^^Ibid.
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40is a creature of habit, not reason, but man can assume ra­
tionality. Yet such reason— as is habit, as is the world in 
all its profusion and particularity, and as is man— is finally 
defined by the criterion of the naturalistic view of existence: 
empirical verifiability of its consequences.
Such is the basic outline of Dewey’s theoretical posi­
tion of the actuality of the world, of knowledge and of the 
process of organisms dealing in the world. It is from such a 
framework that one must deduce the specific theoretical defi­
nition of man in the philosophy of John Dewey.
40
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 125.
CHAPTER IV
SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS
Throughout Logic, Dewey refered to Charles S. Peirce, 
who was one of his teachers at Johns Hopkins University in 
the early 1880's, as the originator of many of the most im­
portant concepts of the theoretical scheme which resulted in 
Dewey’s pragmatic or instrumental philosophy.^ Dewey probably 
could not acknowledge fully enough his indebtedness to 
Peirce's philosophic insight. In reference, however, to meta­
physics, there is a definite emphasis on the subject in 
Peirce's thought which is missing in Dewey's, although the
latter did appropriate much of Peirce's language and criticism
2
of traditional metaphysics.
Peirce asserted that the "common opinion has been that 
Metaphysics is backward because it is intrinsically beyond the 
reach of human cognition. But that, I think I can clearly
Cf. my "The Early Development of the Conceptions of 
Social Psychology and the Social Organism in the Philosophy 
of John Dewey," passim.
2
Cf. Peirce's arguments in "The Fixation of Belief" 
and "The Essentials of Pragmatism" in The Philosophy of Peirce, 
ed. by Justus Buchler (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.,
1940), pp. 5-22, 259-60.
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discern, is a complete m i s t a k e . I t  was precisely Dewey's 
position, however, that metaphysics was beyond human cogni­
tion in that the latter is defined through empirical verifi­
ability and the former is supernatural. Peirce continued:
But it will be said that metaphysics is inscrutable 
because its objects are not open to observation.
This is doubtless true of some systems of metaphys­
ics , though not to the extent it is supposed to be 
true. The things that any science discovers are be­
yond the reach of direct observation.'*
Peirce saw metaphysics as another abstract science, such as 
is logic, dealing with the theory of the most general features 
of reality and real objectsMetaphysics, like all sciences, 
is based ultimately upon observation. Thus it is not superna­
tural, although Peirce acknowledged that over the centuries it 
had coma to have supernatural encrustations because, more of­
ten than not, "its leading professors have been theologians. 
Peirce summarized the position of metaphysics in this thought :
We should expect to find metaphysics, judging from 
its position in the scheme of the sciences, to be some­
what more difficult than logic, but still on the whole 
one of the simplest of sciences, as it is one whose 
main principles must be settled before very much pro­
gress can be gained either in psychics or in physics.
^C. S. Peirce, "The Approach to Metaphysics" in The 
Philosophy of Peirce, p. 310.
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 314. ^Ibid., p. 311.
~^Ibid. Peirce felt the more abstract the science, the 
simpler it was, not having to deal with the welter of facts of 
the subjectively observed world. Simplicity should not, how­
ever, be confused with easiness. That metaphysical principles 
need be settled upon prior to progress in other sciences is 
echoed by A. N. Whitehead below, p. 53.
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Whether or not one agrees specifically with Peirce, 
there is no doubt that he realized the existence of a theory 
of reality— a metaphysics— which was presupposed by science.® 
Dewey, on the other hand, saw metaphysics, absolute idealisms 
and theologies alike, all dealing with nonnatural phenomena. 
Alike, he threw them all out, their "relevance" lying only in 
their unsatisfactory consequences in the history of man. For 
Dewey, the problem was to get rid of such a dependence on 
ideas and supernatural ideal systems which were not the direct
9
result of man's interaction with his environment. Dewey pro­
posed a naturalistic view of realicy which was required by 
the belief in the universality of scientific method, but did 
not specifically acknowledge the metaphysical position this 
assumes. Whether Peirce himself, finally, also made this
8
Ibid., p. 313. Cf., also Manley Thompson, The Prag­
matic Philosophy of C. S, Peirce (Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1953), pp. 137-144.
9
"The issue may be more definitely stated. The ex­
treme position on one side is that apart from relation to the 
supernatural, man is morally on a level with the brutes. The 
other position is that all significant ends and all securities 
for stability and peace have grown up in the matrix of human 
relations, and that the values given a supernatural locus are 
in fact products of an idealizing imagination that has laid 
hold of natural goods. There ensues a second contrast. On 
the one hand, it is held that relation to the supernatural is 
the only finally dependable source of motive power: that di­
rectly and indirectly it has animated every serious effort for 
the guidance and rectification of man's life on earth. The 
other position is that goods actually experienced in the con­
crete relations of family, neighborhood, citizenship, pursuit 
of art and science, are what men actually depend upon for 
guidance and support, and that their reference to a superna­
tural and other-worldly locus has obscured their real nature 
and has weakened their force." Dewey, A Common Faith, pp. 70- 
71.
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error, despite his awareness of the problem, is another ques­
tion; but at least there is the acknowledgement that a study 
of such metaphysical presuppositions is a prerequisite to any 
advancement of the particular sciences. A striking example 
of this awareness is found in Peirce’s article "How to Make 
Our Ideas Clear." Here Peirce, to his own satisfaction, de­
veloped a theory of reality based on empirical verification. 
Yet he refused to label it "a metaphysical theory of existence 
for universal acceptance among those who employ the scientific 
method for fixing belief" because "metaphysics is a subject 
much more curious than useful, the knowledge of which, like
that of a sunken reef, serves chiefly to enable us to keep 
10
clear of it. . . ." He meant here that to assume a meta­
physical position for a scientific process is more than that 
process could, by its own definitions, sustain. Metaphysics 
concerns itself first with principles of reality and there­
fore is concerned with more than merely the usefulness of a 
particular method. Making metaphysical assumptions for sci­
entific method is liable to result in an inadequate metaphys­
ics. The latter would then defeat the advance of the former. 
Thus Peirce would not make, in this article, the metaphysical 
claim, and he noted that one had to be aware of the position 
of the metaphysical claim in general so that he did not come 
to grief because of it.
S. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," in 
The Philosophy of Peirce," p. 40.
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Peirce specifically warned that inadequate perusal or
awareness of one's metaphysical position was precisely that
which crippled one's other positions. It is this warning
which Dewey might have better heeded:
Find a scientific man who proposes to get along with­
out any metaphysics— not by any means every man who 
holds the ordinary reasonings of metaphysicians in 
scorn— and you have found one whose doctrines are 
thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized 
metaphysics with which they are packed. We must 
philosophize, said the great naturalist Aristotle—  
if only to avoid philosophizing (Metaphysics, bk I,
982b-3a). Every one of us has a metaphysics, and has 
to have one: and it will influence his life greatly.
Far better, then, that that metaphysics should be 
criticized and not be allowed to run loose. A man 
may say "I will content myself with common sense."
I, for one, am with him there, in the main. . . .
But the difficulty is to determine what really is and 
what is not the authoritative decision of common sense 
and what is merely obiter dictum. In short, there is 
no escape from the need of a critical examination of 
"first principles.
Insofar as Dewey specifically emphasized the consequences, 
empirically defined, of human and natural activities, and not 
the originating conditions and principles presupposed by them, 
he did attempt to escape from the need of a critical examina­
tion of metaphysics. It is the purpose of the dissertation 
to ascertain what remains of the concept of man once the study 
of metaphysics or any theory which is not ultimately reduce- 
able to empirical analysis is rejected outright.
S. Peirce, "Laboratory and Seminary Philosophies" 
from "Introduction showing the point of view from which Phi­
losophy appears to the author to be an interesting subject to 
a man of common-sense" in the notebook, "Sketch of Some Pro­
posed Chapters on the Sect of Philosophy Called Pragmatism," 
in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. I, ed. 
by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1931), pi. 50.
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In addition to Peirce, another thinker who emphasized
the metaphysical endeavor was Alfred North Whitehead who, in
his philosophy of process, held many ideas in common with
12
Dewey's organic naturalism. Both based their organic thought 
on a high respect for the physical sciences and the value of 
logical analysis. Their views are generally close concerning 
the human condition and the process of common sense, through 
reflection and inquiry, to consummation in the development of 
the human capacity to come to terms with environment. Both 
acknowledged the other as a kindred spirit in the organic 
emphasis of their philosophies and the importance of its 
theme to the modem world. Their remarks on social conditions, 
the criticism of educational systems and their religious views 
are striking in their similarity. The purpose of outlining 
such similarities is to call attention to a striking dis­
similarity in their thought, namely, the insistence of White­
head that there is definite metaphysical (ontological)
12Cf. the discussion in Whitehead on the philosophy 
of organism and its conception of the world in Science and 
the Modem World (New York: New American Library, n.d.,
originally published by The Macmillan Company, 1925), pp. 134- 
141, et passim.
^^"The point is, that speculative extension beyond di­
rect observation spells some trust in metaphysics, however 
vaguely these metaphysical notions may be entertained in ex­
plicit thought. Our metaphysical knowledge is light, super­
ficial, and incomplete. Thus errors creep in. But, such as 
it is, metaphysical understanding guides imagination and 
justifies purpose. Apart from metaphysical presupposition 
there can be no civilization." A. N. Whitehead, Adventures 
of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1957, first published by
The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 128.
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content in the process of science and on the necessity of mak­
ing this content perfectly clear, concise and relevant.
Whitehead noted that even if science were devoid of 
all types of judgment of values, it would still include on­
tology or metaphysics, the determination of the nature of 
14
what truly exists. Metaphysics has been, by its nature, 
bitterly controversial. No one seems to stand in agreement 
about its specific qualities, so scientists have shunned it 
to deal primarily with what can be agreed upon: certain
methods, procedures and consequences. Thus the history of 
Western thought has been divided between whose who dealt with 
the nature of reality without much reference to methods and 
procedures of the world, and those, more recently, who deal 
with methods and procedures alone. There has been little or 
no agreement between the groups. But the basic problem, as 
Whitehead saw it, still remained: "How can mankind agree
about science without a preliminary determination of what 
really is?"^^ Having gone no further than this, and from the 
analysis in the preceding chapter, one may tentatively place 
Dewey in this dilemma. In Logic, which has been presumed 
here to be the primary theoretical work, Dewey was concerned 
with showing how the method and procedures of science have
14
A. N. Whitehead, "The Anatomy of Some Scientific 
Ideas," in The Aims of Education (New York: The Free Press,
1967), p. 121.
^^Ibid., p. 122. (Emphasis added.)
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grown naturally out of the given environment. There is no 
study specifically about what really is. Logic studies 
merely the activity of the organism in its environment : one
starts with reality. The simple development of the natural 
activity results in method, and method judges activity. Ac­
tivity is naturally empirically verifiable, and reflection, 
desire, wish, and reason— while themselves not empirically 
observable— must be in reaction to and then in projection of 
empirically observable activity. If this was not the case, 
Dewey believed, then one had to refer to something not finally 
empirically observable, and this was not in accordance with 
the experience we have of what naturally happens in the world. 
In Dewey, that which is really real is the activity which re­
sults in method. Such is to say that the question of "what 
really is" and the resultant metaphysical inquiry is all be­
side the point, or, at best, is itself merely one of the ques­
tions brought up by the method, the scientific inquiry itself 
and thereby judged on the basis of the assumed theory of real­
ity of the latter.Consequently, it is to be noted that 
Dewey was firmly affixed to one horn of the dilemma Whitehead 
defined. Dewey opted for science, the method and procedure 
of "this world." What needs most definitely to be understood 
is that "this world" and its character is itself the effective
One would note that there is actually no logical 
reason for asking the metaphysical question from simply the 
basis of empirical science. Cf. below, p. 185.
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pronouncement of "what really is" by an unexamined metaphysics.
And this is exactly the point which Peirce and Whitehead at- 
17
tempted to make.
Whitehead was concerned with illustrating the common 
sense assumptions on which science developed. He noted that 
science was the whole of sense perceptions of physical experi­
ence and consciousness of them: it is a way of thinking.
Now science aims at harmonising our reflective 
and derivative thoughts with the primary thoughts in­
volved in the immediate apprehension of sense- 
presentation. It also aims at producing such deriva­
tive thoughts, logically knit together. This is sci­
entific theory ; and the harmony to be achieved is the 
agreement of theory with observation, which is the ap­
prehension of sense-presentation.^®
Whitehead showed, in the remainder of the article, "The 
Anatomy of Some Scientific Ideas," the very intricacy of the 
assumptions and conditions upon which such scientific thought 
rested, and he was concerned with showing that such an analy­
sis itself rested on certain metaphysical principles. He il­
lustrated that judgments of worth, which had no part in the 
texture of science, were part of the motive of the production
17Whitehead comments on this point: "In its use of
this method / the development of empirically based generaliza­
tions _/, natural science has shown a curious mixture of ration­
alism and irrationalism. Its prevalent tone of thought has 
been ardently rationalistic within its own borders, and dogmat­
ically irrational beyond those borders. In practice such an 
attitude tends to become a dogmatic denial that there are any 
factors in the world not fully expressible in terms of its own 
primary notions devoid of further generalization. Such a 
denial is the self-denial of thought." A. N. Whitehead, Pro­
cess and Reality (New York: Harper and Row, 1950) , p. 8.
^®Whitehead, "Anatomy," p. 124.
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of scientific thought. Such motives involve innumerable judg­
ments of value and are the reason the "whole edifice of sci­
ence" has been raised in the first place. Furthermore, the 
"conscious selection of the parts of the scientific field to 
be cultivated . . . involves judgments of value." Whitehead 
noted that whatever the motive for the production of scien­
tific thought, "without judgments of value there would have 
19
been no science."
Dewey would agree with this summary, for valuation is 
a specific part of his theory of scientific method. But in­
sofar as Whitehead held that such a theory of value belonged 
to a metaphysical scheme which, as a whole, supported not 
only a scientific view, but also other positions not explicitly 
related to science (not available to scientific method), Dewey 
would disagree. Reality is exactly that with which science 
deals, and it deals with all facets of reality. Whitehead 
held that metaphysical or ontological presuppositions were
there in every act of life— and not every act was a proper
20
object of scientific method. Science does not diminish the 
need of metaphysical study; indeed, it increases it, for sci­
ence, in Whitehead as in Dewey, is conceived as a possibility
^^Ibid., p. 151.
'^^ "The field of a special science is confined to one 
genus of facts, in the sense that no statements are made re­
specting facts which lie outside that genus." "The one genus 
of facts which constitutes the field of some special science 
requires some common metaphysical presupposition respecting 
the universe." Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 14 and 17.
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for continued advance. But an actuality underlies such possi­
bility, and it must be studied, known, in order that the possi­
bility be given scope and direction. A theory of reality is 
presupposed by the particular events, inferences, elements, 
relations, perceptions, methods and facts of science, and its 
analysis must proceed toward reality itself and not merely to 
the specifics of the science which it happens to support.
Thus metaphysics is a broader study than science: it places
science in the world, and it places ethics, valuations, pur­
poses and aesthetics there also. It is not, cannot, be re­
stricted to the methods of any one of the specific fields or
21
disciplines it supports. Dewey, on the other hand, allowed 
science to support and define, through its methods, the other 
fields— specifically fields of human endeavor. Whitehead, 
however, did not demand an absolute stance for such metaphys­
ical theory— a notion which Dewey calmly assumed all meta­
physics and metaphysicians had to by their very nature do. 
Rather, Whitehead noted :
Physical science is based on elements of thought, such 
as judgments registering actual perceptions, and judg­
ments registering hypothetical perceptions which under 
certain circumstances would be realized. These ele­
ments form the agreed content of the apparatus of com- 
monsense thought. They require metaphysical analysis; 
but they are among the data from which metaphysics 
starts. A metaphysics which rejects them has failed.
21
Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: 
The Free Press, 1968), the entire discussion in Chapter 8, 
"Nature Alive," pp. 148-169.
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in the same way as physical science has failed when 
it is unable to harmonize them into its theory.
Dewey believed that metaphysics and ontology, if they 
had to be spoken of, were themselves functions of and based 
on the elements of scientific thought. He did not accept the 
second part of Whitehead's analysis, that science was only 
among those elements which metaphysics developed and was de­
veloped from. Indeed, science played a part in metaphysics, 
but only a part, according to Whitehead. It contributes the 
"exposition of the fact that our experience of sensible ap­
parent things is capable of being analyzed into a scientific
theory, a theory not indeed complete, but giving every promise
23of indefinite expansion. Whitehead also noted the intimate 
relation of science to logic, the very same analysis upon 
which Dewey built his whole logic as the theory of scientific 
inquiry.
In concluding his essay, Whitehead said that in the 
past, false science had been the reason for bad metaphysics. 
Dewey turned this analysis around to assert that bad meta­
physics— anything that assumed absolute values and facts— had 
been the cause of bad science and that science did not begin 
to really develop until such metaphysical wraps had been com­
pletely thrown off. Whitehead would deny such an analysis.
He would assert that, indeed, science is definitely based on
^^Whitehead, "Anatomy," p. 153.
^^ Ibid.
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metaphysics— on a theory, expressed or not, of what is real.
A rigorous study of this metaphysics is of the utmost impor­
tance for science, but science itself is only a part, "one 
part of the whole evidence from which metaphysicians deduce 
their conclusions."^^ Metaphysics is a search for reality; 
it does not or should not assume an already given reality.
There is an interesting illustration of the exact dif­
ference between Dewey and Whitehead on this point. In Process 
and Reality, Whitehead called metaphysics the true method of 
discovery controlled by the requirements of coherence and 
logic. He said it was like the flight of an airplane in that
. . .  it starts from the ground of particular observa­
tion; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative 
generalization; and it again lands for renewed observa­
tion rendered acute by rational interpretation. The 
reason for the success of this method of imaginative 
rationalization is that, when the method of difference 
fails, factors which are constantly present may yet be 
observed under the influence of imaginative thought.
Such thought supplies the difference which direct ob­
servation lacks
Dewey used a similar analogy in Logic.Imagination or
thought starts with the problematic situation, empirically
defined. It soars to understanding and hypothetical solutions
based on logic. But the criterion of the logic, as of all
thinking, lies in the empirical verification it can receive.
The criterion of the flight is given prior to the flight,
discovery is merely reintegration of empirical data. In
^^Ibid. ^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 7.
^^Dewey, Logic, p. 56ff.
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Whitehead, the object of the flight is not only to understand 
the problem and note solutions of specific empirical nature, 
but also to understand the reality upon which empirical judg­
ments and the problems themselves stand. This distinction 
between the two men is the difference between working from a 
given toward new solutions, and working on the given itself 
to find its reality and criteria, so that the work toward new 
solutions will be assured of fulfilling the whole possibility 
and not just the part.
Metaphysics uses the facts of the various elements of 
existence. By so using them it is limited by their totality, 
and at the same time, because it works toward the definition 
of the real, it defines them and effectively makes them real 
insofar as it has itself approached an adequate world view.
As a metaphysics works toward a more comprehensive understand­
ing of reality, and insofar as this reality itself, through 
the adequate development of metaphysics, becomes more compre­
hensive, so those specific elements which it supports and 
draws from become fuller in their comprehension and expres­
sion. But each element stays within the definition of it­
self. Whitehead and Dewey both acclaimed the "promise of in­
definite expansion" of science. Yet science is just this : 
the study of the physical properties of reality. Only Dewey 
made the error of translating the indefinite possibilities of 
science itself into that which was the criterion for all 
existence. It is in this sense that Dewey = s concept of science
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is not only shown to be based on an unexamined metaphysics,
but has actually taken over the functions of a metaphysics
and insofar as its basis is painfully narrow, it is a pain-
27
fully bad metaphysics. Science, qua science,, is one view 
of reality. It deals with one aspect of reality. Its find­
ings, taken in themselves, are an abstraction from reality.
Its method, taken in itself, deals with but a single, specific 
element of reality. To generalize science as alone relevant 
to the whole of reality, finally, and to generalize its method 
as applicable to all of existence, is to commit what Whitehead 
called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. That is, it
takes a part of the whole, abstracts it from the whole, then
28
treats the abstraction as, the whole.
It is the contention of this dissertation that Dewey 
did this absolutizing of science and the scientific method, 
and that no matter how broadly he conceived science, it was 
still appropos of but a part of existence. That Dewey had 
done this specifically for a purpose, and a good purpose, is 
not denied. Further, it is not denied that he logically and 
explicitly followed out the implications of this assumption.
It is to be shown that the consequences of defining and judg­
ing "fact" and "reality" through science and empirical method
27Cf. Whitehead's illustration of the narrow base of 
purely scientifically defined metaphysics in Science and the 
Modem World, p. 24.
28Cf. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 11, and Sci­
ence and the Modem World, Chapter 3, passim.
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are carefully drawn, but that even while doing so, Dewey con­
tinually tried to broaden the effect on the definition of man
and his activities which science and the naturalistic world 
29
view require.
One must explore the specific consequences of the 
naturalistic world view on the concept of man for the purpose 
of evaluating Dewey's contribution to the philosophy of man. 
The logical starting point of such a discussion is where Dewey 
specifically transposed the criterion of science and the sci­
entific method of inquiry to the peculiar evaluative and pur­
posive character of man in his social activity. This is done 
explicitly in the fully mature thought of Dewey in his short 
work Theory of Valuation, published in 1939 shortly after 
Logic.
29
This is most specifically illustrated here in Chap­
ters 9 and 10.
CHAPTER V 
SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES
The Theory of Valuation is, as is the Logic, not a 
new statement of Dewey's position, rather it is an explicit 
and tightly reasoned summary of the conclusions of his mature 
thought on tne ideas associated with valuation and its place 
in the business of inquiry into the human situation.
If the propositions of the method of physical sciences 
are concerned with matters of fact and the relations between 
them, can such a method ever deal with the unique human prob­
lem of the idea of "should?" That is, can the method of 
science deal with the problem of value? If it can, precisely 
how? Dewey said this is the question of the Theory of Valua­
tion. He noted that value problems dropped out of the phys­
ical sciences when teleology went, thus freeing these sciences 
to accomplish what they have. The question of ends, purposes, 
and value are still, however, very much the issue in human 
science. Does this mean that science cannot be used in social 
matters unless teleology and directionality are denied in 
human existence?^ No, Dewey thought that the methods of the
^Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 3.
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physical sciences could be used in the direction and valua­
tion of human activity, and he began his defense of this 
thesis by noting that his use of the term "valuation" would
be discussed in the light of three meanings; namely, those of
2
prizing, appraising and enjoying. Two further distinctions
were made in the concept of valuation, (1) that of liking/
disliking, and (2) the relation of valuations to things as
means-endsDewey then introduced a term whose specific
use rested at the heart of his entire argument: desire.
Because valuations in the sense of prizing and caring 
for occur only when it is necessary to bring something 
into existence which is lacking, or to conserve in 
existence something which is menaced by outside condi­
tions, valuations involves desiring. The latter is to 
be distinguished from mere wishing in the sense in 
which wishes occur in the absense of effort.
Desire is thus linked with specific existential, empirical 
conditions resulting from the situation itself, and are, ac­
cording to the Deweyan analysis, open to public observation. 
Dewey thus defined desire in such a way that it could be made 
into a proposition testable by empirical method as to its ade­
quacy.^ A desire is an interest in a course of events leading 
to one result rather than another; and it is judged upon how 
it changes the course of events such that the desired conclu­
sion is attained.
But the connection of values with interests is only a 
starting point. Dewey asserted that the statement "values
^Ibid., p. 6. ^Ibid., p. 13.
^Ibid., p. 15. ^Ibid., p. 17.
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sprang from the iirimediate and inexplicable reaction of vital 
impulse and from the irrational part of our nature" was cor­
rect only if vital impulse was seen as the sine qua non of 
values and not as values themselves. If vital impulse, the 
nonreflective immediate reaction of organism in its environ­
ment, habit or immediate disposition,^  is itself valuative, 
then any connection between value and desire or interest is 
denied. "Desire" would then be taken at large, and it would 
mean that any movement of organic impulse is valuative. Dewey 
considered this unacceptable. Vital impulses are a causal con­
dition for the existence of desires and interests, but the 
latter "include foreseen consequences along with ideas in the 
form of signs of the measures (involving expenditures of 
energy) required to bring the ends into existence. Thus 
Dewey saw desires and interests as having their roots in the 
organic interaction with environment which is empirically ob­
servable, and he defined them as truly valuative when the end 
result of such desires and interests was once again judged in 
terms of change in. organic interaction with environment which 
was, again, empirically observable. "Since desires and 
interests are activities which take place in the world and 
which have effects in the world, they are observable in them-
Q
selves and in connection with their observed effects."
^Cf. discussion of "habit," Human Nature and Conduct, 
Part I, passim.
7 8Dewey, Valuation, pp. 17-18. Ibid., p. 19.
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Value propositions may be tested as matters of fact in 
this world, and the argument is developed on the premise that
9
behavior of human beings is open to empirical observation.
That which is not publicly observable is excluded from the 
thesis. It was on the basis of the empirically observable 
character of value that Dewey could accept it as an actual 
"fact" in the world. This is not a strict materialism, but 
it is a strict adherence to a naturalistic stance whose only 
resource to defining reality is the observation of activity 
through scientific, empirical method. Thus, early in Theory 
of Valuation, Dewey expanded the specific method of the 
physical sciences into the realm of the valuative, purposive 
endeavors of human beings. It was through precisely the same 
argument elsewhere that Dewey asserted the methods of physical 
sciences to be applicable to morals, ideals, reason and aes­
thetics. The heart of this expansion of the scope of scien­
tific method is the definition of nonphysically observable 
entities as their public, empirically observable consequences. 
The result of this expansion is the flattening of the mean­
ings of valuative statements— good, bad, evil, right, wrong, 
rational, irrational, beautiful and ugly, into just one mean­
ing: the fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of an interest,
expectation or desire for an end, available to empirical war­
ranted assertibility. One might respond, "But it is the
^Ibid., p. 20.
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specific situation which defines which of the terms shall be 
used, and which would be meaningless." That would be true, 
except that if the final criterion of each situation is that 
of empirical consequence, then the differences in each situa­
tion must be, finally, in terms of quantity and not quality.
The ethical situation does not differ fundamentally from the 
rational, nor the rational from the aesthetic in terms of 
dealing with them through empirioal method. What Dewey did 
acknowledge as being different, and consequently being inef­
fable, was the individual human being's realization of the 
problematic situation through the feeling of the quality of 
the situation as a whole. But this is immediate, personal 
and— most importantly— simply "given." It is not the object 
of scientific method, but that upon which such a method stands, 
from which it originates, and upon whose particulars it oper­
ates. The question then becomes : does this "given" quality
of the situation actually and meaningfully define real differ- 
eices in the types of valuative judgments? Are there really 
ethical judgments, rational judgments and aesthetic judgments 
which have exclusive meanings and values for human beings?
But this is precisely the question which Dewey's scientific 
method cannot answer. The method deals only with the empiri­
cally verifiable consequences of activities, and for the pur­
pose of making this method universal and coherent, the vari­
ous conditions of valuation must be seen as merely the reac­
tion of biological organism to environment on the basis of
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vital impulse or habit. Dewey did, in fact, write as if there 
were actual differences between morals and reason, aesthetics 
and purposefulness : he used the different words. It is
shown that such meanings are finally the same when forced into 
the mold of empirical verifiability.
Dewey, in dealing with the concept of valuation, was
concerned with freeing man and his activities from traditional
absolutes— customs, beliefs, uncriticized authority— and so he
substituted the method of science with its experimental basis
which demanded continual review of everything it did, even of
the method itself. Dewey noted:
The existence of rules for valuation of modes of be­
havior in different fields as wise or unwise, econom­
ical or extravagant, effective or futile, cannot be 
denied. The problem concerns not their existence as 
general propositions (since every rule of action is 
general) but whether they express only custom, conven­
tion, tradition, or are capable of stating relations 
between things as means and other things as conse­
quences, which relations are themselves grounded in 
empirically ascertained and tested existential rela­
tions which are usually termed those of cause and ef­
fect.
Dewey asserted that judging the wiseness of such rules was to 
check off their consequences against acknowledged physical 
laws, and not merely the personal opinions or whims of those 
who held such rules. Empirical propositions used in deter­
mining such wiseness or ignorance are themselves neither good 
nor bad, they become valuative when used in respect of their 
serviceability to already given ends-in-view, the object of
^'^Ibid., p. 21.
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desire. Ends-in-view themselves are judged upon their 
serviceability in the successful fulfillment of the original 
problematic situation. Thus the valuative content of an act 
or proposition is judged as it "services" or is successful to 
the fulfillment of an end-in-view. The end-in-view has valu­
ative content as an act or proposition only if, in its empir­
ical consequences, it fulfills the problem set up in the
original problematic situation. Dewey used the term "ap- 
11
praised." Such values of means and ends are appraised as 
to their probability of success in fulfilling the activity 
which had to be fulfilled to solve the problem. Thus ends 
and means have been judged on the same criterion, and Dewey 
was always at pains to note this, for it was important in the 
theory of continuity. A means is an end insofar as it must 
be itself successfully concluded prior to its being a condi­
tion for an end. The end also is the means for successful 
satisfaction of the problematic situation and it must be 
available as a means for further ends. But one must note 
that the real problem of the conditions of valuation has just 
been pushed back into the original problematic situation of 
organism in a thwarted habitual reaction to environmental
The term "enjoying" (as well as "liking-disliking") 
connotes immediate fulfillment without endeavor or judgment 
of conditions or consequences, and is not of significance to 
this discussion.
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conditions. The notion of judging value on the basis of 
appraisal is that of judging value in terms of specific 
facts and propositions actually working both as ends-in-view 
and means toward those ends. Such an emphasis on valuation 
of ends-means does not touch the process of valuation in the 
problematic situation. This difficulty may be expressed in 
another manner.
Dewey asked : "Are desires and interests, which di­
rectly effect an institution of end-values, independent of 
the appraisal of things as means or are they ultimately in­
fluenced by this a p p r a i s a l ? H e  answered that they were so 
influenced. He noted that no end-in-view was held to without 
reference to the means to attain it, and if means were not 
available, the end-in-view was changed so that means might be 
found.
For what is deliberation except weighing of various 
alternative desires (and hence end-values) in terms 
of the conditions that are the means of their execu­
tion, and which, as means, determine the conse­
quences actually arrived at. There can be no control 
of the operation of foreseeing consequences (and 
hence of forming ends-in-view) save in terms of con­
ditions that operate as the causal conditions of their 
attainment. The proposition in which any object 
adopted as an end-in-view is statable (or explicitly 
stated) is warranted in just the degree to which 
existing conditions have been surveyed and appraised 
in their capacity as means. The sole alternative to 
this statement is that no deliberation whatsoever oc­
curs, no ends-in-view are formed, but a person acts
^^Cf. the explicit formulation of this process. Human 
Nature and Conduct, Part I, passim.
^^Dewey, Valuation, p. 25.
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directly upon whatever impulse happens to present it­
self.14
This is an important statement in that it reflects the require­
ments of the scientific method on the definition of a problem­
atic situation. Dewey has said here that "there can be no 
control of the operation of foreseeing consequences (and hence 
of forming ends-in-view) save in terms of conditions that 
operate as the causal conditions of their attainment." The 
criterion of attainment in empirical consequences is put tem­
porally ahead of the process of forming ends-in-view which 
such attainment brings about. The question is then: which
comes first, the choosing of ends or the choosing of means?
In common sense, and in seeming contradiction to Dewey (at 
least here), it is the ends, because the end-in-view is the 
substance of the hypothesis which results from the factual 
data evaluated for that purpose— that is, for the purpose of 
that end-in-view— in the problematic situation. Therefore, 
the end is stated at first in terms of the problem of the 
situation felt immediately (which Dewey later called the 
"desired"), and not in terms of the means to its attainment. 
One cannot, of course, state means without reference to an 
end. But then Dewey said that a warranted end (later called 
the "desirable") was one whose means were appraised as having 
the capacity to reach it. Means must be appraised in terms of 
their capacity to attain that end, and not the other way
'^^ Ibid.
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around. Dewey attempted to hold both positions: first, that
numerous ends were "had" with the problem, so that at least 
there was some kind of ends in mind prior to empirical in­
vestigation; second, that the only "real" end was one which 
was warranted by the existential conditions or means for its 
fulfillment. Thus Dewey held that the only "real" end was a 
product of the empirical search for proper conditions as well 
as the fact that it had to satisfy the original problematic 
situation if fulfilled. But it is throughout apparent that 
this warranted end-in-view rests as much upon the possible 
(imagined, desired) ends immediately given in the situation 
which proceeded the search for warrantability as upon the 
empirical verification of conditions. Thus the criterion of 
warrantability through empirical verification does not, in 
itself, create or project that end-in-view which is finally 
judged warranted or unwarranted by empirical conditions.
Such a critique does not deny the validity and necessity of 
finding existential conditions for projected ends-in-view, 
but it is_ conceited to find from whence such ends-in-view 
originate. They may be "appraised" as valuable in that they 
satisfy the problematic situation through having existential 
conditions available, but what valuative judgment established 
them in the first place? Then further, what is the status of 
this prior valuative act?
The end-in-view is, consequently, not merely estab­
lished in terms of conditions that are a means of its
73
execution, as Dewey seems here to have held, but rather the 
imagined end— the immediately desired, which is formed through 
emotional reaction to the given problematic situation— is seen 
to be the basis upon which scientific hypothesis and subse­
quent empirical investigation of conditions is conducted. The 
primary valuation is, then, in terms of ends, whether attain­
able or not, which present themselves through the apprehension 
of the specific given quality of the specific given problem­
atic situation. Thus the question of basic conditions of 
valuation is evidently not solved by the scientific method.
It then follows that the question of human purpose and valua­
tion is not within the purview of the scientific method as 
Dewey asserted. Science is thereby reduced to the function 
of establishing and verifying means, not ends— THE fundamental 
assertion Dewey was at pains to refute.
A second problem arises from Dewey's formulation. If 
warranted ends-in-view are established only through reference 
to existing or capable of existing means, then what guarantee 
does one have that the end-in-view finally selected in fact 
satisfies the original problematic situation? None, unless 
each of the possible ends-in-view have been previously guaran­
teed to fulfill the problematic situation, and then one must 
ask on what grounds came that prior guarantee. Ultimately, 
the response from Dewey had to be that it was merely a func­
tion of the given quality of the situation. Thus it is estab­
lished, against Dewey, that any end-in-view must be finally
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judged on the given quality of the situation, and not only or 
finally on its capacity of existential verification. Dewey 
himself acknowledged this in two ways: (1) in judging the
consequences of the actually deployed warranted end-in-view, 
at least one of them had to satisfy that original problematic 
situation; and (2) in establishing the hypotheses upon reflec­
tive reaction to the felt problematic situation, the hypothe­
sis was supposed to have two functions, to define clearly the 
felt problem and to project clearly an end-in-view based on 
its satisfaction (as well as the availability of existential 
conditions). Neither of these criteria is finally based on 
the scientific method's verification of existential condi­
tions, but they are based on continual reference to the given 
quality of the situation. It is the original problem which 
sets the limits within which the end-in-view must be found, 
not merely the ability of existential conditions to fulfill 
it. An analysis such as this separates the concepts of ends 
and means more than Dewey would care to, and he noted that 
"ends framed in separation from consideration of things as 
means are foolish to the point of irrationality."^^ One 
would, of course, not disagree with this, but it must be 
noted that the purpose which lies beneath the framing of ends 
is something other than a consideration of means. Dewey had 
to hold that the valuation of ends was the same as the
^^Ibid., p. 25,
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valuation of means, so that the empirical "appraisal" of both 
through scientific method might be maintained. If it is not 
so maintained, then the continuity of the universality of the 
method is broken, two separate theories of valuations must be 
introduced, and a dualism is created which is insoluble as are 
all other historical dualisms. Dewey escaped the need for con­
sidering such a dualism by showing how all valuations might be 
made in terms of appraisal or the judgment of existential con­
ditions and consequences. He did this, however, at the ex­
pense of considering the original condition of the formation 
of ends as merely a given quality in the complexities of the 
naturalistic, organic situation. But one must ask: what
makes a problematic situation problematic? What makes a 
quality that specific quality? Can these questions be an­
swered by the concept of empirical method? Has Dewey, in 
fact, merely pushed the problem of human value and purpose 
back into the "given" quality of the situation in the natural­
istic conceptual scheme? Such questions demand a clear in­
sight into Dewey's theory of quality.
CHAPTER VI 
THE QUALITATIVE ENVIRONMENT
In Dewey's analysis, man lives in the world immedi­
ately and quality pervades it; man acts and reacts in rela­
tion to the qualitative judgments made therein., "This world 
forms the field of characteristic modes of thinking, charac­
teristic in that thought is definitely regulated by qualita­
tive considerations. Thought— not as an object but as the 
present act of thinking— is qualitatively regulated by what 
the thinker immediately experiences of a given situation in 
the wholeness of the interaction between environment and sub­
ject. The given situation and its quality are composed of 
the thinker and the environment. The thinker experiences and 
reacts to himself in relation to the situation; he reacts to 
himself as well as to natural environment. Man reacts in a 
situation composed of himself and other ; he reacts to the 
quality of the situation and creates the quality of the situa­
tion. Dewey emphasized both organism and environment, neither 
to the exclusion of the other. He did not think he emphasized 
the contribution of the environment to the exclusion of the
\)ewey, "Qualitative Thought" in On Experience. Nature 
and Freedom, p. 177.
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ethical responsibility of the thinker in the situation which 
he, in part, created.
Quality is the color, weight, feeling, and emotion of 
the whole. It is gut level experience which can also be ap­
praised by rational or logical endeavor, but never exists in 
whole as the object of a reflective act. It is experienced 
in its nonreflective, active doing. A reflective act also 
has quality, but not as the object of that reflective act.
Any object is torn from its quality (its own unique character 
of movement of experience) by the very fact of its objectifi­
cation. This is, in itself, not unfortunate— but it is neces­
sary to realize the character of the process so as not to con­
fuse the object of thought with the process and quality of the 
thought experience itself. It is of the greatest importance 
to Dewey that one should not confuse the immediate world in 
which we live with the abstract world about which we think and 
ontologize.
Dewey pointed out that one should not confuse the
mediated object of thought with the immediate being-now-in-
the-act of thinking— the former does not reflect its whole
2
qualitative environment while the latter does. Such a con­
fusion about the whole quality of an object (the object of a 
thought experience being itself an abstraction from its own 
full qualitative situation) results in the "contextual
2
Ibid., p. 179.
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fallacy" of seeing such an object of thought as a thing in it­
self and then intellectually relating it to some other abstrac­
tion which is also outside its peculiar qualitative situation— 
to the end result that the conclusion of such a thought scheme 
has little or no valid relation to the original situation from 
which premises are abstracted.^ Such was where logicians had 
to watch themselves, Dewey thought, for logic should be built 
on a knowledge of the role quality plays in direct experience:
Now my point is that unless such underlying and per­
vasive qualitative determinations are acknowledged in 
a distinct logical formulation, one or the other of 
two results is bound to follow. Either thought is 
denied to the subject matter in question and the 
phenomena are attributed to 'intuition' or ’genius' 
or 'impulse' or 'personality' as ultimate and un­
analysable entities; or, worse yet, intellectual 
analysis is reduced to a mechanical enumeration of 
isolated terms or 'properties.'^
And further:
As a matter of fact, such intellectual definiteness 
and coherence as the objects and criticisms of es­
thetic and moral subjects possess is due to their 
being controlled by the quality of subject matter as 
a whole. Consideration of the meaning of regulation 
by an underlying and pervasive quality is the theme 
of this article.
The argument for cognizance of the importance of quality in
the situation was thus summarized by Dewey:
What is intended may be indicated by drawing a dis­
tinction between something called a 'situation' and 
something termed an 'object.' By the term 'situation' 
in this connection is signified the fact that the
^One notes that Dewey's "contextual fallacy" is 
closely related to Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concrete­
ness . "
4 5
Dewey, "Qualitative Thought," p. 180. Ibid.
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subject matter ultimately referred to in existential 
propositions is a complex existence that is held to­
gether, in spite of its internal complexity, by the 
fact that it is dominated and characterized through­
out by a single quality. By 'object' is meant some 
element in the complex whole that is defined in ab­
straction from the whole of which it is a distinction.
The special point made is that the selective deter­
mination and relation of objects in thought is con­
trolled by reference to a situation— to that which is 
constituted by a pervasive and internally integrating 
quality, so that failure to acknowledge the situation 
leaves, in the end, the logical force of objects and 
their relations inexplicable.^
The question is, of course : if that quality which holds to­
gether the various parts of the situation is itself inexpli­
cable, how far has Dewey advanced the solution of the logical 
force of objects and their relation? The question asked in 
another manner is this: if the pervasive quality itself is
not the object of inquiry, and Dewey explicitly noted that it 
was not, then to what extent is thought itself responsible for 
its valuative content and the ends it seeks?
Dewey went on to point out that the situation, in its 
wholeness, was not and could not be fully stated. Rather, it
is "understood" as the background of any of the particular ob­
jects which are singled out for attention within it. "The 
situation controls the terms of thought, for they are its 
distinctions, and the applicability to it is the ultimate test 
of their validity.This is the ultimate test of pragmatism,
the very substance of the Deweyan analysis.
G Ibid. "^ Ibid., p. 182.
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The parts of any situation are held together by the
immediately experienced quality without which all would fall
apart in meaningless atomism. Quality is a function of the
whole situation, and not analyzable for that reason, but its
presence must be recognized in dealing with particular parks
which are abstractions and are not themselves immediately
experienced. They are objects of reflection in particular
categories (logical, esthetic, etc.) and are mediated by the
tools of such categories.
Thus quality enables us to keep thinking about one 
problem without having constantly to stop to ask our­
self what it is after all that we are thinking about.
We are aware of it not by itself but as the background, 
the thread, and the directive clue in what we do ex­
pressly think of.
What we think of are the relations and distinctions of the 
quality of the situation. Dewey had, however, trouble in 
trying to convey just exactly what he wanted to mean by the 
direct experience, and well he might, as language, by its 
nature (according to Dewey), automatically objectified (medi­
ated) the experience which he tried to communicate. The words 
themselves are symbolic abstractions of the event, and not the 
event itself. Dewey tried, nevertheless, and noted his agree­
ment with Bergson's theory of intuition :
The word 'intuition‘ has many meanings. But in its 
popular, as distinct from refined philosophical usage, 
it is closely connected with the single qualitative­
ness underlying all the details of explicit reasoning.
It may be relatively dumb and inarticulate and yet
Q
Ibid. (Emphasis added).
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penetrating; unexpressed in definite ideas which form 
reasons and justifications and yet profoundly right.
To my mind, Bergson's contention that intuition pre­
cedes conception and goes deeper is correct. Reflec­
tion and rational elaboration spring from and make 
explicit a prior intuition.°
Immediate experience directly intuits the quality of a situa­
tion. The quality determines the objects of reflective thought 
as well as how and why they are thought and, later, how they 
will be judged as fulfilling the demands of the problematic 
situation. One may question, here, if man is active or pas­
sive in relation to quality. Both. Man has had a hand in de­
veloping the quality which now, in the new situation, deter­
mines the "which" and the "how" of specific objects within it. 
The quality is itself the relation of man to environment, 
neither one alone is meaningful outside the relation between 
them which defines both of them. But the exceedingly impor­
tant question is here: what are the characters of the poles
of this relation? On the one hand is the physical/social en­
vironment, on the other, the individual organism, man. Dewey 
left no doubt as to the qualitative definition of the environ­
ment, but in what manner does the organism contribute to the 
qualitative whole? If the qualitative whole is immediate, 
intuited and felt— as it is— and if it is not the object of a 
reflec'-ive act of inquiry— which it is not— then the organism 
contributed to any new situation as he comes to it, namely, 
in the natural active, habitual and nonreflective state. Only
^Ibid., p. 184.
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the quality itself calls for or creates thought, reflection. 
Thought does not call for or create quality insofar as it is 
preceded by it in any already given qualitative whole. Thus 
while man is_ actively a participant in the whole of the quali­
tative situation, his activity is natural habitual activity, 
not purposive, conscious activity. Man may be active in the 
development of the qualitative whole, but not man as conscious, 
reflective, imaginative and purposive. It is important for 
the remainder of the discussion to keep in mind the peculiarly 
narrow definition of man as contributor to the pervasive qual­
ity which is the originating condition of all acts of con­
scious and unconscious endeavor.
In Dewey's analysis, man is not self-directing, the 
environment is not directive: both are poles of directional­
ity. Both are the givers and receivers of directionality.
This is an ontology of relation, with the pervasive quality 
of the relation given as a beginning point for active endeavor.
Concerning the movement from the directly or immedi­
ately experienced to the abstracted object of the mediating 
experience (which is itself, of course, immediate), Dewey 
said:
The underlying pervasive quality in the last instance 
l_ Dewey has here used as an example the proposition 
'that men die'_7, when it is put in words, involves 
care or concern for human destiny. But we must re­
member that this exists as a dumb quality until it 
is symbolized in an intellectual and prepositional 
form. Out of this quality there emerges the idea 
of man and of mortality and of their existential con­
nection with each other. No one of them has any
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meaning apart from the others, neither the distinc­
tions, the terms, nor their relation, the predication.
All the difficulties that attend the problem of predi­
cation spring from supposing that we can take the terms 
and their connection as having meaning by themselves.
The sole alternative to this supposition is the recog­
nition that the object of thought, designated proposi- 
tionally, is a quality that is first directly and un- 
ref lectively experienced or had.^0
One would hasten to add that this quality itself is not had as 
the object of reflective thought. It is experienced directly 
first in its own experience, and not as the object of another 
experience. Quality, now as object, is part of another rela­
tion pervaded by another quality being now experienced immedi­
ately. Quality as object of experience is mediated by the 
very stance or purpose for which it is now an object, namely, 
the quality of the now-going-on act of its mediation. The 
act of mediation is itself imediate. Perhaps it was for this
reason that Dewey refered in Human Nature and Conduct to the 
11
"habit of knowing" while elsewhere quite explicitly recog­
nizing that habit "does not, of itself, know, for it does not
12
of itself stop to think observe or remember."
Throughout the discussion here, reference is continu­
ally made to the "givenness" of the quality of the situation. 
One might ask if this "given" is itself only that which a con­
scious being wants to include for his purposes in an
^°Ibid., p. 189.
^^ewey. Human Nature and Conduct, p. 186. Also cf. 
p. 209 and p. 269, et passim.
^^Ibid., p. 177.
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ontological framework; that is, is the "given" a result of or 
a cause of directionality? From the analysis here, it is ob­
vious that the given of a situation, the pervasive quality, is 
the cause of directionality. Evidently Dewey was aware of the 
difficulties which might arise from a theory which merely puts 
facts for which it cannot account into the "given" with which 
it starts. Dewey said on this point:
The only thing that is unqualifiedly given is the total 
pervasive quality; and the objection to calling it 
'given' is that the word suggests something ^  which it 
is given, mind or thought or consciousness or whatever, 
as well possibly as something that gives. In truth 
'given' in this connection signifies only that the qual­
ity immediately exists, or is brutely there. In this 
capacity, it forms that to which all objects of thought 
refer, although, as we have noticed, it is never part 
of the manifest subject matter of thought. In itself, 
it is the big, buzzing, blooming confusion of which 
James wrote. . . . There is, however, no articulate 
quality which is merely buzzing and blooming. It 
buzzes to some effect; it blooms toward some fruitage. 
That is, the quality, although dumb, has as a part of 
its complex quality a movement or transition in some 
direction. It can, therefore, be intellectually sym­
bolized and converted into an object of thought. This 
is done by statement of limit and of direction of 
transition between them. 'That' and 'sweet' define the 
limits of the moving quality, the copula 'tastes' (the 
real force of 'is') defines the direction of movement 
between these limits. Putting the nature of the two 
limits briefly and without any attempt to justify the 
statement here, the subject represents the pervasive 
quality as means or conditions and the predicate repre­
sents it as outcome or end.
The point here is that inquiry or logic works with proposi­
tions which are the symbolized facts and process in a situa­
tion, the quality of which is just there to be had, defining
^^Dewey, "Qualitative Thought," pp. 189-190.
85
the relations of those parts within the situation. That qual­
ity, brutely given, is what all conclusions must finally 
validly be caused by and related to. In the quotation, though, 
Dewey failed to mention that the symbolized propositions and 
conclusions were no longer in the qualitative situational 
whole from which they were abstracted, but were then in a 
wholly new qualitative experience— the act of thinking logi­
cally. Thus one might get the impression that the quality 
can, as a whole, become the object of another experience— an 
idea which Dewey was at pains to deny.
If Dewey was aware of the problem of merely putting 
facts for which he could not account in his system and its 
method into the primordial "given" from which he started, it 
is evident that he did not get around it. C. S. Peirce had 
previously seen this quandry clearly:
Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some abso­
lutely inexplicable, unanalysable ultimate ; in short, 
something resulting from mediation itself not suscep­
tible of mediation. Now that anything is_ thus inex­
plicable can only be known by reasoning from signs.
But the only justification of an inference from signs 
is that the conclusion explains the fact. To suppose 
the fact absolutely inexplicable, is not to explain 
it, and hence this supposition is never allowable.
This is exactly the problem of the brutely given 'quality' in 
the problematic situation scheme of John Dewey. It is pre­
cisely the result of the inadequacy of empirical method to 
deal with primary purpose and evaluation which forced Dewey
14
C. S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapaci­
ties," The Philosophy of Peirce, p. 229.
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to attribute that which made the problematic situation prob­
lematic to the unanalysable, pervasive quality. The implicit 
metaphysical structure of the 'quality' of the situation, as 
well as the situation as a whole, guides the activity and 
structure of the whole naturalistic world view, man included, 
yet it is not the proper object of the only way of knowing 
Dewey attributed to man— scientific method. The excessive 
limiting factor of this unanalysable, brutally given meta­
physics on the concept of the nature of man is to be well 
noted. Also, as a result of this structure is the assumption 
that what is analysable is so only through empirical method, 
i  to the ultimate flattening of the fundamental difference be­
tween specific valuative statements on ethics, purposiveness 
I and aesthetics. There simply is little real difference be-
I tween the concepts of good, value, morals, and aesthetics if
I they are all judged empirically on their satisfaction of a
problematic situation, also defined empirically. The conse­
quences of such flattening of important valuative and moral 
distinctions through exclusive use of scientific method is 
illustrated clearly in a return to the analysis in Theory of 
Valuation.
CHAPTER VII 
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DESIRE
In Theory of Valuation, Dewey argued that valuation 
was a function of the relation of an object to the other ob­
jects of a situation where it had to be appraised in terms of 
its success in satisfying problematic situations. Value is 
not extrinsic, but intrinsic to the function of subjects in an 
existential situation. It is judged on the basis of empirical 
fact, not upon religious or cultural norms absolutized over 
centuries of custom. Value is intrinsic to an active situa­
tion judged empirically. It does not exist intrinsically to 
a subject through reference to some outside force or norm, 
but only in the empirical judgment of its function in a situa­
tion. Dewey summarized a point made broadly earlier, but here 
with interesting implications:
An end as an actual consequence, as an existing out­
come, is, like any other occurrence which is scien­
tifically analyzed, nothing but the interaction of 
the conditions that bring it to pass. Hence it fol­
lows necessarily that the idea of the object of de­
sire and interest, the end-in-view as distinct from 
the end or outcome actually effected, is warranted 
in the precise degree in which it is formed in terms 
of these operative conditions.
^Dewey, Valuation, p. 29.
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To what degree, then, is human endeavor involved in this pro­
cedure? Is a man responsible for creating the idea of the 
end-in-view as expressing his desire to remove the obstacles 
which have caused a problematic situation? Yes, man as re­
flective creates hypotheses in reaction to ambiguous problem­
atic situations. But is the creation of such ideal ends-in- 
view an evaluative and purposive procedure? In Dewey's analy­
sis, one "prizes" his end, but prizing is the immediate 
thought of the enjoyment of an end, without existential ef­
fort for its realization. Man does not participate in a 
truly evaluative procedure unless he weighs his idealized end- 
in-view against empirical, existential conditions for its ful­
fillment as well as the empirical, existential consequences of 
such a fulfillment. This is the application of the strict 
scientific method. The ends-in-view are evaluated by means of 
empirical method as to the empirical conditions for their ful­
fillment. Appraisal of ends-in-view is in terms of empirical 
evaluation of the conditions of consequences and consequences 
themselves, and it is only after the subsequent empirical 
testing that an ideal end-in-view may become valuable (war­
ranted) . In short, the physical existence of the conditions 
for the desired consequence is responsible for judgment of 
value, not the unique character of man in the problematic 
situation. Man is responsible only insofar as he is true to 
scientific method, and the method only insofar as it is true 
to empirical fact. What is not considered is the valuative
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and purposive content in the "given" of the original problematic 
situation which has a great deal of effect on the judgment of 
value in the continuing solution of that problem. Dewey af­
firmed the valuative content of the quality of the problematic 
situation, but it too was seen only in terms of empirical condi­
tions for consequences. After all, part of the given situation 
is the organism’s old habits which are themselves conclusions 
of previous empirically evaluated procedures. The concept of 
the thinking man in the problematic situation lies in his reac­
tion to and judgment of empirical fact. Man is not the evalu­
ator of fact; rather, his activity is evaluated ^  empirical 
fact. Man is not a judge; he is— in his peculiar activity as 
man— the judged. In Dewey's theory, he is evaluated by the as­
sumptions of empirical method and the naturalistic world view. 
Man himself is "appraised," not "prized." His activities are 
judged (appraised) empirically; he is not valued (prized) in 
and for himself. But, of course, this is just what must occur 
to the subject matter of a scientific endeavor. Such is not,
then, a philosophy of man; rather, it is a philosophy of sci-
2
ence. Kaiit's ethical dictum is violated, and implications 
about Dewey's theoretical concept of man begin to form.
2
"Now I say that man, and in general every rational be­
ing, exists as end in himself, not merely as a means for arbi­
trary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions,
whether they are directed to himself or to other ational be­
ings, always be viewed at the same time as an end." Immanuel 
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by H. J. Baton (New York: 
Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1964), p. 95. Cf. below, p. 148, 
Dewey's implicit awareness of this principle.
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The question may here be raised: just what is the mean­
ing of "human desire" if it is evaluated in terms of empirical 
conditions for its fulfillment? The discussion of the problem 
is pivotal. Dewey reexamined the problematic situation to 
find the method in which "desires, and interests arose and func­
tioned, and in which end-objects, ends-in-view, acquired their 
actual contents."  ^ The problematic situation, immediate and 
felt per se, is to be the object of "an empirical investiga­
tion of the actual conditions" of that situation.^ The prob­
lem itself arises when there is something the matter of when 
there is trouble in the existing conditions such that one can­
not just naturally or habitually, without thought or reflection, 
continue with his activity. "Something the matter" creates a 
want or desire for the consummation of a solution. If one acts 
merely through impulse or habit, what is done is not done 
through reflection, and is not valuative in nature.
But if and when desire and an end-in-view intervene 
between the occurrence of a vital impulse or a 
habitual tendency and the execution of activity, 
then the impulse or tendency is to some degree modi­
fied and transformed: a statement which is purely
tautological, since the occurrence of a desire re­
lated to an end-in-view is a transformation of a 
prior impulse or routine habit. It is only in such 
cases that valuation occurs
Valuation is a function of a problematic situation, one in
which there is something the matter, a lack, a deficiency, a
3 4Dewey, Valuation, p. 33. Ibid.
^Ibid.., p. 34.
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contradiction or privation to be made good, solved, or ful­
filled by changing the existing conditions of the organic 
interaction with environment. Since the change of such condi­
tions involves inquiry, or scientific method, valuation has an 
intellectual content, "for the end-in-view is formed and pro­
jected as that which, if acted upon, will supply the existing
6
need or lack and resolve the existing conflict."
The immediate, felt problem is an awareness that some­
thing is the matter.. It is so felt precisely because vital 
impulse or habitual activity is thwarted and cannot here keep 
life activity in smooth continuity. The feeling of this cre­
ates desire to continue the smooth flow of activity, the latter 
being the immediately prized end. It is here that the intel­
lectual factor implements the method which requires an objec­
tive, empirical investigation of that situation which, hereto­
fore, has acted in an immediate, radically subjective condi­
tion. The subject matter of such an investigation is facts 
about the problematic situation abstracted from their "natural" 
place, and is used as facts for the construction of an hypo­
thesis which outlines specifically the cause of the felt prob­
lem, and which points to an end-in-view which, given existen­
tial conditions for its fulfillment, will solve the felt prob­
lem, if put into effect. For Dewey, the emphasis was on find­
ing these existential conditions for the end-in-view rather
®Ibid.
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than on analyzing the conditions of the given quality from 
which such an end-in-view was projected. The end-in-view is 
judged valuable on the availability of existential conditions 
for its fulfillment and its existential consequences. Accord­
ing to this scheme, one would assume that "desire" has only 
the function of prizing an end, then turning over the problem 
to science. Dewey, of course, did not agree, for to do so 
would be to destroy the link between man's comprehension of 
the problematic situation and his ability to continue with 
the creation of a science of inquiry to progressively be able 
to solve the problems there. In this naturalistic concept of 
the organic growth of the inquiry which defines man as differ­
ent from animals, the development must be smooth without re­
course to appeal to an outside (nonnatural) power or idea.
Thus desire does not only prize an end, for ends can be
. . . foreseen as ends or outcomes only in terms of the 
conditions by which they are brought into existence.
It is simply impossible to have an end-in-view or to 
anticipate the consequences of any proposed line of 
action save upon the basis of some, however slight, 
consideration of the means by which it can be brought 
into existence, otherwise, there is no genuine desire 
but an idle fantasy, a futile wish.
Desire must also, therefore, consider physical conditions for 
its end, and not merely that end by itself. It is in this con­
text that Dewey made an exceedingly enlightening statement :
The likelihood of the occurrence of failure in attain­
ing desired ends is in direct ratio to failure to form 
desires and interests (and the objects they involve)
^Ibid., p. 35.
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on the basis of conditions that operate either as ob­
stacles (negatively valued) or as positive resources.
The difference between reasonable desire and-.unreason­
able desire . . .  is precisely the differenre between 
those which arise casually and are not reconstituted 
through consideration of the conditions that will ac­
tually decide the outcome and those which are formed 
on the basis of existing liabilities and potential 
resources
Firsn, it is to be noted that Dewey next demanded that desires 
be formed on the basis of existential conditions for their 
fulfillment. This is not the desire for a prized end which 
is the immediate reaction to the felt problem. Dewey specif­
ically rejected those theories which related desire to im­
pulses as they happened to occur, for this meant that immedi­
ate, nonreflective impulse was that which was responsible for 
valuation. Dewey's theory holds, of course, that valuation is 
a function of the existential conditions to support a problem 
solving end-in-view. Dewey asserted that desire, correctly 
taken, was
. . .  a modification of a raw impulse through foresight 
of its outcome . . . the whole difference between im­
pulse and desire is made by the presence in desire of 
an end-in-view, of objects foreseen consequences.
The foresight will be dependable in the degree in 
which it is constituted by examination of the condi­
tions that will in fact decide the outcome.
It can but be noted that describing "desire" in terms of fore­
sight of consequences and empirical examination of conditions 
affecting those consequences is to describe "desire" precisely 
as Dewey defined logic, inquiry, the scientific method, and
^Ibid., p. 29. (Emphases added.) ^Ibid., p. 30.
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reason 1 Indeed, this is why Dewey could talk about "reason­
able and unreasonable" desire.
Did Dewey then drop the distinction between the two 
sorts of desires and affirm only the definition of desire 
which included foresight of conditions and consequences? No, 
he maintained them both in order to retain that which was spe­
cifically human in the evaluative process : emotion (raw im­
pulse) . He distinguished between them by calling the object 
which presented itself first through the mechanism of impulses 
as the "desired." Then, the "object of desire which emerges 
as a revision of the first appearing impulse, after the 
latter is critically judged in reference to the conditions
10
which will decide the actual result . . ."is the "desirable,."
It is on the basis of the "desirable" that valuations and judg­
ments of "should" are to be formed. Dewey said that the dis­
tinction was not introduced a priori, but merely "points to 
the difference between the operation and consequences of unex­
amined impulses and those of desires and interests that are 
the product of investigation of conditions and consequences."^^ 
It is interesting to note that this concept of the "should" 
which derives from the desirable, is not based on a tradi­
tional moral theory, but from "the conditions which will de­
cide the actual result." It becomes evident, however, that 
while Dewey rejected traditional moral theory and accepted only
10 11
Ibid., pp. 31-32. Ibid., p. 32.
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that which was a working factor in the problematic situation, 
the assumptions of the specific character and method of the 
problematic situation itself forms a moral theory' along tradi­
tional lines in terms of absolute assumptions. Dewey believed 
the existential situation— naturalistically described— was the 
only environmentof morals.
The desirable is the ideal in the process of solving
a problematic situation. Dewey was careful to note that this
was not an arbitrary ideal such as he thought all traditional
moral and value theories imposed on existential situations.
An ideal becomes arbitrary, he thought, "in the degree in
which it is not connected with things which exist and is not
12
related to concrete existential requirements." Thus Dewey 
once again emphasized that an ideal, the desirable, or the 
end-in-view, should be judged on its reasonableness as against 
its arbitrariness on the grounds of its function, of what it 
does, not on the grounds of its origin. If an ideal does 
function for human needs, it is called reasonable and not 
arbitrary. Dewey, of course, did not consider the assumption 
of the emphasis on function, conditions and consequences of 
projected ends-in-view, and the empirical method itself as 
arbitrary or anything but concrete. But he did, arbitrarily, 
fix his attention on the empirical mode and on the conditions 
of and consequences of projected ends-in-view (empirically
^^Ibid., p. 39.
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defined) to problematic situations. Prior conditions of the 
problems themselves are referred merely to the given quality 
of the immediately felt situation. Yet is it not also neces­
sary to find what it is about man that he can be in a problem­
atic situation to begin with? Does an inadequacy of existen­
tial conditions make a situation problematic, as Dewey held, 
or does the concept of inadequacy itself define existential 
conditions as problematic? The question then is whether it 
is sufficient to base a whole system of thought, and the 
definition of man along with it, on types of reactions to 
given situations, or whether it is necessary to open up the 
"given" to find how and why it is simply "given."
Dewey noted that the "desired" was merely an end-in- 
itself, and like all merely ideal ends, would— if acted upon—  
break down the continuity of inquiry and contradict the or­
ganic basis of ongoing activity. Dewey held that nothing 
happened as final in that there was nothing which was not 
part of an ongoing stream of events. This is scientific, 
organic analysis applied to human activity. It follows that 
the distinction between ends and means is temporal and rela­
tional. Not only the desirable end-in-view of a problematic 
situation, but also "every condition that has to be brought 
into existence in order to serve as means is, in that connec­
tion, an object of desire and an end-in-veiw, while the end 
actually reached is a means to future ends as well as a test
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of valuations previously made. The importance of this is
how Dewey made the analysis. He began it by asserting that
"in all the physical sciences (using 'physical' here as a
synonym for nonhuman) it is now taken for granted that all
14
'effects' are also 'causes.'" The point is that Dewey has
taken what is of value in the physical sciences, purposely
nonhuman, and directly transplanted it to the specifically
human situation:
If the notion of some objects as ends-in-themseIves 
were abandoned, not merely in words but in all prac- 
ical implications, human beings would for the first 
time in history be in a position to frame ends-in- 
view and form desires on the basis of empirically 
grounded propositions on the temporal relations of 
events to one another.
Moreover, Dewey explicitly proposed that man, in his relations 
and activities, would not be truly free until he used himself 
and his activities, aims and values as inputs to the empiri­
cally verifiable scientific method. Freeing man from such 
arbitrary value systems as religion and social custom is a 
function of setting man and his activity as another subject 
matter for scie n c e . T h u s  man must be defined within the 
scope of the method of science, i.e., finally empirically. 
Science evaluates man. If man is not the evaluator of ends—  
Dewey said method and scientific fact are— then one must think 
that man must be seen as the creator of ends. But in Dewey's
^^Ibid., p. 43. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
^^This is the basic subject matter of A Common Faith, 
cf. pp. 55-57, 66, 72-73, 86, et passim.
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analysis what actually belongs alone to man is found to be 
merely a nonvaluative exercise in reaction, the forming of the 
"desired." Man, according to Dewey, as a reflective creature 
is responsible only for the desired ends which form the basis 
of an hypothesis of an end-in-view through scientific method. 
Such a hypothetical end-in-view is experimental and nonvalua­
tive until proven "real" ( warranted as valuable) by empirical 
means. But the last steps are not the unique function of man, 
only the blind reaction to the quality of the situation is.
Is man, in his activity of reflection— of being rational—  
only hypothetical in character? Dewey's view of science de­
mands this. Hence the developer of ideals, nonvaluative in 
themselves, is a neutral being, experimental, and hypothetical. 
Is man really so? If Dewey was to be consistent with his ex­
pressed world view, man simply had to be so.
It further follows that if human ends are judged 
solely in terms of the conditions necessary to their fulfill­
ment and their consequences empirically defined, such ends 
are defined as means as well as ends. The effect, which Dewey 
purposely endorsed, is to deny a fundamental difference be­
tween ends and means so that organic continuity may persist. 
Dewey felt he had to do this to discredit the continued be­
lief in 'ends-in-themselves' as solely and finally legitimate 
kinds of ends. The result is the severe limiting of the
17
Dewey, Valuation, p. 40.
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scope of specifically human activity. Denied is man's role in 
developing the criteria upon which his aims and projections, 
in terms of ends-in-view, are finally judged valuable— for 
the empirical method, while continually refined by man, was 
assumed by Dewey as the natural development of the empirically 
defined naturalistic world view. On the other hand, the hypo­
thesis formed in the thinking process of man is strictly a re­
action to the problematic situation, which is so precisely 
through the givenness of its quality. In Dewey's formulation, 
only between the given of the problem and the given of the 
mode in which the solution is to be evaluated does man him­
self play his role. The severity of the limitation is illus­
trated by noting that actually the only step in the whole 
process which can be deduced from Dewey's theory is man's 
emotive reaction to the problem and therefore the positing of 
an immediate desire for solution. All other factors of the 
problematic situation are not concerned about the unique 
position of man, but rather are deducable from the assumed 
naturalistic position: the quality of the given situation,
the given mode of solution and verification. The whole of 
man’s own activity— in the problematic situation— that which 
is unique to him and which therefore must be that which sets 
him off from the rest of the universe— is the positing of the 
"desired." The analysis here shows that, for Dewey, it was a 
strictly nonvaluative, nonmoral, nonintellectual procedure.
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It is precisely here, then, that one must reevaluate 
the meaning of some of the steps and terms Dewey used. Begin­
ning with the process of establishing the desired, one should 
note that the desired end is_ an ideal— a quite arbitrary 
ideal— with its content coming from the given whole of the 
problematic situation. What causes it? Specifically, the 
human need in the situation. Thus one has an arbitrary ideal 
caused by a need in the situation. Yet this arbitrary ideal,
contra Dewey's position on arbitrariness, is not at all ^
18
extra to the situation. Next, and equally important, the 
end posited by such an arbitrary ideal is, in fact, an end- 
In-itself (a point which Dewey acknowledged, but for different 
reasons, namely, because there was no consideration of empiri­
cal means to its attainment). It is the first projection of 
an end which, no matter how much it is to be seen in terms of 
the existential conditions for its fulfillment (and thus 
changed into the "desirable"), must always be seen as an end, 
the end or purpose of this problematic situation, here and 
now for this man. Such an arbitrary end-in-itself is a func­
tion of the conditions of the problem (whatever further analy­
sis shows this to be), and not of the empirical conditions 
for fulfillment. If all judgment is based on the latter, as 
Dewey seemed to propose, then the criteria of both the ends 
and means are empirical availability. But means, no matter
18
Cf. above, pp. 95-95.
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how much they may need to be empirically available, must be
previously defined by the end for which they are means ; such
ends, no matter how much they also may need to be empirically
available, must be ends which are seen in themselves and thus
have their own value based upon the conditions of the original
quality of the problematic situation prior to their evaluation
in terms of the existential conditions for their fulfillment.
To suppose that this entails a manipulated abstraction of the
facts of the concrete situation, and not the facts themselves—
19
as Dewey explicitly argued — assumes that scientific analysis 
of fact is the only analysis of fact. Thus the result is the 
failure to pay attention to the more comprehensive human situ­
ation. Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness never had 
a more cogent and flagrant example.
To propose what is here being proposed is to assume 
there is a real value in the idea of desire prior to its being 
defi. ^ d in terms of scientific method. This is to assert 
that desire, in positing the ends which Dewey called the "de­
sired," has a purposive and valuative function, and that this, 
at least in part, is a consequence of valuative conditions in 
man prior to the judgment and function of scientific method 
and the explanatory scheme of the naturalistic universe 
Oddly enough, though Dewey had to thoroughly disagree with
19
Dewey, Valuation, p. 44.
^%or, for that matter, has Dewey’s own "contextual 
fallacy" seen such an example.
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this criticism theoretically, he seemed to attempt to vitiate 
its effect by agreeing that man did, in fact, bring something 
uniquely his own to the scientific analysis of reality, and 
that this uniqueness was valuable and had to be saved from 
being obscured by the scientific method. In the closing analy­
sis of Theory of Valuation, Dewey dealt with the place of the 
emotive— the "desired"— in man's inquiry and evaluative pro­
cedures. He criticized the past for following only the demands 
of the emotive, while paying little or no attention to pre­
cepts of rational reflection, appraisal and the "desirable":
The split which exists in present social life between 
ideas and emotions, especially between ideas that have 
scientific warrant and uncontrolled emotions that 
dominate practice, the split between the affections 
and the cognitive, is probably one of the chief sources 
of the maladjustments and unendurable'strains from 
which the world is suffering. . . .  We are living in a 
period in which emotional loyalties and attachments 
are centered on objects that no longer command that 
intellectual loyalty which has the sanction of the 
methods which attain valid conclusions in scientific 
inquiry while ideas that have their origin in the ra­
tionale of inquiry have not as yet succeeded in acquir­
ing the force that only emotional ardor provides. The 
practical problem that has to be faced is the estab­
lishment of cultural conditions that will support the 
kinds of behavior in which emotions and ideas, desires 
and appraisals, are integrated.
The important phrase here is that "emotions and ideas, desires 
/ in terms of the emotive "desired"_7 and appraisals, are in- 
tegrated." Dewey did not want emotion deleted, even though 
his analysis points out that, theoretically, it is nonvalua­
tive in nature. Dewey continued:
21
Dewey, Valuation, p. 65.
103
In fact and in net outcome, the previous discussion does 
not point in the least to supersession of the emotive by 
the intellectual. Its only and complete import is the 
need for their integration in behavior— behavior in 
which, according to common speech, the head and the 
heart work together, in which, to use more technical 
language, prizing and appraising unite in direction of 
action.
But what does the unfication or integration of the nonvalua­
tive and valuative achieve? In Dewey's analysis, it achieves 
the valuative, which is simply to say, that Dewey did not inte­
grate or unite these two "sides" of desire— the nonvaluative 
"desired" and the valuative "desirable." He chose the latter 
no matter how important he felt it was to keep the former 
within the framework of his system. He elaborated: "The
operation of desire in producing 'the valuations that influence
human action will also be liberated when they, too, are ordered
23
by verifiable propositions regarding matters-of-fact." De­
sire, thus "liberated" from emotion, custom, authority, ap­
peals to absolutes and ancient traditions is, in fact, reason 
or the rational, according to the rest of Dewey's analysis. 
Desire "liberated" from the emotive, nonvaluative, is not uni- 
fiable or capable of integration with desire as emotive. The 
latter is immediate to the situation, and it is not unifiable 
with desire as rational precisely because of the care which 
Dewey has taken to liberate desire from the immediate and the 
emotional. On the one hand he spoke of integration, on the 
other— and in the next sentence— he spoke of liberation from
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 55.
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such an integration. This seems simply a contradiction. Why?
Because Dewey realized the quandary his theoretical analysis
had left him: If one takes away the concept of emotion from
the basic human endeavor of acting purposefully in the world,
then one has effectively taken the humanness out of being 
24
human. Dewey thought the emotional part of human nature 
was so important that he attributed the popularity of totali­
tarian dictatorships, even, to "the split between the affec- 
tional and the cognitive . . . the strain produced by separa­
tion of the intellectual and the emotional is so intolerable
that human beings are willing to pay almost any price for the
25
semblance of even its temporary annihilation." Dewey was
aware of the problem, and he cared. There can be no doubt
about that. But look at the theoretical solution: If man is
tom between emotion and the rational, define desire (emotion
toward ends) as empirical rationality; then define all value
and valuation as the successful fulfillment of such empirical
rationality; then note that science, and its naturalistic
world view, is all that really defines "fact." This done,
the problems of man can quite handily be solved. Dewey
thought this was so: "The science that is put to distinctively
human use is that in which warranted ideas about the nonhuman
26world are integrated with emotion as human traits." Only,
24
Cf. Dewey, A Common Faith, pp. 79-80, also, Human 
Nature and Conduct, p. 258.
^^Dewey, Valuation, p. 65. ^^Ibid., p. 66.
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one sees what such "integration" means: just as the "desired"
and the "desirable" are integrated to get the "desirable," so
"science and the nonhuman world" are integrated with "emotion
as human trait" to get "science and the nonhuman world."
Dewey concluded his book by reaffirming this point:
In this integration not only is science itself a 
value (since it is the expression and the fulfill­
ment of a special human desire and interest) but it 
is the supreme means of the valid determination of 
all valuations in all aspects of human and social 
life.
Can there be any doubt as to the theoretical definition of 
man in the philosophy of John Dewey? He asserted that "knowl­
edge of the human condition psychological science," and 
that "the propositions which have resulted and which now form 
the substantial content of physics, of chemistry, and, to a 
growing extent, of biology, provide the very means by which 
the change which is required can be introduced into beliefs
28
and ideas purporting to deal with human and social phenomena." 
Can there be any doubt that, theoretically, man has become 
merely and simply the empirical subject matter of an empiri­
cal science based on an empirical definition of valuation in 
an empirically defined naturalistic scheme of the universe?
Provided that man is, indeed, definable wholly within 
the scope of empirical science, Dewey's proposed solution to 
the problems of man seems indeed valuable. One of the keys
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 52 and p. 63.
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to such an interpretation of man is the advances Dewey felt
biology had made:
A grounded theory of the phenomena of human behavior is 
as much a prerequisite of a theory of valuation as is a 
throry of the behavior of physical (in the sense of 
nonhuman)things. The development of a science of the 
phenomena of living creatures was an unqualified pre­
requisite of the development of a sound psychology.
Until biology supplied the material facts which lie 
between the nonhuman and the human, the apparent traits 
of the latter were so different from those of the 
former that the doctrine of a complete-gulf between the 
two seemed to be the only plausible one. The missing 
link in the chain of knowledge that terminates in 
grounded valuation propositions is the biological. As 
that link is in process of forging, we may expect the 
time soon to arrive in which the obstacles to develop­
ment of an empirical theory of valuation will be those 
habits and traditions that flow from institutional and 
class interests rather than from intellectual defi­
ciencies.
The crux of the matter lies in the ability of biology to suc­
cessfully define man in such a way as to deny the necessity of 
a difference between the treatment of man and the treatment of 
rocks and amoebas as subject matter of the physical sciences. 
For the purposes of science, which are, in Dewey's theoretical 
account, the only purposes, there is no difference between the 
nonhuman and the human. Few would deny that physical science 
may treat of man as physical object just as any other physical 
object. But to generalize from this that science is "the 
supreme means of the valid determination of all valuations in 
all aspects of human and social life” demands just what Dewey 
has been consistent enough to propose: namely, the flattening
29
Ibid., p. 63.
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of the definition of man such that it may become the subject 
matter, and only the subject matter of empirical method.
Truly, Dewey was willing to pay almost any price for the tempo­
rary semblance of the annihilation of the split between the af- 
fectional and the cognitive and for a successful method for 
dealing with the problems of men. There is no doubt that 
Dewey defined man in this manner because he thought he had 
successfully kept the human in the situation through affirma­
tion of human emotion. Analysis shows, however, that such an 
affirmation still does not draw what is specifically human 
into the evaluative process. Affirmation of the emotive by 
an empirical method itself viable only insofar as it denies 
the emotive is contradictory. Man, as feeling, loving, car­
ing, valuing, and purposing— man as a creature of pathos in 
the arbitrary, ethical immediate now-world— is, in the Deweyan 
theoretical scheme, simply a blind, reactionary, hypothetical, 
nonvaluative, amoral and ignorant creature. Only when sub­
sumed under empirical criteria and judged upon empirical con­
ditions for consequences do his activities become moral and 
valuative, and even then only upon the judgment of the major­
ity of interested empirical investigators whose conclusions 
can forever be only tentative. There is no comprehensive 
concept of man, even in Dewey's definition of the human being­
in -emotion, in the final nonemotive evaluation of man from the 
empirical standpoint. And through his emotions, the man John 
Dewey knew this, for it was precisely the reason he spent
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seventy years of his life devoted to man— man as whole human 
being, not as physical subject matter for empirical science.
CHAPTER VIII 
THEORY OF MAN IN HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT
In another basically theoretical work on the nature 
of man, Human Nature and Conduct, 1922, Dewey viewed a broader 
spectrum of human life than in the Theory of Valuation. The 
basic position is the same, but the additional breadth allows 
further critical analysis of Dewey's position.
Dewey's concern in Human Nature and Conduct is basi­
cally "morals," which he defined as "all the subjects of dis­
tinctively human import, all of the social disciplines as far 
as they are intimately connected with the life of man and as 
they bear upon the interests of humanity."  ^ Since what Dewey 
here attempted to do was to study human nature in terms of the 
scientific knowledge of his day, he saw his attempt as from 
che standpoint of a psychology in its broader sense, that is, 
as it purported to have something relevant to say about all of 
human activity. The purpose then, is
. . . that a knowledge of human nature provides a map 
or chart of all humane and social subjects, and that 
with this chart in our possession we can find our way 
intelligently about through all the complexities of
4)ewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. v.
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the phenomena of economics, politics, religious be­
liefs, etc.
Such human nature is a contributing factor to the form of 
natural science, much like any other possible subject matter 
of science, and Dewey disagreed with Hume that human nature, 
in particular, was the key to the content of natural science. 
This is, of course, in keeping with Dewey’s position that man 
is another natural part of the universe— with all others, but 
another subject matter of the universal inquiry of science.
Dewey concluded the introduction by noting that while 
this was not a strictly psychological text, it did treat the 
idea of habit which was the key to social psychology. The 
operations of impulse and intelligence were tne keys to in­
dividualized mental activity, he thought, but "they are secon­
dary to habit so that mind can be understood in the concrete 
only as a system of beliefs, desires and purposes which are 
formed in the interaction of biological aptitudes with a so­
cial environment.The interaction of organism with environ­
ment is judged as ethical, and change to institute the ethical
is "involved in positive respect for human nature when the
4
latter is associated with scientific knowledge." Evil is 
the severing of morals from the findings of science about 
human nature, the "actualities of human physiology and psychol­
ogy."^ Thus Dewey, at the very outset of the book, left no
2 3
Ibid., p. vi. Ibid., Preface to the first edition.
4 5
Ibid., pp. 3-4. (Emphasis added.) Ibid., p. 4.
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doubt how human nature was to be defined, and how actuality 
was found. It remains but to note some of the consequences 
of the development of the argument.
The emphasis of this book lies in the discussion of 
human nature for the purpose of defining moral activity.
Moral activity, the same as evaluative activity in Theory of 
Valuation, is discovered through tracing the problematic 
situation to its conclusion. The latter, judged on its em­
pirically verifiable consequences, is good or bad, moral or 
immoral, on the basis of how successful it is in satisfying 
the original problem. In the original life activity of the 
organism, stimulus and response are mechanically linked to­
gether in an unbroken chain. It is the path of unconscious 
least resistance which is neither good nor bad, but merely 
the ongoing activity based on natural and habitual responses 
to the world. Dewey called this "ruthless and dull efficiency" 
and noted that, fortunately, nature put obstacles in the way 
of complete acceptance of such a life. Such obstacles recall 
consciousness to the task of carr^'ing the organisms past them,
and Dewey was careful to note that this was the only reason
6
that consciousness was called into operation. The ongoing 
activity itself is composed of habits and natural activities 
of the organism. Habits are secondary and acquired, not na­
tive and original, and are outgrowths of unlearned activities
6
Ibid., p. 173.
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which are part of man's endowment at birth.^ Dewey asserted 
that these unlearned activities had meaning which was acquired 
in the social situation, and this was why they contributed to 
formation of habit. Habit is routine; it is the nonreflective 
interaction with the environment, and is as much conditioned 
by the environment as by the organism itself. Habit is a re­
peated pattern of action with the environment in response to 
certain stimuli. It is not simply a repeated function, but a 
given response to a given stimulus. In social terms, it is 
strict custom. A habit is originally formed as a successful 
response to a new stimulus, and continues until it no longer 
has conditions available for its success. The sum of the in­
terpenetration of habit in the organism is its character.^
9
The activity of character is will.
When the ongoing activity of organic habit is thwarted 
or impeded by circumstances, the organism does not consciously 
will to change, for will is blind response. Rather, the or­
ganism has a natural impulse— on "instinct"—  to activity in 
reaction to the new situation, the novel stimulus which old 
habit cannot respond to satisfactorily. If habitual response 
does not fulfill the need, then this impulse strikes out, de­
manding activity, demanding satisfaction of the new stimulus. 
In this way, impulse is the release from old habit and custom;
7 8
Ibid., p. 89, also cf. p. 147. Ibid. p. 38.
9
Ibid., p. 42.
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it affords the opportunity of imagination and invention. In 
short, it demands new ends, new purposes, at the same time re­
leasing the organism from the absolute clutches of habit and 
custom. As such, it calls forth intellect, not merely immedi­
ate activity, "but reflection upon the way in which to use im­
pulse to renew dispositions and old habit.
Impulse is needed to arouse thought, incite reflection 
and enliven belief. But only thought notes obstruc­
tions , invents tools, conceives aims, directs tech­
nique, and thus converts impulse into an art which 
lives in objects. Thought is born as the twin of im­
pulse in every moment of impeded habit.
Dewey later described "desire" in the same way: "Desire is
the forward urge of living creatures. When the push and drive
of life meets no obstacles, there is nothing which we call 
12
desire." Desire is the surging forth of the organism to 
break through the obstacle which dams up its ongoing activity. 
The end of such desire, the end of such impulse, is not neces­
sarily to be seen as the end of the reflective thought and it 
definitely is not to be seen as the actual outcome of the pro­
cess of resolving the obstacle of the problematic situation.
It is to be noted here that the ends of impulse and desire 
are that "desired" of which Dewey spoke in Theory of Valuation. 
Basically, there are no differences in the analyses, but there 
are some differences in the manners in which they are carried
^^Ibid., p. 170, also cf. p. 177.
^^Ibid., pp. 171-172. (Emphasis added.)
^^Ibid., p. 249.
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out. In Human Nature and Conduct there is a definite sense 
in which thought, reflection or deliberation assigns value, 
or moral content, to possible ends-in-view prior to their ac­
tual use in the empirical situation, and prior to their judg­
ment on that use.^^ In Theory of Valuation such ideations or 
ideal ends-in-view are judged strictly on their existential 
conditions and consequences through empirical verification.
It is a difference of particular emphasis, and not of the 
basic analysis.
In both works there is an ambiguity in the analysis 
as to just where thought starts. In Theory of Valuation the 
"desired" and the "desirable" are both ends of desire, but 
the former is of the desire of immediate reaction to the prob­
lem, while the latter incorporates reflection on the existen­
tial conditions necessary for its fulfillment. It was noted 
that the process of determining the "desirable" was that of
thought, of inquiry, and of reason. In Human Nature and Con-
14
duct, in the passage quoted above, Dewey noted that "thought 
is b o m  as the twin of impulse in every moment of impeded 
habit." Why include "impulse" at all, then? What value has 
it if it is simultaneous with thought? But in the later 
formulation in which Dewey used "desire," it was put this way: 
"The 'object' which then presents itself in thought as the
^^Ibid., pp. 191-192, p. 208, et passim. 
14
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goal of desire is the object of the environment which, if it
were present, would secure a reunification of activity and
the restoration of its ongoing a c t i v i t y . T h i s  implies
that the original immediate desire has defined an end which
thought then works upon in terms of projected existential con-
16
ditions empirically defined. This is the more likely formu­
lation in both works, but then it runs, again, into the dif­
ficulty that the formulation of ends is necessarily evaluative, 
and such evaluation precedes logically and temporally the 
judgment of evaluation on empirical grounds. Once again this 
is to suggest a hidden criterion of valuation (morals, aesthet­
ics, etc.) prior to the engagement of the processes of the em­
pirical investigation.
Thought, itself, is reflection upon the problematic 
situation through a deliberative process which notes the 
"facts" of the situation as they pertain to the problem, then 
establishes hypotheses. Such hypotheses both more clearly de­
fine the problem and suggest solutions. "During this search, 
old habit supplies content, filling, definite, recognizable, 
subject-matter.It is imagination projecting ends based 
upon what the organism already knows, namely, the past
^^Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 249-250.
Impulse determine the direction of movement. . . . 
Impulse defines the peering, the search, the inquiry." Ibid., 
p. 180.
Ibid.
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activities of its history and the habits formed in such ac­
tivity. When this imagination works, it
. . . reinforces, inhibits, redirects habits already 
working or stirs up others which had not previously 
actively entered in. In thought as well as in overt 
action, the objects experienced in following out a 
course of action attract, repel, satisfy, annoy, pro­
mote and retard.
And so deliberation proceeds, and when it ceases, choice of
an end has taken place. What is such a choice? It is "simply
hitting in imagination upon an object which furnishes an ade-
19
quate stimulus to the recovery of overt action." "All de­
liberation is a search for a way to act, not for a final ter-
20
minus. Its office is to facilitate stimulation." In this 
formulation, Dewey emphasized the process of imagination's 
figuring ways to solve the dilemma. When a proper solution 
is reached, the deliberative process is over and action re­
sults. Here reasonableness is taking all points into con­
sideration prior to action. If error in action occurs, "it
comes from lack of data, not from ineptitude in handling 
21
them." While it later becomes evident that the data » is em­
pirically defined, the emphasis here is on the concept of 
reasonableness as deliberative process correctly enacted 
rather than its empirical verification.
But reasonableness is in fact a quality of an effec­
tive relationship among desires rather than a thing 
opposed to desire. It signifies the order,
1 Q 1 9
^^Ibid., p. 192. Ibid.
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perspective, proportion which is achieved, during 
deliberation, out of a diversity of earlier incom­
patible preferences. Choice is reasonable when it 
induces us to act reasonably: that is, with regard
to the claims of each of the competing habits and 
impulses.
Taken in itself, in merely this formulation, one would have 
to ascribe a different criterion to reason (or reasonable­
ness) than strict obedience to empirical verifiability. But 
Dewey emphasized the attainment of such ends-in-view, and it
is only in the attainment, empirically verifiable, that the
23
reasonably arrived at end-in-view is, in fact, reasonable. 
Actual operation of the conclusion or choice is the criterion 
which defines it as_ the choice and as reasonable. Delibera­
tion projects about this operation in reaction to present 
operations and memory of past operations. Dewey did not deny 
that such projections might be wrong, but it was because they 
were of empirical events and of reactions to them that they 
may be tested by empirical investigations. Reason is defined 
as dealing with empirical situations in such a way as to be 
verifiable by empirical method. What was reasonable in the 
past may not be so now or in the future, but if the projections 
of past reasonableness are based on empirical data, they are 
now and continually available to empirical verification. If 
the data are insufficient or wrong, it is the fault of the 
data, and not of the empirical process, i.e., reason or logic. 
The very fact that deliberation occurs, according to Dewey's
^^Ibid., pp. 194-195. ^^Ibid., p. 251ff.
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formulation, is that empirical data has changed and what was 
valuable in the past in dealing with it is not valuable now: 
this is the cause of the problematic situation. The projec­
tive deliberation is simply a way of creating new habits for 
new or different empirical data, and this is an experimental 
process. In any specific case, insufficiency of data does 
not deny the reasonableness of the method; it actually affirms 
it. It is when the method is not applied to empirical facti- 
city that it becomes unreasonable, for Dewey thought that inso­
far as one was not true to empirical fact, he would be lost 
and confused in activity.
When a choice is made and activity replaces delibera­
tion, a new habit is formed which is good, valuable and moral 
as it actually satisfies the requirements of the original 
problematic situation. There is, in Dewey, some sense in 
which the good, moral or valuable is itself not an object of 
reflective thought, and is therefore not realizable as such. 
For example, Dewey was careful to note that "habit, does not,
of itself, know, or it does not of itself stop to think, to
24
observe or remember." If a solution is projected in terms 
of both satisfying the problem and as having existential con­
ditions for its fulfillment, it is projected as a good or a 
value. But judgment of it as such is upon its actual fulfill­
ment. Of course, if this fulfillment is wholly satisfactory
24
Ibid., p. 177.
119
with no bad existential consequences, what obstruction is 
there presented for consciousness and deliberation to review 
it and judge it as good? None, evidently. Only objects of 
negative value are the objects of conscious reflection. Only 
if a projection is inadequate is it the subject matter of 
further intellectual, empirical investigation. Scientific 
method projects, but it knows only the past. It is put into 
operation only in response to inadequacy, not adequacy, for 
the latter is a function of habit which "knows" not itself 
nor anything else.^^ This objection may be answ.erable in the 
following terms, according to Dewey's formulation: Past suc­
cessful activities which are now habits, are the subject matter 
for present difficulties, and as such, they are reflected upon 
as possible solutions of a present problematic situation which 
has been initiated by a blockage which did not affect the other 
habit. In this case, the other habit is finally judged as ade­
quate, as good. Such an answer is only partially successful, 
however. The present situation is always different from any 
other. If that other successful habit is called upon in the 
present situation, it cannot be judged good until it has 
proven itself again in a new situation, and one arrives again 
at the old dilemma: how is it known as good if reflection is
always based on inadequacy? This has relevance in the concept 
of responsibility for moral activity as well as in itself as a 
25
John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The
Free Press, 1965), p. 148.
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criticism of the problematic situation conceptual scheme. It 
also introduces the concept of the continuity of the thinking 
process.
Dewey noted that "in every waking moment, the complete 
balance of the organism and its environment is constantly in­
terfered with and as constantly restored.Consequently a 
concept of a stream of consciousness results. Life is a series 
of interruptions and recoveries, rhythmic in quality. But
"continuous interruption is not possible in the activities of 
27
an individual." The point of this position is that one 
does not think all the time, but periodically, in response to 
blockage of the habitual ongoing activity which does go on all 
the time. When Dewey said that man was naturally active, it 
was this habitual biological function to which he had refer­
ence, and not mental activity. Consciousness is a "stream" 
only when its continuity with natural events is strongly 
emphasized. It is a stream in the sense of constant availa­
bility. If it were in constant activity, that would mean the
organism was in continual disturbance and in such a circum-
28
stance, Dewey said the self would go to pieces. The sum of 
this discussion is that if moral and evaluative procedure is 
judgment based on empirical data, ideas of goodness and morality 
are not continuous, but merely available. Their availability
26
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itself is only experimental in that they must be tested anew 
for each specific situation. The consequence of this position 
is that morality and values are strictly relative to here-now 
consideration. Dewey was at pains to illustrate this very 
point because it was his position against a priori, idealized, 
absolute moral laws. The latter, he believed, were responsi­
ble for man's inability to act on the moral plateaus which he 
had established for himself, and therefore acted on no moral 
basis at all.
From this detailed sketch of the basic problematic 
situation produced in Human Nature and Conduct, specific 
areas of human behavior are defined and analyzed. Most im­
portant for the discussion at hand in broadening the implica­
tions of the concept of man found in the Theory of Valuation 
are those of human moral responsibility, creativity, religion 
and the social situation. Critical discussion involves the 
interpenetration of all these concepts, so it is only an 
arbitrary choice to begin with an evaluation of moral responsi­
bility in this theoretical scheme.
Dewey asserted that it was the responsibility of the
mature, upon discovering the use of intelligence to modify
the environment for problem solving, to observe, to recall 
29
and to forecast. Intelligence is an experiment about prob­
lem solving ends which "is carried on by tentative rehearsals
29
Ibid., p. 171.
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in thought which do not affect physical facts outside the 
body. A physical act overtly tried out is irrevocable, as 
are its consequences and also, presumably, the responsibility 
for it. Dewey said that man using intelligence in the prob­
lematic situation constructed an hypothesis based on past 
activity, empirical conditions for the end-in-view it espoused, 
and its consequences as a means of solving the problem. Such 
an hypothesis is a principle on which a man acts. It is be­
cause man can recognize and construct principles, moral princi­
ples, that he is responsible for his acts. By equating moral 
principles with hypothetical thought, Dewey emphasized the 
experimental character of moral endeavor, for "principles are 
methods of inquiry and forecast which require verification by 
the event. . . . Principles exist as hypotheses with which to 
e x p e r i m e n t . H o w  does one experiment with an hypothesis? 
First he forecasts its consequences hypothetically, but only 
in actual physical activity through the method of empirical 
verification— science— is the truth (warrantability) of such 
an hypothesis confirmed. And if the hypothesis is incorrect? 
The scientific method requires as a primary part of its own 
definition, continual reaffirmation of the physically observ­
able consequence of an hypothesis in the same given conditions 
for the whole community of those scientists interested. This
^°Ibid., p. 190.
^^Ibid., p. 239.
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was specifically affirmed by Dewey of C. S. Peirce in his 
32
Logic.
What of man in a moral situation? If he does not wish 
to act merely on cultural or traditional principles, he must, 
as Dewey suggested, project possible consequences. Is this 
process hypothetical? Yes, it is the abstract, imaginative 
function of mind. If a man acts on the basis of the hypothet­
ical principle, is this act hypothetical? No, and Dewey 
pointed this out. No act, as physical act in the world, is 
hypothetical; it is irrevocable, as are its consequences.
Which process, then— according to the Deweyan formulation—  
has value in terms of being the subject matter for evaluation? 
Only the physical act— only it is available to scientific 
verification. The construction of principles and hypotheses 
is nonvaluative. They are but ideations; they are neither 
good nor bad. Only physical acts based upon them may be so 
judged. What is the criterion for the goodness or badness of 
physical activity? Is it man's hypothetical principle, or is 
it the empirical method of the naturalistic world view? It is 
the latter, according to Dewey. Only empirical method may de­
fine what actually are the consequences, and if those conse­
quences satisfy the original problem. Dewey noted that man 
was responsible for thinking, for using intelligence to guide 
himself. But, according to the explanatory scheme presented
32
Dewey, Logic, pp. 13-14, and p. 14n.
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by Dewey, such thinking is only hypothetical in nature, not 
actual and evaluative. Does intelligence guide man then? If 
it is not moral or evaluative, how can it? Furthermore, if 
intelligence, thought or consciousness is only and merely in 
reaction to "given" qualitative situations, in what sense 
could the term "guidance" really be used? If one "guides" 
himself to solve a given problem, but the problem is not his 
(not of his making, but only given by the quality of the situ­
ation) , in what sense does he "guide" himself? He merely 
"guides" the solution of some one or something else's problem. 
What does this say of ethical man? What does this say of 
moral responsibility? Is it not the empirical method and the 
"given" empirical facts of the environment which are actually 
responsible for ends, purposes and moral endeavor, and not 
man? One may then conclude that there is no sense in which 
the theoretical description of man in Dewey is moral or evalu­
ative in nature. Man is reactive and hypothetical in nature. 
He is known by science only as a past empirical act.
Dewey noted that "what a man is doing limits both his
33direct control and his responsibility." What man "is doing- 
is defined in empirical terms, and to what extent this posits 
limitations on the responsibility and control in the theoreti­
cal definition of man, Dewey evidently does not note. It is 
the activity of Dewey the man which denies his theoretical
33
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 259.
125
concept of man. It is the pathos of man to which Dewey as 
human being reacted. This reaction shows him that "our choice 
is between the development of a technique by which intelli­
gence will become an intervening partner and a continuation
34
of a regime of accident, waste and distress." But at what
price is this "technique" bought? Dewey said:
The good, satisfaction, 'end,' of growth of present 
action in shades and scope of meaning is the only 
good within our control, and the only one, accord­
ingly, for which responsibility exists.
Nevertheless, one is forced to ask: just who or what is it
that is actually responsible for such control? Man, accord­
ing to the theoretical scheme here, is intelligent and there­
fore moral, but intelligence and its morals are shown to be 
both hypothetical and not individual in character. Man is 
physical and active, and as such he is real. If man is respon­
sible— and Dewey said he was— and if he is real physically— as 
he can only be if such is judged empirically— then his real 
moral responsibility is judged through empirical verifiability. 
One must ask what sort of moral judgment is made empirically.
Discussion of man in his social setting has not been 
the object of a great deal of attention to this point. But 
Dewey lays great stress on the social situation of man, quite 
in agreement with Aristotle. Ethics "is_ social, whether bad 
or good."^^ Man, in every activity, every habit, every
"^^ Ibid., p. 277. ^^Ibid., pp. 280-281.
^^Ibid., p. 17, also of. p. 315 and 319.
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responsibility is social in character. All of man's activi­
ties "are working adaptations of personal capacities with en- 
37
vironing forces." This is necessarily so in Dewey's posi­
tion, for social conditions fade into environing conditions 
in that both are characterized by being subject matter avail­
able to scientific analysis. Immediately then, while noting 
that man is a social creature, and that society is not itself
a physical thing, the social is judged actual on its empiri-
38
cally available activities. What is not thus verifiable of
society are the customs and traditions themselves. These 
exist as, again, hypotheses or principles of action, just as 
ideations of human intelligence. They are good and true, 
moral and valuable only insofar as they are adequate stimuli 
for successfully satisfying the empirically defined active 
requirements in the world. They are bad insofar as they do 
not do so, and in the writings of Dewey as a whole, they are 
generally bad, for they are more likely "what was sometime 
rational, possibly in some prior experience of one's own, but 
more probably in the experience of some one else which is now 
blindly set up as final authority." The necessity of such
^^Ibid., p. 16.
38"Social pressure is but a name for the interactions 
which are always going on and in which we participate, living 
so far as we partake and dying so far as we do not. The pres­
sure is not ideal but empirical, yet empirical here means only 
actual." Ibid., p. 327. (Emphasis added.)
39
Ibid., p. 66.
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social custom and authority is affirmed, for it is as neces­
sary as the intellectual function of man and the physical en­
vironment. The important point is that it, too, be subject 
to the rational criterion of these other two, namely, that of 
empirical science. Dewey summarizes this point:
Human interaction and ties are there, are operative in 
any case. But they can be regulated, employed in an 
orderly way for good only as we know how to observe 
them. And they cannot be observed aright, they cannot 
be understood and utilized, when the mind is left to 
itself to work without the aid of science. For the 
natural unaided mind means precisely the habits of be­
lief, thought and desire which have been accidentally 
generated and confirmed by social institutions or cus­
toms . But with the admixture of accident and. reason­
ableness we have at least reached a point where social 
conditions create a mind capable of scientific outlook 
and inquiry. To foster and develop this spirit is the 
social obligation of the present because it is its ur­
gent need.
This is, of course, the main plea in the philosophy of John 
Dewey: to impress the proven methods of physical science
onto the social sciences so that man as social creature may 
order and control himself as the physical sciences have or­
dered and controlled physical nature.
Insofar as Dewey reduced the criterion of social 
existence in the same manner as he reduced the function of 
intelligence in the individual man, the former was open to 
the same criticism here put forward of the latter. Man re­
acts to problematic situations, and these situations consist 
of habitual activity and the physical environment. Habitual
40
Ibid., p. 329.
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activity is where the social function is important, for habits
are formed originally through meaning given to instinctual (or
impulsive) activity. Such meaning is given by parents and
41
others in the social realm. "When a child acts, those about
him react. They shower encouragement upon him, visit him with
42
approval, or they bestow frowns and rebuke." Act and conse­
quence— the awareness of the satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
consequence— develops and changes the hypothesis or principle 
upon which the first act was based. The older the child, the 
more reflective and aware he becomes of possible consequences, 
social or strictly physical. It is the basis upon which sci­
ence, the theory of inquiry, stands, and it is the basis on 
which Dewey proposed social transaction stand. And this is 
possible precisely insofar as social activity is available to 
empirical method. Once so defined, the problem of solving 
social problems is solved; all that remains is the task of 
doing it. Dewey did not suggest that this "doing" would be 
easy, but he did propose that this is the manner in which it 
had to be done, for judging or evaluating on previous moral 
rules, on blame and approbation was more emotional than intel­
lectual:
It is guided by custom, personal convenience and re­
sentment rather than by insight into causes and conse­
quences. It makes toward reducing moral instruction, 
the educative influence of social opinion, to an
41 42
Ibid., pp. 89-90. Ibid., p. 314.
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immediate personal matter, that is to say, to an ad­
justment of personal likes and dislikes. ^
Once again, this is an endeavor on the part of Dewey to dis-
value the immediate and snrictly personal end, the "desired."
He emphasized that such "desireds" were merely old custom/
habit, and generally resulted in social chaos if carried out.
But one wonders that if morals are not "an immediate personal
matter," what are they? The "development . . . of a more ade-
44quate science of human nature" which Dewey proposed, as­
serts what is needed in a moral situation, namely, "an im­
personal impartial habit of observation" so that moral situa-
45
tions can be seen for what they "really amount to." Such 
an impersonal treatment of the concrete moral situation in 
Dewey's theory results in the criticisms presented above in 
which human moral responsibility is negated, personal valua­
tion is rejected, and only the method and conceptual scheme
45
seem to stand as responsible.
It is the "enormous role played in popular morals by
appeal to the supernatural and quasi-magical" against which 
47
Dewey reacted. His analysis of human behavior and the 
historical consequences of the appeal to absolute and magical 
forces is vital and important. Custom, tradition and
A? 44
Ibid., p. 320. Ibid., p. 321.
45 46
Ibid., pp. 320-321. Cf. above, p. 124.
47Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 323. Cf. also, 
Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 46, et passim.
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conservative clinging to passionately held to (but unreason­
able) authoritarian institutions is doubtless one of the roots 
of present problems. The reaction to nonempirical philosophi­
cal stances does not, however, logically entail their total 
dismissal nor the total acceptance of their opposite, the 
strictly empirical. Dewey was perfectly aware of this sort of 
overreaction and overacceptance : He called it the philosophi­
cal fallacy to suppose "that whatever is found true under cer­
tain conditions may forthwith be asserted universally or with-
48
out limits and conditions." Dewey did not escape his own 
good sense. One need but show where, sooner or later, what 
Dewey held theoretically true, but which was, on the whole, 
unacceptable, Dewey himself simply ignored. Where specific 
criticism is lacking, the very mode of Dewey's human activity 
and accomplishment fulfills the same purpose.
Nevertheless, Dewey called for a strictly empirical
scientific approach to human relations :
It is a commonplace that modem industry and commerce 
are conditioned upon a control of physical energies 
due to proper methods of physical inquiry and analy­
sis. We have no social arts which are comparable be­
cause we have so nearly nothing in the way of psycho­
logical science. Yet through the development of phys­
ical science, and especially of chemistry, biology, 
physiology, medicine and anthropology we now have the 
basis for the development of such a science of man. °
^®Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 175. 
49
Ibid., p. 324.
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Social and intellectual, moral and hypothetical, evaluative
and aesthetical are all actual, not ideal; but actuality means
the empirical, and thus empirical method is the universal 
50
method.
If man is a social as well as a physical creature, 
but these terms are flattened into one empirical meaning, and 
if intellect and morals/evaluation are likewise given only 
empirical meaning, what happens to the traditional human char­
acteristics of creativity and religion?^^ Dewey said that 
"activity is creative insofar as it moves to its own enrich­
ment as activity, that is, bringing along with itself a re-
52
lease of further activities." Any activity can be creative,
but only if its fulfillment opens further activity to higher
and broader scope. Tangible products of creative activity
are not necessary, but are not derogatory to creative activity
either, and Dewey pointed out that architecture is probably
53
more creative than dancing. But when man merely reacts to
^°Ibid., p. 327.
^^Dewey, himself, did not think he had, by denying the 
overweaning importance and belief in the nonnatural or super­
natural, absolutely affirmed the merely empirical. He felt he 
had saved that which was valuable of the emotional and ideal. 
He thought he had done this through inserting them into the 
naturalistic framework. The contention of this dissertation 
is that what he actually did by such an insertion, is to de­
fine the nonempirical by the methods of the empirical itself. 
Such is merely to deny the nonempirical altogether. So while 
he did not affirm that everything is empirical, he in effect 
did just that through the effective denial of everything else.
52 53
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 143. Ibid.
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a given end or purpose (Dewey used the example of a man tending
a machine), there is no creativity, no insight, no affection 
54
and no growth. To increase a creative phase of human activ­
ity, directing impulse and habit through thought, is an affair 
of modifying the social conditions which reward or deny native 
activities. How is this done?
The first step in dealing with it is to increase our 
detailed scientific knowledge. We need to know ex­
actly the selective and directive force of each social 
situation ; exactly how each tendency is promoted and 
retarded. Command of the physical environment on a 
large and deliberate scale did not begin until belief 
in gross forces and entities was abandoned. Control 
of physical energies is due to inquiry which estab­
lishes specific correlations between minute elements.
It will not be otherwise with social control and ad­
justment. Having the knowledge we may set hopefully 
at work upon a course of social invention and experi­
mental engineering.^^
There is no doubt, at least in this definition of creativity, 
that it is just another subject matter of empirical method, 
for it is defined as successful empirical activity, in any 
field, for practically any purpose. In fact, creating condi­
tions for creativity is a product of "experimental engineer­
ing." But even the way this summary statement is worded im­
plies that the idea of creativity, if not creativity itself, 
precedes logically and temporally the movement toward it.
Dewey here thought that a scientific analysis of the exact 
properties of the social situation would allow man to better 
recreate those situations where creativity was most displayed.
54 55
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But Since the sine qua non of the intellectual, scientific 
movement is the indefinable, immediate and unspeakable prob­
lematic situation, intellectual and scientific method can be 
only partially adequate for the job.^^ What is not the ob­
ject, but rather the cause of scientific method in the problem­
atic situation is ineffable. In Dewey's own explanatory 
scheme, then, there is some question that both creativity and 
the method which is to describe and extend its conditions 
spring from the same conditions. Dewey, in that he felt all 
things sprang from naturalistic conditions, would not be at 
pains to deny this. If, however, naturalistic conditions are 
not adequate in themselves for these two processes, then there 
is a problem. The criticism here asserts that such a natural­
istic base cripples the concept of man in that it does affirm 
that naturalistic conditions are adequate.
For this— and for other easons mentioned— the meta­
physics which supports the naturalistic position is inade­
quate. Indeed, just in this short discussion of creativity 
it becomes evide.-.r that the method to discover and enhance 
creativity presumes the idea and process of that very crea­
tivity. Dewey denied that this was circular; it is merely 
the spiral concept of organic, natural development. Neverthe­
less, he did start with the idea of creativity, a fact which 
in this analysis cannot be denied unless he confused
^^Ibid., p. 254, et passim.
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psychological with logical priority. In fact, Dewey might 
not even deny that, but he would, then, explain that creativ­
ity, being "natural" and being a feature of the "given" 
problematic situation, operates all the while, but man comes 
to realize it only through growth and the ability to inquire, 
through scientific method.
Dewey's discussion of man in the empirical world af­
firms real change in the empirical world. He assumes this 
change is progressive and creative : "Variability, initiative,
innovation, departure from routine, experimentation are em­
pirically the manifestation of a genuine nisus in things.
The life of man "seems in these respects as in others to ex­
press a culmination of facts in nature." Man is the recep­
tor of these natural "things" and part of the creator of them 
only insofar as he too is a natural part of the empirical en­
vironment, for they are all "given" in a particular situation.
So, again, the question must be raised: What IS man?
Dewey noted that "man is a creature of habit, not of reason
59
nor yet of instinct." Yet man thinks, when he has to work 
through problems which mere habit will not solve. When he 
has a given situation which is unfavorable (because the givens 
are in conflict), he reacts with the impulse to find condi­
tions which will resolve the conflict. The given character 
of the conflict establishes the perimeter within which the
57 58 59
Ibid., p. 310. Ibid. Ibid., p. 125.
135
solution may be found. An end-in-view is projected, and it 
either works or not; if it does, it is a new habit, if it 
does not, the process is repeated. The problem comes about 
by change in the relations of givens in the natural environ­
ment; its solution is appropriated by finding and using pos­
sible empirical conditions. The process is intelligence. 
Insofar as man uses intelligence, he is a human being, dif­
ferent from a simple animal and morally responsible for his 
activity.
The process is intelligence, but is man intelligent? 
No, Dewey very specifically and consistently denied that in­
dividual man is intelligent. He "appropriates" intelligence :
Intelligence becomes ours in the degree in which 
we use it and accept responsibility for consequences.
It is not ours originally or by production. 'It 
thinks' is a truer psychological statement than 'I 
think.' Thoughts sprout and vegetate ; ideas prolif­
erate. They come from deep unconscious sources. 'I 
think' is a statement about voluntary action. Some 
suggestion surges from the unknown. Our active body 
of habits appropriates it. The suggestion then be­
comes an assertion. It no longer merely comes to us.
It is accepted and uttered by us. We act upon it and 
thereby assume, by implication, its consequences. The 
stuff of belief and proposition is not originated by 
us. It comes to us from others, but education, tradi­
tion and the suggestion of the enyironment. Our in­
telligence is bound up, so far as its materials are 
concerned, with the community life of which we are a 
part. We know what it communicates to us, and know 
according to habits it forms in us. Science is an 
affair of ciyilization not of individual intellect.
Within such a formulation, where IS the man Dewey 
sought to save? What has he done to man by attempting to
^^Ibid., p. 314. (Emphasis added.)
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save him? It is apparent that what there is left of man is 
what is given him by the naturalistic world view— strictly 
given. This is perfectly clear by the definition of man's 
responsibility as "implication." Man is implicated in his ac­
ceptance of intellectual consequences precisely as he is im­
plicated by burning his hand in a fire. It simply happens 
to him. The indictment against man is self defined. Further­
more, how can a man accept responsibility for intelligent ac­
tion without that being a process of thought through which he 
has already, by some prior act accepted its responsibility, 
and so forth?
Dewey's theory of the naturalistic universe, as seen 
through its implications in the theory of man, does not solve 
problems of the human condition. It solves all the problems 
which are set up within the naturalistic universe itself (at 
least, it has not yet been conclusively proven not to do this), 
but since man is not wholly there, man's problems continue to 
proliferate. The more so, in fact, because the effective mask­
ing of the real problems through a one-sided definition of them 
only makes them the more difficult. Problems and their condi­
tions are not put into the human realm of activity— nor are 
they solved. They are merely pushed back into the realm of 
the given, or denied to be within the human condition whatso­
ever:
We are not the creators of heaven and earth ; we have 
no responsibility for their operations save as their 
motions are altered by our movementsOur concern
137
is with the significance of that slight fraction of 
total activity which starts from ourselves
But then, later, Dewey admitted that that very function which 
defined man from other creatures of nature, intelligence, did 
not start from man. Finally nothing save blind emotive reac­
tion is unique to man. As are the grains of sand on a beach, 
man is forever washed about by the waves of a universe of mo­
tion and empirical fact.
Yet if even this is the case, who notes it? Who sees 
it? Who feels it and defines it and hypothesizes about it, 
and who absolutizes about it and creates gods from it? What 
about the creature who does these things? Is it a creature 
defined by a given world view, or is it man who defines the 
world view and himself? It is, indeed, man. It was John 
Dewey, forever the standing contradiction of every bit of his 
theoretical definition of man. It was John Dewey, the full 
participant in the expanse of creation, who could turn upon 
himself and say that man was petty in comparison with the 
totality of natural events; who could say that man was merely 
connected with an infinity of empirical events that sustain 
and support his activity. It was John Dewey who could define 
the created universe as available to empirical verification 
and assert that such verification comprehends its full reality, 
then note that it was the office of religion to promote the 
awareness, appreciation and significance of this universe
^^Ibid., p. 206.
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because such cognizance was incapable of objective presents- 
62
tion. It was the man John Dewey who, as strict scientist, 
turned to religion and noted that "the religious experience 
is a reality insofar as in the midst of effort to foresee and 
regulate future objects we are sustained and expanded in 
feebleness and failure by the sense of an enveloping whole.
It was the man John Dewey who, as a philosopher, created an 
intellectual system into which he would define everything, 
then stepped out of it just long enough to note that there 
was a point in every intellectual activity where effort ceased 
and where striving and doing fall back on a course of events 
which effort and reflection cannot touch.
It is the paradox of man in the philosophy of John 
Dewey which is illustrated when he as a feeling, religious 
and intelligent man, dedicated to the problems of man in this 
world, created an absolute, crippled scheme in the naturalistic 
world view to solve those problems. The space-time concept of 
man thus created contrasts sharply with the man who created it 
as well as the concept of man for whom it was created.
^^Cf. Dewey, A Common Faith, pp. 18-19, et passim.
p. 261ff.
^^Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 264, also cf.
CHAPTER IX
DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
Democracy and Education is one of Dewey's better 
known books. Even though Dewey was 55 when he wrote it, it 
may be considered one of the earlier major works. Written in 
1916, it preceded Human Nature and Conduct by eight years and 
Logic, Theory of Inquiry by 22 years. If it is considered 
one of the earlier major works, one must yet realize that 
Dewey had been writing and publishing since 1882. While the 
earliest efforts were Hegelian in outlook, Dewey had by 1900 
begun to reach the basics of the instrumental or pragmatic 
position which he was to defend throughout his mature years. 
Most of the major elements of the instrumental position were 
clearly defined in the little work How We Think, published in 
1910.^ Consequently, the positions taken by Dewey in Democ­
racy and Education represent a summary form of the instru­
mental position developed to that date in its relevance to 
education. That Dewey continued to develop this position for
^Cf. Morton G. White, The Origin of Dewey's Instru­
mentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 152.
White places the development of Dewey's own instrumental 
thought with Studies in Logical Theory, 1903, and he thinks 
that by 1904 most of the idealist ties had been broken when 
instrumental logic was affirmed.
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another 34 years is a note not only on longevity, but also on 
the basic faith in the pragmatic or instrumental position.
As Dewey remarked about his own position in the Preface
2
to the enlarged edition of How We Think in 1933, so one can 
here remark that few if any basic positions change in Dewey's 
thought through the years, but all positions undergo continual 
scrutiny and minor modifications, more often than not, in the 
terms used to express them. With such a premise in mind, one 
may approach Democracy and Education through the insight 
gained by close inspection of the theoretical scheme in the 
later works. Indeed, it is most advantageous to approach 
Democracy and Education in such a fashion because of its sum­
mary statements dealing with the philosophic position .-which 
supports the criticism and suggested reform of education in a 
democratic system. Some fundamental naturalistic issues are 
not altogether clear in the work and much of the theoretical 
basis is not always explicit or is merely sketched in, still 
to be the subject of continual reworking. Making the funda­
mental philosophic position clear, through use of an analysis 
of the later works, clarifies the argument and brings forth 
with singular clarity the paradox in the concept of man.
One of the basic themes of Dewey's instrumentalism, 
developed from organic, biological ideas, is that the continu­
ity of life means a continual réadaptation of the environment
2
Dewey, How We Think, p. iii.
141
to the needs of living organisms— social and physical continu­
ity. The renewal and continuity of experience, in its broad­
est sense— the continuity and renewal of man through and in 
society— is the overall definition of education.^ The agency 
or activity of education is the study and learning of the 
modes of social continuity and growth. It is thus, as Dewey 
often pointed out, one phase, and perhaps the most important 
phase, of philosophy in general. "For education, when it is 
genuinely education, brings about not only acquisition of 
knowledge and skills, but it forms also attitudes and disposi­
tions that direct the uses to which acquired information and 
4
skill are put." Education is a result, then, of all true ex­
perience of organism in relation to both the physical and so­
cial environment. Education is the theory of inquiry, it is 
science, and it is art and music: It is the growing aware­
ness of the world about the organism, the broader and more 
open, more purposeful relationships one may attain through de­
veloping expanded horizons of common life.^
More narrowly speaking, education is the guiding of 
the experience of the young so that the goals and aims of 
society might become theirs, that their experience become
^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 2.
4
Dewey, "The Determination of Ultimate Values or Aims 
Through Antecedent or a Priori Speculation or Through Pragmatic 
or Empirical Inquiry," p. 475.
^Cf. John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1950), pp. 26-30, et passim.
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ordered and communicable so that they might broaden the basis 
of like-mindedness. The conscious assumption of the aims of 
society makes the individual a part of the society, frees him 
to grow, to continue to find more in common with the social 
environment, and widen his possibilities. Society itself con­
sists of an immense complex of social groups, each with its 
own purposes, and the job of education is to adapt the natural 
responses of the young to the aims of an ever increasing num­
ber of these individual, but integrated aims and purposes.
The more the single individual can have in common with the 
greater number of groups within society, the wider his out­
look, the more varied his experience, the broader his response 
ability, the freer he is to think, to define purpose, to create 
ends, and to advance society through being a full member— con­
tributing member— in that society. So far as the society opens 
itself to the growing fulfillment of the individual member, so 
far as it promotes the common end through freedom of interac­
tion among the diverse groups which compose it, it is a demo­
cratic society.^ Education is the opening process, the process 
of making common. The common is that which enables the commun­
ity to exist through communication of ends and methods ^ of the 
attainment of those ends. Democracy is that which promotes 
the atmosphere of the common, that which expands the common 
basis of endeavor such that it may be common to more people
^Cf. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New 
York: Beacon Press, 1948), pp. 185-186, also Chapter VIII,
"Reconstruction as Affecting Social Philosophy," pp. 187-213.
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and more groups, toward the common end. Education is the pro­
viding of instruments and methods of guiding the young to the 
formation of the social disposition most valuable to the so­
ciety, and thus to the individual himself. Democracy is the 
providing of the basic situation in which this can be accom­
plished, and for which it can be accomplished. In Dewey's 
definition of education and democracy, the two are inseparable. 
Both terms may be taken as broadly or as narrowly as the situ­
ation demands ; both provide the means and the goals of the 
other. Without the open society, the society of an expanding 
basis of common ends and common care, education would be a 
servile training of muscles to the ends of other men. With­
out education, democracy would be a figment of man's imagina­
tion in the savage world of blind action/reaction.
The interdependent concepts of dem.ccracy and educa­
tion proposed by Dewey must stand at the heights of his achieve­
ment. It is in this context that Dev...y's insight to the mean­
ing of man is most evident. Beginning with the assertion that 
humanity had to recognize that the ultimate effect of every 
institution was its distinctively human effect, Dewey noted 
that no institution was a true social group if "individuals 
use one another so as to get .desired results, without reference 
to the emotional and intellectual disposition and consent of 
those u s e d . D e w e y  laid strong emphasis on shared activity
^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 5.
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and experience, which means, as well, shared or common ends 
of activity. It was in such a manner that Dewey based his 
distinction of training from education. Training consists 
of molding behavior to secure habits which are useful through 
reward and punishment. The latter are the ends of the activ­
ity of training, not the goals toward which the useful habits 
are valuable. On the other hand, true education, Dewey 
thought, was a function of securing such habits when the in­
dividual "really shares or participates in the common activ­
ity."®
Making the individual a sharer or partner in the asso­
ciated activity so that he feels its success as his 
success, its failure as his failure, is the complet­
ing step. As soon as he is possessed by the emo­
tional attitude of the group, he will be alert to 
recognize the special ends at which it aims and the 
means employed to secure success.°
While the methods, physiological and psychological, are the 
same in training and in education, the purposes and ethical 
content are not. Dewey required that the value of the indi­
vidual be observed. A human being must be directed by his 
own ends, not directed by others. When one acts to others’ 
ends, he is not participating in shared or common activity 
and experience. Communication and true social ties are im­
possible, because without common ends, and the activities of 
language and community, individual man is truly "individual" 
in the totally fractured and alienated sense of that term.
®Ibid., p. 13. ®Ibid., p. 14.
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Man would thus have truly become an object of simple manipula­
tion, not a participant in the ends of his own activities.
This concept of the "shared" or the "common" has the 
greatest significance in this theory. It is the basic prin­
ciple in Democracy and Education. Without common interest, 
without endeavor toward a truly shared and common goal, ac­
tivity of two or more individuals, even if toward the same 
goal, is merely a juxtaposition, and not shared activity.
Without conscious envelopment in a common end, there is no 
community. Without community there is no education or democ­
racy. There is, there can only be, training and the total 
autocratic state.
Dewey asserted that true society, then, existed only
in communication, in the transmission of shared interests and
activities. "Men live in a community in virtue of the things
which they have in common; and communication is the way in
11
which they come to possess things in common." It is im­
portant to note that Dewey used the term "common" to mean 
that activity and purpose which is shared. The common does 
not demand "sameness." He also uses the term "like-mindedness," 
which does not demand the same thoughts. Both the common and 
like-mindedness denote shared aims, beliefs, aspirations, 
knowledge and understanding. It is a question of each person 
knowing what others are doing and referring his own activity
10 11
Ibid. p. 30. Ibid., p. 4.
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12
and aims to the others. In like-mindedness, meanings are 
shared, experience is shared, though no two persons' experi­
ences are the same. It is a concept of man with man, through 
knowledge of the common end. With such a concept, Dewey then 
felt man would promote the interests of others, since they 
shared many of the same goals through the society to which 
they belong. To grow is to come to share more and more activ­
ity and experience. To grow is to come to see the other per­
son more fully through more fully sharing his experience, 
through more fully communicating through the common in their 
endeavor. The broader one's horizons are through the common 
or shared experience, the more free one is. The broader the 
common interests become, the more respect for the others hold­
ing those common interests, and the more common interests 
there are. The basis of democracy, according to Dewey, is 
this expansion of freedom of endeavor through awareness of 
the common among all people. Truly shared experience rules 
out the use by one individual of others for his own purpose : 
One does not have his purpose defined solely in terms of him­
self; one has purpose in community with others, for this is 
the only true meaning of purpose— it being a human activity, 
human activity being social, and social being defined in terms 
of common or shared activity.
^^Ibid., p. 30.
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It was on this basis that Dewey attacked extreme in­
dividualism and pointed out that "there is always a danger 
that increased personal independence will decrease the social 
capacity of an individual.Independence is always in 
shared relation through the expansion of it, not in severing 
shared relation altogether. Thus true individuality lies in 
relation, and not in personal independence from relation.
Dewey was aware, however, that danger lay in overemphasizing 
the content of the relation itself, as he felt Hegel had done. 
Here the relation of man to man in society is not the fulfill­
ment of the individual man, but only of a concept of the state 
in its unfolding of the Absolute. If the fulfillment of an
abstract Absolute is the purpose of human relation, "the con-
14
scious ideas and preference of individuals are impotent."
Once again man becomes a means to the realization of something 
else, and true community and relation is fractured— destroyed. 
The middle path between extreme fractured individualism and 
the moribund demand of extreme social compliance must be main­
tained. It is the purpose of Dewey's philosophic endeavor to 
assure such a balance.
Because of Dewey's emphasis on the destructive re­
sults of the use of one man by another without shared or com­
mon purpose, criticism of existing economic conditions occu­
pied much of his attention. His attacks on economic servitude
^^Ibid., p. 44. "^^ Ibid., p. 50.
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are to be found in many of the major as well as minor works.
There can be no doubt that here Dewey, in his defense of the
intrinsic value of man himself, was aware of Kant's moral 
15
dictum. The economic remarks, and much of the theory of 
freedom and democracy, depend upon an approach similar to 
that of Kant. In any event, the social criticisms of Dewey 
have been well noted in academic circles, but that they are 
often contingent upon and developed with the economic criti­
cism seems not to be so fully recognized.Awareness of the 
economic problem stems from the awareness of the unique, in­
trinsic value of the human being in the economic process. It 
was for this reason that Dewey criticized the use of science 
to streamline and make more efficient production. The use of 
science in industry to promote production is the use of sci­
ence as a means, and not as cognizant as well of ends, to the 
ultimate lack of a well-balanced social concept, and to the 
neglect of human factors The result of one-sided inter­
ests in industry through, history has produced class structures 
and severe limits to the promotion of shared experience. Upon 
the limitation of shared experience and continuity of growth, 
one finds the limitation of the advance of society. If eco­
nomic factors hinder such growth, they are to be reviewed,
^^Ibid., p. 252.
^^Lloyd P. Williams, "A Liberal's Perspective on the 
Dismal Science: John Dewey's View of Economic Theory and
Practice," Proceedings, Southwestern Philosophy of Education 
Society, 1968.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 85.
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readapted, and reconstructed, to more fully serve the inter­
ests of human development. It is in this light that one finds 
Dewey's economic analysis. It cannot be said to be an eco­
nomic theory in its own right, but rather a call for greater 
emphasis in economic reconstruction for purposes of human 
growth.
Each human being was original in his own existence,
18
Dewey affirmed— he was in his individuality incommensurable.
His aims and goals in common with others, are his own. An
individual man acts in his originality. Not acting in his
own originality, he is not acting for his own purpose and is
merely a means to the ends dictated by something or some one 
19
else. One's own appropriation of the correct method for ac­
tivity in the problematic situation is also original to the 
individual. While in common with the method of social accept­
ance and endeavor, one's own method remains the "personal con­
cern, approach, and attack of an individual, and no catalogue 
can ever exhaust their diversity of form and tint. " It is 
on such a basis that man's moral responsibility for his own
actions rests, although this topic is not emphasized in Demo- 
21
cracv and Education. Man is thus seen as a personal
^^Ibid., p. 121. ^^Ibid., p. 172.
20
Ibid., p. 173.
^^In fact, the whole concept of moral responsibility 
is conspicuous by its absence in Democracy and Education—  
an extremely interesting omission considering the moral empha­
sis of the work as a whole.
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creature, aware of and responsible for himself. He comes to 
be in the social situation, not out of it, and he comes to 
be valuable in himself in the social situation, and not merely 
for the social situation.
Man is free when he freely participates in the mean­
ing and care for the end toward which he endeavors, but he is 
not to be defined merely in this endeavor. Man is a multi­
plicity of acts: he is many-sided, many-purposed. He is
fully man in that he has these many facets of existence going 
in him at all times: man is truly a complex, just as is soci­
ety. In fact, in the Deweyan analysis, the more complex he 
is, the more he has in common with the greater number of people 
and groups, the more free he is, and the more he participates 
and creates the democratic society. For the purposes of edu­
cation, it is mandatory to be aware that "no one is just an 
artist and nothing else, and insofar as one approximates that
condition, he is so much the less developed human being; he
22
is a kind of monstrostiy." To educate a man to be one 
thing, in disregard for that which he holds in common with 
all men, is merely to train him for purposes ultimately not 
his own. Purposes are social in character, for man is social, 
and to neglect the full man in education is not to educate 
him at all. A narrowly educated man is not a man educated to 
participate fully into the society into which he was bom.
22
Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 307.
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He is trained for the society, not educated into it. He was
23
a slave, Dewey pointed out, not a free man. In short,
Dewey said a man had to live. Man lives only insofar as he 
creates and recreates, constructs and reconstructs the environ­
ment to his own purposes, and insofar as he participates in 
the society such that he may learn and partake in constructive 
purposes. Man lives only insofar as he uses intelligence to
direct his activity and to realize the social meaning of his
24
act or projected act. Hence Dewey rejected an educational
system based on teaching only skills and technical method:
. . .  it is not the business of education to foster 
this tendency, but rather to safeguard against it, 
so that the scientific inquirer shall not be merely 
the scientist, the teacher merely the pedigogue, the. 
clergyman merely one who wears the cloth, and so on.
The emphasis on the depth and breadth of man is nowhere more 
evident in Dewey. Man is_ a very complex, deep and broad crea­
ture, and the primary purpose of man is to become more com­
plex that he may become even deeper and broader. Man is open- 
ended in his ontological character. Purpose is within the on­
going open-endedness which Dewey assumed for man. Goals, spe­
cific ends, are not the main purpose. Growth is the main pur­
pose. It is the end-in-itself, the only one, in Dewey's con­
ceptual scheme. It is an end-in-itself which requires that 
no specific end be only an end, and not also a new, fresh be­
ginning. To the critics who note that growth as an end is no
^^Ibid., p. 252. '^^ Ibid., p. 308. ^^Ibid.
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end— and thus note the philosophy of Dewey is basically pur­
poseless— one must remark that indeed, growth no end. But 
it was just because of this concept of growth that Dewey 
found ultimate justification for man's being the purposive 
being that he was in all the variety and endless specific 
purposes that he might need and develop in his existential 
life. For Dewey, the concept of growth was precisely the 
open-ended frame necessary so that man might come to have spe­
cific purposes and goals. Without a concept of open-ended 
growth, specific purposes are not ends for man at all: they 
are merely absolute dictates to a nonpurposive and nonrespon- 
sible creature, but not a human being. Education in both the 
broad and narrow meanings is the movement of man toward be­
coming a fully purposive human being through participation in 
his own objectives, and the concept of growth is what guaran­
tees him unlimited possibilities in terms of both means and 
ends.
Dewey observed that there was a saying which noted, in 
effect, that for man to be good, he had to be good for some­
thing . He continued :
The something for which a man must be good is capacity 
to live as a social member so that what he gets from 
living with others balances with what he contributes.
What he gets and gives as a human being, a being with 
desires, emotions, and ideas, is not external posses­
sions, but a widening and deepening of conscious life—  
a more intense, disciplined, and expanding realization 
of meanings. What he materially receives and gives is 
at most opportunities and means for the evolution of 
conscious life. Otherwise, it is neither giving nor
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talcing, but a shifting about of the position of things 
in space, like the stirring of water and sand with a 
stick. °
Dewey's statements on man reflect an acute awareness 
of critical problems which confront man's attempt to become 
and remain human in his social and self-directive character.' 
Dewey saw the subservient and nonparticipatory position of 
man in specifically economic situations, and generalized this 
to similar problems in all social life. He was, in Democracy 
and Education, particularly aware that man had come to exist 
in a world where his own ends were not realized in the eco­
nomic activities which he was forced to endure in order to 
survive. The means to man's survival are not his own ends, 
nor in his own control. He is neither concerned with nor 
cares about the ends for which he trains and at which he 
spends most of his waking hours. Dewey has aware of the de­
humanizing effect, and realized that continued emphasis on 
such a system robbed man of fully participating in his own 
life and his own goals even during his off hours. The full­
ness and richness of life has been blurred by continued empha­
sis on activity without the conscious sharing of ends by those 
working toward those ends. Such brutalizing of human endeavor, 
such narrowing, begins in school where from the first the 
young are not allowed to realize and participate purposively 
in the goals set for them by others. Dewey noted that this
^^Ibid., p. 359. Cf. above, p. 137, then p. 130.
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dictation by— instead of participation in— the social realm 
was further emphasized by the continual pressure to train stu­
dents for future economic purposes. When they graduate, they 
immediately find themselves once again working toward distant 
goals provided for them, dictated to them, in which they 
neither share nor care. The whole emphasis in Democracy and 
Education is to expose this sort of narrowness in our society 
and our schools, and to propose adaptation of a particular 
philosophical position which provides for the emancipation of 
man from the sort of fractured individualism caused by empha­
sis on self-activity, self-fulfillment, self-purposiveness 
and freedom of the self from the encroachment of others, and 
also from the sort of individualism caused by the destruction 
of participatory human relations through overemphasis on the 
value of the society as a whole, or an abstract ideal end of 
society in which man does not fully share qua individual human 
being. The main line of argument in the whole work lies about 
the concept of the common or shared experience— or like- 
mindedness . It is this concept which allows for communication 
(language/symbolization) and the social community itself. 
Community begins with that which is shared, that which is had 
in common among the participants, namely, the meanings of 
value, the worth of certain goals, and the knowledge of methods 
of their attainment.
Dewey asked, then, what it was that guaranteed that 
such a concept of community would continue to exist so that
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the fulness of the human beings within it might be maintained 
and expanded. Dewey answered that the use of intelligence 
had allowed civilization to advance to where it then was, and 
that the lack of intelligence had allowed civilization to cre­
ate some of the dehumanizing problems which he noted. Conse­
quently, Dewey proposed that the method of intelligence be 
brought to bear on the human problems of the world just as it 
had been brought to bear on the physical world. What is the 
method of intelligence which he promoted? Science, he as­
serted. It is the most advanced method for dealing with the 
world as it really is experienced which man has yet developed. 
It was the philosophy of naturalism which Dewey turned to— the 
connection of organic nature with human affairs, the substitu­
tion of experience and experiment for those absolute ideal 
givens which have in the past and still do block the way to 
realizing the world for what it really is. Such a position 
is not a sheer empiricism; the type of mechanistic empiricism 
which free man to increase his power over nature, but which
"reduced the world to a barren and monotonous redistribution 
27
of matter in space." Rather, it is the scientific, organic 
world view which sees man at home in nature, with his pur­
poses and aims dependent for execution upon natural conditions, 
Such a nature is one of activity, a nisus of things with pur­
poses which direct the natural order of organic growth.
27
Ibid., p. 284.
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This philosophy is vouched for by the doctrine of bio­
logical development which shows that man is continuous 
with nature, not an alien entering her processes from 
without. It is reenforced by the experimental method 
of science which shows that knowledge accrues in virtue 
of an attempt to direct physical energies in accord 
with ideas suggested in dealing with natural objects in 
behalf of social u s e s . ^8
The problem then becomes how such a naturalistic 
world view does in fact support and promote the continuity of 
full human activity in shared experience in the social environ­
ment. Is Dewey's definition of being human in all its depth 
and scope provided for by viewing man through the science 
which he recommended as the method of the world in which man 
was found? The analysis of this problem has been the concern 
of this dissertation; its results provide the clue to the 
paradox of man in the philosophy of John Dewey.
^^Ibid., p. 285.
CHAPTER X
AMBIGUITY OF THE COMMON IN DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
Dewey, in the Preface to Democracy and Education 
noted that:
. . . the philosophy stated in this book connects the 
growth of democracy with the development of the ex­
perimental method in the sciences, evolutionary ideas 
in the biological sciences, and the industrial reor­
ganizations, and is concerned to point out the changes 
in subject matter and method of education indicated by 
these developments.^
Dewey later illustrated this when he introduced the democratic 
ideal in terms of the concept of the common or shared experi­
ence. One might think it is by deliberation and conscious ef­
fort that man increases his scope of common interests and 
goals with fellow man, thereby creating freedom and the founda­
tions of the democratic society. Dewey emphasized, however, 
that this was not the case:
On the contrary, they were caused by the development 
of modes of manufacture and commerce, travel, migra­
tion, and intercommunication which flowed from the 
command of science over natural energy.
While Dewey affirmed that it remained to the intellect and de­
sire to fully appropriate what science had given the social
^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. iii.
^Ibid., p. 87.
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realm, it is Dewey's naturalistic position which asserts that 
man's ability to extend his shared or common experience is 
based on physical proximity, the "physical annihilation of 
s p a c e . W h a t  brings man together with man is the physical 
domination of the existing features of nature such that indi­
viduals are brought into relation with one another either 
physically or through reference to other physical objects and 
their abstractions which form a common or agreed upon and 
therefore "shared" experience. Dewey specifically asserted 
that after the "community of interest" and the individualiza­
tion of man had come into existence, then it was a matter of
4
deliberate effort by men to sustain and extend them. But 
the community of interest and man's individualization are not 
a product of man's purpose or intent at all ; they are a given 
product of physical proximity. They are, in a word, given by 
the nature of the situation. Man, very clearly and explicitly 
in this statement on the democratic ideal, intellectualizes 
and emotionalizes the empirical, naturalistic given in such a 
way as to "internalize" it and become responsible for main­
taining it. One then asks what sort of purpose encouraged 
the prior scientific discoveries which created the situation 
of increased physical proximity. If man does not consciously 
or purposely or deliberately create the conditions of shared 
experience, of common interest, does one then assert that
^Ibid., p. 85. ^Ibid., p. 87.
159
they are the purposive goal of science? Why, if science did 
create the conditions for freedom and democracy, should it do 
so at all? Are the ends of empirical science human freedom 
and growth? But what science or theory of science maintains 
such a concept? None.
Did Dewey, then, mean to assert that freedom and demo­
cracy were mere chance— purposeless accident? If such is the 
case, in what sense is man responsible for this accident of 
chance? One must then ask: In what sense can anyone promote
the value or method of education in such a scheme?
Dewey, of course, did not consider democracy and free­
dom a pure accident of chance. The difficulty arose when he 
attempted to provide a world view and a method for promoting 
the insight he had into the problems of human existence.
Dewey, for all the reasons developed in this dissertation, ac­
cepted and promoted science as he knew it through the broadest 
definition he could give it. Yet it is still upon the par­
ticular empirical sciences which the instrumental philosophy 
is constructed, and it was the physical sciences to which 
Dewey turned for insight into the difficulties of the social 
situation:
Every step forward in the social sciences— the studies 
termed history, economics, politics, sociology— shows 
that social questions are capable of being intelligently 
coped with only in the degree in which we employ the 
method of collected data, forming hypotheses, and test­
ing them in action which is characteristic of natural 
science, and in the degree in which we utilize in
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behalf of the promotion of social welfare the tech- ^
nical knowledge ascertained by physics and chemistry.
If it can be accepted that man is himself the naturalistic 
object of scientific endeavor, then it can be asserted that 
the ends and projects of man's participation in the world, 
physical and social, are within the scope of scientific 
method and purpose. This was precisely the theoretical posi­
tion which Dewey held. He maintained that if such a position 
could not be held and proven, then man was reduced to the cir­
cumstance of moral and intellectual bondage either under the 
absolute claims of ideal and supernatural entities wholly out­
side the purposive and realizable character of man, or under 
the blind stimulus/response cycle of nonpurposive empiricism. 
For Dewey, man had to actively and consciously participate in 
the purpose of his existence; he had to continually expand the 
shared and common experience with man and the world. Man must 
be in the world; he must be a full participant in the motives, 
activities, purposes and knowledge of his social situation.
Only thus is he morally responsible, intellectual, and complete 
within himself and for others. Only thus is he free to con­
tinually expand his shared experience, his common basis with 
other men in the social sphere, in the subsequent democratic 
society. And only thus is there reason for and method to 
education for these goals. This view of man is a broad one ; 
the theory of man implied is meaningful and speaks eloquently
^Ibid., p. 285.
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for Dewey's insight into the human situation. Yet one must be 
satisfied that such a man ^  himself the naturalistic object 
of scientific endeavor and that it can be asserted that the 
ends and projects of man’s participation in the world, physical 
and social, are within the scope of scientific method and pur­
pose.
In Dewey's analysis, man is an active organism; he is 
in continual, active relation with his environment. As he ex­
periences , he notes consequences of activities, physical and 
social. He creates habits and dispositions to cope with the 
world about him. In short, man comes to have a "mind"— an 
organization of habits of intelligent response.^ Man is con­
trolled in his activities by the sorts of habits he establishes. 
Such habits are developed through positive reinforcement by 
the physical and social situation into which the organism is 
bom. Education has to do with the specific sort of habit 
learned in and for a specific social situation in a particular 
culture. Dewey noted that mind was, in this sense, the method 
of social control which the society developed in the individual. 
In any given social situation, man acts. Dewey regarded the 
potential for all sorts of response to stimuli to be inherent 
in man through his biological make-up. The specific social 
situation in which these responses are manifested judges 
which are satisfactory to the ends and purposes of the social
^Ibid., p. 32.
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group, and positively affirms those, disapproving of all 
others. Through the continual application of this method, 
the growing organism comes to realize, that is, understand, 
the goals and purposes of the social group of which he is a 
part. The sum of his habits thus learned, the meaning of 
their purposes and their moral and social content, is what 
Dewey called mind. Only when an organism comes to understand 
the goals and purposes of his specific social group, do those 
goals become his. Only when they are consciously his, does 
he have a common basis for sharing in the activity toward 
those goals. The organism thus becomes truly social, and he 
becomes truly man. Dewey could therefore say, as he did, 
that social control was not personal, but intellectual.^ The 
quality of mind, the habits of understanding the goals and 
methods of the social group, are given to the individual as 
he grows. He assumes the quality of mind demanded by the 
social group; he assumes and becomes responsible for the in­
tellectual developments of the social group.® For Dewey, man 
became man through the assumption of these qualities and 
traits from the social group; man did not acquire them from 
some a priori source outside the social reference. Man does 
not choose them within society either. Rather, he leams 
them, and his mind is a reflection of the intellect of the 
society.
"^Ibid., p. 33. ®Cf. above, p. 125ff.
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It is here that Dewey has been criticized for defin­
ing the human being only in terms of the mandates of the so­
cial group, that man is totally other-directed by the social
9
forces around him. There is validity in this criticism.
When Dewey's theory says that "human beings control animals
by controlling the natural stimuli which influence them; by
10
creating a certain environment in other words," then asserts 
that "human actions are modified in a like fashion" by the so­
cial g r o up,one  cannot but continue and draw the inference 
that man is, indeed, seen in the same other-directed explana­
tory scheme as Dewey outlined for the training of animals.
When his theory asserts that social relations are not "per­
sonal" relations, one may well question what sort of man is
12
found in such a concept of the social. Or when Dewey's
philosophy says that "social organization means utilization
13
of the specific and variable qualities of individuals," does 
not one ask: for whose utility or purpose is man finally seen,
his own or society's? When man's freedom is a function of 
democracy, and democracy is denied as a conscious projection
9
Cf. Paul E. Pfuetze, Self, Society, Existence (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1951). Pfuetze criticizes George
H. Mead along such lines. The similarity of Mead and Dewey 
in this area is attested to by both men. Pfuetze's work is 
an interesting study of the naturalist's concept of man.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 12.
11 12
Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 33 and p. 39.
^^Ibid., pp. 90-91, cf. also pp. 118-119.
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of man's purpose, and when intelligence is denied as being a 
part of man's nature, instead only a borrowing he makes use 
of through the social whole (through understanding the goals 
and methods of the social whole), then where does one find 
much scope and value in the peculiarly human? When purpose 
and goals are learned as the purposes and goals of the social 
group, and become one's own only when one fully understands 
and appropriates them, in what sense is man participatory in 
his own goals rather than the goals of another?
Indeed, there is some basis for the criticism of 
Dewey's concept of the relation of the growing organism to 
the social environment into which he was bom. But if the 
criticism is left at merely the enumerating of visible diffi­
culties, one is left simply with two contradictory concepts 
of man in Democracy and Education (and elsewhere). One con­
cept of the nature of man, as noted above in Chapter 9, seems 
to imply a definite awareness of the depth and responsibility 
of being human. The second concept of the nature of man, 
from the same work, indicates an exceedingly truncated view 
wherein man is totally submerged in factors and purposes in 
no sense of his own making. There is a reason for this di­
chotomy : One must know how it came about.
The criticism of the other-directedness of man in the 
theoretical social concept of Dewey must go on to carefully 
define the method which Dewey took to the definition of social 
activity in the first place. The method by which knowledge of
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the social is approached is derived from the definition of 
the social realm. This definition is a reflection of the or­
ganic, biological, and naturalistic world view whose implicit 
assumptions comprised the metaphysical position from which 
Dewey operated. Specifically, then, Dewey viewed the empiri­
cally verifiable results of overt physical activity to define 
that which can be known of the social situation. What else 
there may be of the world is ideal dream unfounded— or else 
ideal dream verified by scientific analysis, by which means 
it is called a scientific hypothesis. This having been veri­
fied, is considered a law or principle valuable until proven 
inadequate. From the basis of known evidence, the biological 
and evolutionary principles of organic activity form the basis 
for the social views which Dewey held. The development of 
this argument is circular, a fact which Dewey not only did 
not deny, but affirmed in that such circularity represented 
and proved the worth of itself in the evolutionary development 
of inquiry.
It is, therefore, science, empirical method, through
which the activities of social life must be studied, judged
and evaluated. Knowledge of man and society is, as all knowl-
14edge is, empirically grounded. Such science. The final, 
the ultimate criterion of the method which Dewey incorporated 
to solve the problems of man, to define man, society and the
14
Ibid., p. 326.
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role of education with society, is empirical. The primary 
question then becomes : what does this empirical criterion
mean to the concept of the shared, the common, upon which the 
whole edifice of democracy, education, and freedom— conse­
quently the meaning of man— is raised?
Since Dewey's thesis is that what is shared by the in­
dividuals of a social group is based on the degree to which 
the group has mastered the forces of nature,and that civili­
zation has advanced through the growth of that mastery (sci­
ence) , the method of science is precisely that method which 
the young must come to realize in the social group. The knowl­
edge of purposes and ends, and its empirical method, is the 
hallmark of the progressive civilization. This is what educa­
tion must do: teach the most progressive method of dealing
with ends and problems which the civilization has yet found.
It is on the broadening effect of establishing the common, 
the shared experience, method and purpose, that society be­
comes progressively more free and democratic, and man becomes 
more human. Thus for Dewey, science was not only a means for 
taming the forces of nature, but also was intrinsic in the 
growth of civilization. Science is not merely a product of 
civilization; it is a cause of civilization, and it continues 
to grow as the youth of a civilization are trained to better 
use it not only as method, but also as structurer of ends and
^^Ibid., p. 224-225, also cf. p. iii.
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purposes. Furthermore, as a youth is educated into this 
method of knowledge, old customs, old absolutes, and old tra­
ditions having no basis within the scopes and aims of science, 
are thrown out. Thus the inflexible and conservative of the 
older civilization is removed, and the flexible and more shared 
society showly comes into existence.
What is the criterion of the common or the shared ac­
cording to the scientific method which Dewey proposed? The 
criterion is the subject matter of intelligence. The subject 
matter of thinking is abstraction, that which is common to 
past activity or habit and which may be relevant and useful 
to the present and future activity of the organism. Verified 
abstractions are the intelligence of the social group, culture 
or civilization which Dewey (often at some length) pointed out 
that man drew from and consciously became responsible for when 
he chose to use it. Verified abstraction is, of course, just 
another way of saying "science," which
. . . aims to free an experience from all which is 
purely personal and strictly immediate; it aims to 
detach whatever it has in common with the subject mat­
ter of other experiences, and which, being common, may 
be saved for further use. It is, thus, an indispensa­
ble factor in social progress.^®
The aim of science is to deal with the common, that 
which is open to public observation and open to the community 
of scholars for empirical investigation indefinitely. That 
which is thus open is available to being shared in experience;
^^Ibid., p. 226.
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it is the very definition of the "conimon." It will be noted, 
then, that the definition of the common in science is identi­
cal to that which Dewey used to support the concept of the 
shared in social endeavor. That is, the empirical availabil­
ity of subject matter of science is also that which is empir­
ically available in social intercourse, thus creating the com­
mon about which and through which the social situation is 
built. Both science and society evolve through the same pro­
cesses, according to Dewey. In fact, as in all other flatten­
ings of meanings demanded by adherence to strict scientific 
criteria, the terms "science" and "society" come to have much 
of the same, if not exactly the same meaning. In fact,
Dewey's concept of democracy is precisely the community of 
scholars busily engaged in dealing with a commonly defined
subject matter, through common methods, thus using the same
language in communicating about their common objectives.
Dewey noted the incredible advance of science over the last 
couple of centuries through the development of shared experi­
ence through common means, ends, and language. He noted the 
broadening of scope and method through this use of the ion,
and he noticed that the common criteria of reality and pur­
pose put scientists, gua scientists upon equal footing which 
demanded respect for what the other is doing, through the 
fact that both are engaged in the promotion of a common end. 
Dewey noticed that personal bias had to be discarded; personal 
attractions to absolute criteria which were not allowable
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through the common of scientific procedure had to be tossed 
out, and the method of proof by experiment and freedom of ac­
tual doing required that no scientist dominate or dictate to 
another. Dewey noted that the further one was allowed to ex­
periment, the more one opened up the common through whj ch all 
could grow— as long as the criterion was always the empirical 
method as a basis upon which all could agree. In a word,
freedom and democracy are the actual results and processes of
17
the scientific method.
Dewey then generalized this concept to all social re­
lations, all civilization. The common of science must then 
be the common of society. This is the basic assumption of 
Democracy and Education. The common of scientific subject 
matter is the same as the common of social interaction, for 
social interaction, through the naturalistic world view, is 
finally defined empirically, through chemistry, physics and 
biology. The same criterion of the common which creates the 
open-ended scientific attitude and the community and communi­
cation of scholars also creates the democratic c pen-ended so­
ciety of community and communication that is necessary for 
the progress of man. Yet there is a foreboding emphasis in 
Dewey's analysis of the common in scientific endeavor: The
"^^ Note the extremely idealized concept of capabili­
ties of scientific method which Dewey held. Has the continued 
use of scientific method, however, actually united the various 
disciplines and sciences, or do the separate disciplines using 
such method actually draw further apart in terms both of sub­
ject matter and common language?
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common in science is the abstract. It is that which has been 
found common precisely through the elimination of all which 
is strictly personal and immediate to experience. Dewey as­
serted that from the standpoint of science, "what may be of 
precious import to the individual implicated in the experi-
18ence, the peculiar and unreduplicable" is beside the point.
Rather, "this material is accidental, while the features
19
which are widely shared are essential." Precisely what is
20
personal in the incommensurable human being is that which 
is not essential to the scientific development of the concept 
of the common in social life. Whatever is unique in the in­
dividual is not available to other, according to such an an­
alysis. Only that which is available to others may be sym­
bolized and communicated. Indeed, Dewey said that practically
all that which was of value in a personal experience was that
21
which could be so shared. Is it to be deduced from this 
formulation that what is social about man is exactly that part 
of him which is not personal? It must be so for the subject 
matter of science, for here man is subject matter only insofar 
as he is common, that he does have shared characteristics and 
not simply shared characteristics, but only those available 
to empirical method. What is common to mankind is not found 
in his concrete activity as man, but in the reflected
^®Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 226.
^^Ibid. ^°Ibid., p. 121. ^^Ibid., p. 226.
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abstraction of his empirical qualities— and Dewey says that
only through this latter is he a social creature! It is only
from the generalization of such abstract qualities that social
progress is to be made, for generalization is the extension
of such abstractions to clarify and direct new social situa- 
22
tions. Dewey noted that "scientific abstraction and gener­
alization are equivalent to taking the point of view of any
man / or, in other words, of no particular, concrete man_/,
23
whatever his location in time and space." Dewey affirmed 
the abstractness and remoteness of this position, but re­
quired that social progress had to be built upon it. He as­
sumed that concrete activity based on such abstract views 
justified the abstraction and put it back into the "real" 
world. Yet when one considers the narrow metaphysical posi­
tion supporting the criterion of such activity— that of natu­
ralism— one questions both its concreteness and the "realness" 
of the world to which it supposedly refers. In truth, the 
"real" world is not touched upon in Dewey's procedure. "Any" 
man acts in the world; the act and the world are both defined 
empirically. There is no sense of the concrete human being 
in his incommensurable, individual being. Insofar as man 
acts only on what he knows for himself (although knowing-for- 
oneself i;- strictly impossible in Dewey's conceptual frame­
work) , it is merely "personal, untransferable, and, as it
^^Ibid., p. 227. ^^Ibid.
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24
were, instinctive." It is interesting that a creative act
thus must also be defined as fitting into a prior framework
of the common in order to be, in the first place, transferable
and communicable— a fact which strictly limits the definition
25
of creativity and the new.
Where, then, in the scientific formulation of the com­
mon, is the concrete, valuable in himself and responsible to 
himself human being which is so deeply felt in this very work? 
Where is the concrete human being who is himself human only 
insofar as he is not merely the means for another's considera­
tion? Where is man's purpose if he, as an individual, personal 
human being, is only the abstraction of himself in the common 
knowledge of methods and ends of the society which is defined 
by the scientific analysis of the social situation?
Simply, there is, in Democracy and Education, a very 
basic ambiguity in the concept of the "common." The ambiguity 
of the treatment of man in this work, as expressed in these 
last two chapters, is precisely the reflection of the ambigu­
ity of the sorts of shared experience real concrete man has—  
which Dewey in his broad insight to the pathos of man has ex­
plicitly and with great depth of feeling expressed— and the
'^^ Ibid.
25
There may be implicit here a strict limitation, 
also, of the concept of progress, if each step of the progres­
sive must be communicable in terms of past knowledge, or the 
common. Progress must be shared progress in Dewey's sense.
And yet, in a very real way, these terms are contradictory in 
Dewey's analysis.
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shared experience found in a concept of common subject matter 
required by science as an abstraction of concrete, personal 
activity. Upon this basis, Democracy and Education is divisi­
ble into two distinct works of philosophy: One, the propaga­
tion of scientific analysis and the naturalistic world view; 
the second, an appeal to man to be fully human in a world 
dominated by lack of humane care and shared experiences of the 
common good.
The concept of the common in the appeal to fuller 
humanity is, while not altogether explicit, based on inter­
personal relationships, on the realization of the self in re- 
lationt to others, both as individuals and as groups. One 
does not interact with the purpose of another person or group, 
but rather with that concrete person, or the persons of that 
concrete group. In fact, the position Dewey held here implies 
man having as his own purpose interaction with another in a 
concrete relation. In Dewey's formulation of the socializing, 
educative activity, activity itself is initiated by the in­
dividual in his own interests, and the response to this activ­
ity is both social and physica l. The social response is af­
firmative or negative insofar as the means and purpose of the 
individual's act are in harmony— or in common— with the indi­
viduals of the social group. Their response, conditioned as
Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 35. Note that 
such individual interests implies purpose— or an idea of it—  
prior to consciousness of the social or group purpose.
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it is by knowledge (conscious or unconscious) of means and
goals acceptable to the group as a whole, sets the situation
in which the new member comes to realize the uniqueness of
the activity and goals of the other. "The whole situation
requires that each should adapt his action in view of what
27
the other person has done and is to do." But the point is 
that the new individual comes to the group with his own in­
terests, or else he would not come to the group at all. What 
he interacts with is not the abstract common of the group, 
but the concrete individuals of the group as persons other 
than himself. He becomes human, not by accepting the dic­
tates of the other, but by his growth in realizing them as 
other, and now as his. To the degree which Dewey emphasized 
the importance of the other, the analysis is weak. But he 
did, in fact, make an analysis of the confrontation of one 
with another, as well as the growth of man in the confronta­
tion of one with another, and noted the growth of man in view
of man's relation with man, not man's relation with the ab- 
28
stract "common." The common, as scientific knowledge, is 
always of the past, of an event known and verified. It is 
not the process of here/now confrontation, the interpersonal 
relation of two men meeting and sharing, one with the other. 
The metaphysics of this position is not developed at all in 
Dewey's thought; most importantly to this discussion, it is
^^Ibid., p. 35. ^^Ibid., pp. 33-36, et passim.
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not at all deducible from the instrumental, naturalistic posi­
tion. Such a hint of a more comprehensive metaphysics of man 
does exist in Dewey's thought, and insofar as it does, it al­
lows him the fuller definition of man which one is constantly 
reminded of throughout his works.
The metaphysics of Dewey's scientific philosophy, on 
the other hand, is not worked out either; in fact, as noted 
in Chapter IV, they are denied altogether. Yet the assumptions 
Dewey made about reality and its method of apprehension are 
clearly evident in the analysis of the development of Demo­
cracy and Education and in the continuation of its emphasis 
throughout the remainder of his life. There is, then, a 
juxtaposition of two implied matephysics when one deals with 
the concept of man in the philosophy of John Dewey. His con­
tinuing ambiguity of his treatment of man. The result is—  
if one attempts to make a unified whole of Dewey's thoughts 
on the subject of man— a paradoxical theory of what it means 
to be a human being.
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
The contention of this dissertation has been that 
there is a very real paradox in the concept of what it means 
to be a human being in the philosophy of John Dewey. It has 
been shown that the evidence strongly points to the fact that 
the problems of men were the basic motivation of Dewey's con­
cern with philosophy. The history of his philosophic endeavor 
shows that his "bogey"— as William James would have said— was 
a demand for a philosophy supporting a complete, concrete 
human existence. This led Dewey, in his early thought, to 
the Hegelian idealism of G. S . Morris, but later he found 
much the same negation of man in absolute idealism as he 
found in mechanistic, atomistic empiricism. Retaining the 
concept of the organic unity of society, but supporting it on 
a theory of science based on a social and biological natural­
ism rather than on absolute idealism, Dewey developed a posi­
tion in which he thought he could expound a theory of man in 
its fullest and most concrete form, and yet retain a method 
true to the most efficient system of dealing with the natural 
world which had been developed. He called his system social 
naturalism, instrumentalism, or pragmatism; its method, the
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scientific method, applied to human ends and affairs. The 
first part of this dissertation was concerned with illustrat­
ing the major tenants and assumptions of the naturalistic 
world view, and the particular features of its method— empiri­
cal science— as a mode of existential verifiability.
Yet, between the concept of the concrete human being 
with which he was throughout concerned, and the consequences 
of a metaphysics of naturalism and its empirical method on 
the theory of man, there appears a fundamental contradiction. 
While Dewey reacted to idealism for submerging the intrinsic 
value of man in favor of an absolute given end in history, it 
seems evident that he did much the same thing by defining man 
in the absolute given of the naturalistic situation, with 
which and from which man started. The limitation of the in­
trinsic value of man as well as his responsibility for fixing 
and fulfilling ends are as evident in one case as they are in 
the other; only the directionality of the emphasis has been 
changed.
The description of the consequences of the naturalis­
tic world view, as Dewey understood it, on the concept of man 
has been the basic concern here. There is no lack of direct 
admissions by Dewey of the logical implications of the natu­
ralistic position which he accepted. Dewey thought, however, 
that he had successfully integrated the feeling and idealiz­
ing human being with a creature defined wholly within the em­
pirical, naturalistic world view. The basic point has been
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to show that this is a false and unaccomplished integration—  
that, in fact, as is illustrated so clearly in Theory of Valu­
ation, such integration is itself defined on empirical cri­
teria and therefore the conclusion is always in empirical 
terms. Desire and rationality were integrated to get empiri­
cal rationality; spiritual, moral man was integrated with 
empirically defined man to get empirical man. The allusion 
to Hegelian dialectics fails ; the synthesis is not reached 
because the criterion of its attainment is strictly that of 
one of its two conditions.
The final two chapters illustrate the paradox in the 
major work. Democracy and Education. Here Dewey's exhorta­
tions about the concrete, integrated human being are the most 
clear and the most compelling. There can be little doubt of 
the insight into the human condition that Dewey displayed and 
acted upon during his entire life. It was shown that the meta­
physics of this "felt" position were barely hinted at, but 
that they are indeed discernable, and that they are not deduc- 
ible from the standard naturalistic position which is pro­
posed as supporting this insight into real human conditions.
In Democracy and Education, the paradox of man is clearly 
deyeloped, step by step as Dewey pleaded for the conditions 
of society— democracy and education— which would produce the 
human being responsible in the promotions of his own ends and 
fully deyeloped within and through the social situation. The 
concept of man thus proposed varies between the desired
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integrated concept of being human and the truncated, other- 
directed creature deducible from the naturalistic definition 
of the social structure. The paradox in Democracy and Educa­
tion rests quite clearly on the ambiguity of the concept of 
the "common." In one sense it is the full, inter-personal re­
lation of concrete human beings in realization of the differ­
ence of the other: in the second sense, it is the nonpersonal 
abstraction of what is knowable to any person and communicable 
in like-mindedness. It is shown that Dewey built his theory 
of society on the second meaning of the term "common" although 
the argument of this dissertation is that the concept of man 
deducible from only this approach is painfully inadequate.
The explanation here advanced for the major dichotomy 
in the theory of man is that the inadequacy of Dewey's natu­
ralistic position is a result of his refusal to grant that 
there was a metaphysical position involved which required a 
great deal of investigation. Here it has been pointed out 
that Dewey failed to investigate his metaphysical assumptions 
even though his definition and development of the naturalistic 
world view itself may be seen as consisting of almost an ex­
plicit metaphysical pronouncement. Had Dewey emphasized the 
investigation of the conditions of the naturalistic world 
view as thoroughly as he did the consequences of it, it might 
well have been developed into a very adequate metaphysics.
But he did not do this, for, of course, one of the provisions 
of the naturalistic world view, as he understood it, was an
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emphasis on consequences and not upon conditions. It is here 
concluded that one of the primary reasons for the lack of 
depth in the theoretical definition of man is the exceedingly 
narrow naturalistic metaphysics upon which it is unwittingly 
based.
Dewey's ultimate faith in science is one of the more 
interesting, yet ultimately detractive elements of his thought. 
The history of science and its growth was, for Dewey, the 
history of civilization because the history of science stood 
under the development of economic history which was of the 
most basic importance. The results of science were not civili­
zation, but there could be no civilization without them, he as- 
1
serted. Dewey in 1916, during the writing of Democracy and
Education was enthusiastic about what science has done:
Every domesticated plant and animal, every tool, every 
utensil, every appliance, every manufactured article, 
every aesthetic decoration, every work of art means a 
transformation of conditions once hostile or indiffer­
ent to characteristic human activities into friendly 
and favoring conditions.
By 1946 and the Preface to Problems of Men. Dewey was aware 
of science s ability to destroy the world through atomic weap­
ons, yet he still held firmly to the idea that through the 
application of scientific method to the aims, purposes, and 
aspirations of specifically human endeavor, the problems of 
men might yet be solved. The optimism is shaken, but the 
faith in science as method remains. Science had surely
^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 37. ^Ibid.
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promoted the quantity of social life, had extended the physical 
sphere of activity, and had given man a control over his envi­
ronment never dreamed of in previous ages. But had science 
improved the quality of life? As far as is here discerned, 
Dewey did not really ask this question. He did not fully ask 
the final question relevant to his philosophy of science:
"Is science applicable to the human situation? Dewey simply 
assumed this to be the case. It seems, though, to be evident 
that science as method contributes to human purpose only ac­
cidentally and that science as criterion of human purpose is 
just not warranted. Bertrand Russell admitted that the logic 
of science and the analysis and definition of reality through 
its principles was difficult to argue against philosophically—  
except that there was one perplexing problem: namely, one
could not live by the precepts of such an analysis. Human 
purpose must stand outside the scope of empirical method, but 
this consideration was rejected by Dewey. Yet one must note 
that the continued appeal to the narrow base of science for 
the solution to the broader human and social problem only 
hinders the beginning of the search for understanding of 
human relations— for space-time relations, it is here held, 
do not exhaust human relations.
The paradox of man in the thought of John Dewey is on 
the one side illustrated by his seventy year quest in and for 
man, and on the other by the development of a crippling theory 
of man based on scientific, empirical, method. In that Dewey
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is no longer questioning, and it is to those of the present 
to act in and for the condition of man, the question follows : 
may one safely follow Dewey's principles? The conclusion here 
reached is that insofar as Dewey's concern for man and his ac­
tivity and courage in man's behalf is a reflection of his 
principles, one would do well to act upon them.^  But insofar 
as the principles acted upon are reflective of the theoretical 
position— the metaphysics of naturalism— activity upon these 
principles must not only be disregarded, but actively rejected, 
for Dewey's position has done a great deal to create and de­
velop the myth of science as the savior of man and his world. 
Science as means (seen in its cloak of technology) has done 
wonders in moving toward the domination of man's natural en­
vironment. But far from making that environment friendly for 
human growth, the evidence seems to indicate such science has 
substituted an environment more hostile and infinitely more 
dangerous than any man has known in his history. Science as 
evaluator and formulator of human purposes has not proven vi­
able because inherently and metaphysically it does not, can­
not , point to the ends of a being not defined within its 
scope and method. Science and an empirically grounded world 
view cannot point to ultimate ends-in-themselves, and cannot 
point to human ends infinitely more complex and integrated
^George S. Counts relates a story about the time 
Dewey, demonstrating for woman suffrage in a New York City 
street, held in his hand a sign declaring "My husband can 
vote— Why can't I?"
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than those science admits of: because of these facts, to pro­
mote the role of science in structuring the ends of man is to 
promote not only an erroneous irrelevance, but a positive
evil. It detracts man from his one and only goal: being hu-
4
man.
Dewey, in promoting the naturalistic world view, held 
an implicit metaphysical position. He either denied it or 
its importance— in any case he did not make it an object of
4
Cf. John Dewey, "Reconstruction as Seen Twenty-five 
Years Later," Introduction to the 1948 edition of Reconstruc­
tion in Philosophy. Dewey defended his position against pre­
cisely the criticism of science as evaluator of man put forth 
here. The object of philosophy is to take science to the dis­
tinctly human realm, he again asserted, and to note the de­
structive capability of science— specifically nuclear weapons—  
is no criticism of science itself, but rather of the nonscien- 
tific social institutions which have forced science to use its 
wares in a destructive manner. "The institutional conditions 
into which it enters and which determines its human conse­
quences have not as yet been subjected to any serious, system­
atic inquiry worthy of being designated scientific." (p.. xxv.)
That such human conditions as cause the destructive use of 
science are themselves available to scientific endeavor al­
ways was— and continued to be— Dewey's belief: "From the
position here taken, reconstruction can be nothing less than 
the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the lit­
eral sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities 
which will progressively direct inquiry into the deeply and 
inclusively human— that is to say. moral— facts of the present 
scene and situation." (p. xxvii.) The first step, Dewey as­
serted, in such a development, was to recognize that the pres­
ent human situation "has its origin in physical inquiry."
(p. xxviii.) Dewey concluded by once again noting the imma­
ture state of science— having still to be regarded as the 
evaluator of human processes, not merely those of the physical 
world. There simply exists no doubt in the works of John 
Dewey that science is as applicable to a human being as it is 
to any other "natural" (i.e., available fully to empirical 
methods) object. The ironic point is the question as to 
whether science itself is even finally capable of knowing 
natural objects fully, much less the full scope of human be­
ings .
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scholarly research. He did not, therefore, see the possible 
consequences of it nor did he judge its rationality or coher­
ence. He took it for granted that the world was as he found 
it, and as it made sense to him. He took the method of the 
physical world which was most explanatory and successful, and 
he dealt with the activities of the social world on this 
basis. His metaphysics lies under the givens of this posi­
tion, of the acceptance of "this world"— the empirical and 
existential conditions of the naturalistic world. The meta­
physics is there. However, the system of basic assumptions—  
the netaphysics— is inadequate insofar, at least, as it 
treats of man. The inadequate metaphysics vitiates the re­
sults of the naturalistic world view.
Dewey created and worked his instrumental philosophy 
fifty or more years without regard to the metaphysical as­
sumptions. The system adequate, of course, as it looks at 
itself, but it is not the only one looking at it. Man looks 
at it. Not in the terms of the system, but in the terms of 
man. Man does this through living the consequences of belief 
in the system, then through understanding the basis upon which 
the system is built, its metaphysics— its assumption of the 
meaning and existence of reality. Man brings his reality to 
the system, and judges the system on that basis. To allow 
the naturalistic system of Dewey to judge man on naturalistic 
assumptions may not only be inadequate, but it is to judge 
man created as posterior logically to it and not morally
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responsible for it. Rather, man brings his reality to the 
system by judging its reality, by assuming for himself the 
consequences of the theory of reality upon which naturalism 
rests. Final judgment of any system cannot be made on the 
basis of its own criterion, for that criterion is already de­
termined by the theory of reality upon which it is based.
One must judge the metaphysics of naturalism from the view­
point of a metaphysics of man. One must judge the reality of 
naturalism by its promotion or its hinderance of the reality 
of man.
This is where Dewey's theoretical system fails. Not 
because it is inadequate to its own ends— any logical system 
should be thus adequate— but because it is limited by the 
scope of its metaphysical position: in Dewey, the metaphysics
of naturalistic, biological empiricism. One does not finally 
ask how the system limits reality, but how the assumptions of 
reality limit the system.
One must then ask of the theory of reality, as pre­
cisely Dewey did not, how its reality complements the reality 
of man; that is the question of man. One asks of Dewey:
"How does the metaphysics of the position limit what I am?” 
Yet is it not a fact that Dewey's implicit metaphysics denies 
man the ability to even ask this question? If the position 
maintains, as this dissertation has described it as maintain­
ing, that the activity of man is in reaction to the reality 
posited by the naturalistic world view and is then finally
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evaluated by the empirical criteria of the naturalistic world 
view, then indeed man cannot, would not even ask the meta­
physical question. But more than that, man could not even 
create the naturalistic world view which Dewey developed!
For Dewey, one does not create reality, one reacts to it, and 
one cannot even know reality but tentatively and relatively.
The requirements of the definition of man through the 
implicit metaphysical position of Dewey are quite clear. It 
defines man as less than what one is here doing in asking 
these questions. It demands that if such questions are asked, 
they are asked by a fantasying mind. But it is not really 
the system itself which demands such a conclusion, it is the 
metaphysics of that position. The system and man within the 
system merely work with the "given" facts. And the facts of 
man and his position in the naturalistically defined world 
view are mostly "given" because the metaphysics assumed is 
so narrow. With a more adequate metaphysics, the facts which 
cannot be explained through the system and its method, and 
which are therefore attributed merely to the naturalistic 
world through faith, could be accounted for. And they proba­
bly would be accounted for through giving man more relevance 
in their creation and development.
In Dewey's philosophy it is the metaphysics which is 
inadequate for the reality which man brings to the naturalistic 
world view. It is so precisely because Dewey did not care to 
require of the metaphysics that they be adequate, only the
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system. And surely the system was adequate— adequate insofar 
as it solved the problems of the man defined by its metaphys­
ics. But real man and his problems are not there.
Thus one can act without reflection on the metaphys­
ical assumptions made by that activity. But what one does is 
strictly limited by those assumptions. Not to know what it 
is that one is limited by is to be not a self-directive, pur­
poseful human being.
It is, in fact, through a metaphysics such as Dewey 
assumed, that computer machines may be described. Computers 
are judged on their consequences, by their successful activi­
ties within the quality of the problematic situation given 
them, within the space-time world of their naturalistic en­
vironment. Thus would a computer describe itself: "Given
natural forces and objects, given natural laws of space-time, 
given the empirical world order, given a problem, given the 
tools to solve it, given a spark of electricity to shove me 
toward a conclusion, I am as valuable as my consequences, 
empirically verified. Indeed, that is what I am." But can­
not a computer grow in order to grow? Cannot a computer take 
steps as means to given ends, and given ends as means to fur­
ther steps and ends? But wherein is final purpose; wherein 
is the end-in-itself for which the computer is what it is? 
There is no such thing. Final ends are not a function of 
either the computer or the empirical environment in which it 
is constructed. But it does not follow, therefore, that
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final ends are nonexistent. To describe them as such is to 
take the world of the computer, and of the naturalistic sys- 
tme, as the world, to assume this abstraction as the final, 
real reality. To do so is to commit the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. But this is only obvious to one who views the 
limited world of the computer and the naturalistic system 
from an understanding of the theory of reality which creates 
and supports them.
Dewey demanded, though, that man had to participate 
in the ends of his activity through real purpose— unlike a 
computer— for such participation was really that which defined 
him as man. Dewey was very insistent on this point, but is 
this demand deducible from the naturalistic metaphysics? It 
is the view here that it is not. Naturalism implies, but its 
metaphysics does not account for, one very important factor: 
man— and specifically, John Dewey— who has defined naturalism 
in its very limitation, who has, in fact, himself created 
that world view which sees existence in fainlly empirical 
terms. But a creature of the naturalistic world view could 
not define his limitation. He could not feel his inadequacy 
in it. All this requires a broader stance. It requires a 
theory of reality broader than the theory of reality which 
Dewey assumed through his instrumental philosophy. And one 
of Dewey's theories of man has here been shown to require
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such a broader metaphysical b a s i s D e w e y ' s human insight, 
as is expressed in Democracy and Education, will not be forced 
into, nor can it be deduced from the explanatory scheme through 
which he defined the real world.
The problems of men is Dewey's own bete noire— his own 
final end-in-itself. This care is an arbitrary absolute, just 
like the essentials of every man's existence in the world 
through his purpose and his moral responsibility. Social and 
physical reality is_ arbitrary, not relative. The method by 
which Dewey chose to view the world is the relative considera­
tion, and as it is the relative, so it is the abstract
Cf. Gustav E. Mueller, "John Dewey's Aesthetics," in 
The John Dewey Centennial Celebration (Norman, Oklahoma, 1959), 
pp. 17-25. Professor Mueller sees the dichotomy of man in the 
aesthetics of Dewey much as this dissertation find it in the 
social and educational thought : "Let me state at the outset
my major criticism: his aesthetics is much better than his
metaphysical naturalism would permit it to be. His natural­
istic intention fails; but he is nevertheless so true to 
aesthetic experience that his metaphysical bias does not mar 
the result. He is right when he insists that the aesthetic 
function of human existence is essential and not acquired, 
primary and not secondary or artificial; but he is wrong when 
he confuses this with natural or ordinary experience, by 
which he means survival of organisms. An unavowed double 
meaning in the term "human organism"— a quaternio terminorum—  
results in an unrecognized contraduction later." (p. 20.)
That man himself stands prior to the mere reaction of the 
organism in the problematic situation also is affirmed by 
Professor Mueller: "Dewey's ambiguity, then, lies in this :
if immediate vital experience is transformed by man into the 
appearing spectacle enjoyed as the image of a concrete unity 
of opposed energies, evident to an imaginative beholder as a 
rhythmically ordered whole or as cosmos, then the human func­
tion of an aesthetic world-view making this transfiguration 
possible is already in operation and presupposed ; it is not 
derived from the immediate experience." (p. 21.)
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consideration. The concrete fact which eludes the naturalis­
tic explanatory scheme is that reality and man's real partici­
pation in it absolute and is_ arbitrary. But such is not to 
say that the world is determined. It is rather to allow man, 
his thinking, imagining and valuation, into the concrete world. 
Man should be seen as opening himself to various conditions of 
reality and thereby defining it for himself. Such an act is_ 
arbitrary, for it defines not only reality, but man himself.
It is arbitrary because it is concrete (quite contrary to 
Dewey's analysis). It is absolute because it is this, here 
and now— and not another, nor relative in its meaning to 
another. It is man, in and for himself. But to suppose that 
any absolute and arbitrary condition or situation is final in 
itself, is to close man up within that condition. It would be, 
as Dewey well noted, to break the continuity of nature, to 
fracture man from meaning in the world. Nevertheless, such a 
position does not require, as Dewey’s did, that the only non- 
relative fact is man's belief in the metaphysics of naturalism 
and its subsequent theory of relativism. It does require that 
man be defined within the fully concrete world so that the 
relations through which he comes to expand his definition of 
reality are real relations, not based on the abstract, non­
personal "common" by means of which Dewey constructed (or re­
constructed) the social group.
Dewey, in assuming a theory of man, described man's 
position within the empirical world order by construction of
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a theory of reality which presupposed just that: An empiri­
cally defined world order. But his act of choosing this par­
ticular scheme of reality was a function of his evaluative 
character prior to the position into which he defined himself 
as human being. The naturalistic world view presupposes its 
creator and his full character as a human being. Dewey's act 
of defining the world as empirical is not reducible to empiri­
cal terms. Such a criticism of Dewey's assumption that real­
ity is reducible to space-time relations alone is an act which
the metaphysics of Dewey's position cannot allow. But this 
criticism affirms the position that one is as much as his meta­
physics allows him to be. Insofar as the breadth of such a 
metaphysics is sufficiently greau, so is man. Therefore let 
it be seen that man is morally responsible for that which he 
is as well as that which he has mistakenly defined himself as 
not being. Let man define himself fully as man? let him cre­
ate no gods, especially no crippled gods under which man him­
self is crippled. Let man— not an abstract world view or its 
limited metaphysics— be the judge of reality. Let man, fi­
nally, give reality, in its absolute arbitrariness, his arbi­
tration.
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